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 “At Parnassus Investments, we follow a responsible investment approach to understand the 
full impact of a company. We carefully consider a company's environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) factors. By incorporating ESG factors into our fundamental investment 





This quote from an investment fund that explicitly practices socially responsible investment, 
or SRI, is an example of how investors nowadays are embracing this investment approach. 
SRI emerged from a faith based investment practice to evolve into a broader consideration of 
non-financial indicators that determine a firms’ impact on society and the environment 
(Renneboog et al. 2008). The remains of this faith-based approach are still present in some 
SRI labeled investment funds in the form of exclusionary investment screens.
2
 These screens 
determine the investable universe, companies that act in contradiction with the investor’s 
norms, values, beliefs, or tastes are not considered as an investment: 
 
“Parnassus Investments applies exclusionary screens to our investment universe. The spirit 
of these exclusionary screens, as described in the Funds' prospectus, is to avoid investment in 
companies with negative impacts that outweigh any potential benefits from their business 
activities. 
We do not invest in companies that derive significant revenue from the following activities: 
                                                 
1
 www.parnassus.com, retrieved early 2014. 
2
 Also refered to as “negative screens”. 
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.   Manufacture of alcohol products 
.   Manufacture of tobacco products 
.   Direct involvement with gambling 
.   Manufacture of weapons 
.   Generation of electricity from nuclear power 
.   Business involvement with Sudan 
…”. 
 
Besides this fairly simplistic form of SRI, investors use information about corporate 
social responsibility (or CSR) to make their investment decisions. Investors refer to this type 
of information as environmental, social, and governance (or ESG) information. One way to 
use this information is by applying best-in-class screening, meaning that investors consider 
only the companies with the best CSR practices (as measured by ESG information) compared 
to firms in their industry.
3
 Investment companies generally do not commit to this form of 
screening, instead they state the use of ESG information where relevant: 
 
“Parnassus Investments uses qualitative analysis of environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) factors to help determine if a company is appropriate for investment. ESG analysis 
can provide insight into a company's management, culture and competitiveness, as well as its 
impact on society. We believe that integrating ESG analysis into our investment process can 
help minimize investment risk and improve returns.”. 
 
In addition to using ESG information when investing and applying exclusionary 
investment screens, investors also engage with companies in attempts to change their 
behavior (e.g. Dimson et al. 2012).  Consider environmental externalities; engagement with 
companies to reduce these externalities can lead to a change in the company’s behavior, e.g. a 
reduction in externalities (Chava 2013). Successful engagement can even be profitable for the 
                                                 
3
 Also refered to as “postive screening”. 
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firms as well as its investors (Dimson et al. 2012). In contradiction, the screens in the 
example above are very stringent; Phillip Morris’ main products are cigarettes, therefore this 
company will not be considered as an investment as long as the tobacco exclusionary screen 
is applied. Throughout this dissertation, I will focus on SRI screens. 
 
1.1 Effects on performance: tastes vs. mispricing 
 Before I present the research of this dissertation, I will continue with a literature 
review on the current state of the SRI literature with a focus on the effects of SRI screening 
on returns of equities. Subsequently I will use this review as background for the chapters in 
this thesis. The majority of papers that look into the effects of SRI on equity returns 
hypothesize that exclusionary SRI strategies should have a negative effect on SRI portfolio 
performance whereas the use of ESG information might have a positive effect through 
increased understanding of the firm. Below I will explain these hypotheses and their 
foundations as well as the hypothesized effects on individual equities.    
Effects of tastes: According to the widely used Markowitz portfolio theory, SRI (in the form 
of restrictions on investment opportunities) should be costly because limiting the investment 
space can’t lead to better outcomes in equilibrium. The negative effects on an investment 
portfolio can come from a loss of diversification or missed investment opportunities. Chapter 
4 directly investigates tastes for SRI screens of Dutch pension fund beneficiaries. If they get 
positive utility from SRI they might even be willing to accept the hypothesized lower return 
resulting from the investment restrictions. 
Besides affecting the portfolios of investors that use SRI screens, tastes for or against 
assets has the potential to influence the portfolios of all investors. In the following I will 
provide an example applying the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), for simplicity assume 
there is one group of investors with similar tastes, one group without tastes, and rational asset 
prices. What will happen is that the group without tastes holds the optimal unconditional 
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mean variance efficient portfolio (T), the investors without tastes hold the conditionally mean 
variance efficient portfolio (D). The market portfolio (M) is the positively weighted average 
of T and D on the hyperbola connecting them, see Figure 1.1. As a result, M is generally not 
mean variance efficient and we do not get CAPM pricing. However, since all assets need to 
be held, we will get to a situation where the investors without tastes offset the holdings of the 
investors with exogenous tastes. Since the investors without tastes should deviate from the 
optimal portfolio, they want to be compensated in the form of higher expected returns (or 
lower prices) for the stocks they have to overweight. This effect can work in the opposite 
direction if a stock is very popular, driving up the price. 
The logic, even when using other asset pricing models, is that tastes can shift prices of 
securities (that are subjective to tastes) away from their “true” value as if tastes were not 
present. This happens if similar tastes influence the portfolios of a significant number of 
investors. Consequently the expected returns of those stocks can be abnormally high or low 
and this can be tested using measures of Jensen’s alpha (e.g. Fama and French 2007, Hong 
and Kacperczyck 2009).
4
 Applying this theory to the effects of exclusionary SRI screens on 
individual securities, we should see that the excluded controversial stocks trade at lower 
prices and have higher expected returns, given that similar screens are applied by a 
significant number of investors. Similarly, best-in-class screens can lead to the overweighting 
of stocks with good CSR profiles leading to higher prices and lower expected returns for 
these stocks. 
Alternative explanations for asset prices deviating from the CAPM also exist. Merton 
(1987) argues that deviations can be traced back to neglected firms having a higher perceived 
risk due to information asymmetry between investors. Using this theory, one could argue that 
investors disagree about the payoff structure instead of having tastes for or against assets. As 
                                                 
4
 See Fama and French (2007) for a more general and formal proof as well as specific situations in which 
(I)CAPM pricing holds. 
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a result, the average belief about the payoff structure can deviate from the “true” or “rational” 
one leading to irrational prices (Fama and French 2007). These alternative arguments also 
support the idea that an SRI portfolio excluding certain assets from the investment space 
performs similar to a conventional portfolio at best. 
 
Figure 1.1 The CAPM with segmented investors 
This figure shows investment opportunities for investors under the Capital Asset Pricing Model. T is the 
unrestricted mean variance efficient tangency portfolio. D is the conditional mean variance efficient portfolio for 
investors with a restricted universe. M is the market portfolio which is the weighted average of T and D. For 




















Effects of mispricing: On the other hand, the use of value relevant ESG information 
used in SRI might be overlooked by conventional investors. Meaning that the conventional 
investors do observe the costs that are immediately expensed through the income statement 
but they undervalue the benefits of ESG practices that are often intangible, difficult to 
quantify, and materialize in the long term similarly to R&D investments (Lev et al. 2005, 
Derwall et al. 2011). The idea of undervalued ESG practices can be justified by both 
instrumental stakeholder theory (e.g., Cornell and Shapiro 1987, Zingales 2000) and the 




Both theories predict that ESG practices can be value relevant. Therefore, informed 
investors who trade based on this information can reap the benefits of underpriced ESG 
practices. This can be done by identifying underpriced CSR activities of firms, make the 
investment in the firm before the market recognizes the underpricing, and finally hold on to 
the investment until the market corrects the price. Particular moments when such corrections 
take place are earnings announcements since this is when the market should recognize that 
earnings are higher than expected (Core, Guay, and Rusticus 2006, Edmans 2011). 
In line with the view that ESG practices can lead to better performance, the empirical 
literature that tests if doing well results in doing good, finds mixed results, see McWilliams 
and Siegel (2000) for a review. However, these papers cannot conclude that a causal 
relationship exists, e.g. firms with higher (anticipated) accounting profits have more 
possibilities to invest in CSR. Recent work of Jiao (2010) and Deng, Kang, and Low (2013) 
use instrumental variables and find a causal relationship of corporate social responsibility on 
                                                 
5
 In instrumental stakeholder theory, the firm is a nexus of contracts and has the function of a middleman 
between the consumer and the suppliers of inputs. Therefore the claimants of a firm are all parties with explicit 
or implicit contracts with the firm. The highest firm value is reached when those contracts are managed 
optimally. The resource-based view of the firm argues that CSR practices that are pro-active and value relevant 
can lead to a competitive advantage just as any other investment. 
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accounting profits. While Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2014) find evidence that CSR is at least 
partially explained as managerial pet projects using two quasi-experiments to control for 
causality. This evidence shows that the relationship between CSR and earnings is complex.  
 
Empirical evidence of socially responsible investment returns 
In the following I will describe studies on the returns of investments with an SRI 
dimension. Using the two effects described above I will summarize and comment on the 
findings of studies into SRI. Looking only at the effects of tastes one would predict that SRI 
yield lower returns due to increased investment restrictions while the effects of mispricing 
predict better performance conditional on CSR investments by companies being undervalued. 
I will start with an evaluation of hypothetical stock portfolios that enable me to test the 
hypotheses separately. Subsequently SRI mutual fund return studies will be evaluated. 
Effects of tastes on investment portfolios 
Putting extra constraints on a portfolio should lead to lower expected returns of this 
portfolio. A common constraint in SRI is excluding stocks that go against social norms. If 
enough investors neglect these stocks, the prices go down and the risk-adjusted returns go up 
as the investors that do invest in these stocks have a smaller investor base for risk sharing and 
thus require an extra risk premium (Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 2001). This indirect way of 
testing the effects of tastes on performance is referred to as the “shunned stock”- or 
“neglected stock” hypothesis (see e.g. Statman and Glushkov 2009). Common examples of 
such shunned assets are stocks of companies that earn revenues from the tobacco, alcohol, 
gambling, and weapons industries (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk 2009), or stocks of heavily 
polluting firms (Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 2001)
6
.  
                                                 
6
 Other related theoretical studies include Angel and Rivoli (1997), Fama and French (2007), and Gollier and 
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Empirical evidence teaches us that socially controversial stocks have either higher 
expected returns as implied by stock prices or earned higher realized returns than socially 
acceptable stocks (e.g., Fabozzi, Ma, and Oliphant (2008), Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), El 
Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra (2011), Derwall, Koedijk, and Ter Horst (2011), Chava 
(2013)). In Table 1.1 I provide an overview of studies into controversial investment returns.  
However, for social norms to affect asset prices the requirement is that enough assets 
under management are influenced by these social norms (Heinkel et al. 2001). Testing this 
requirement, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) show that institutional investors whose 
investments are influenced by social norms (including pension funds, banks, university 
endowments, employee ownership plans and others) hold fewer assets in sin stocks. In line 
with the hypothesis that sin stocks are neglected by influential investors they find that 
compared to a sample of equivalent firms without activities that go against social norms, sin 
companies are financed more with long-term debt and are covered by fewer analysts. Finally, 
the result for equity owners has been a four-factor risk-adjusted outperformance of 26 basis 
points per month for a portfolio of sin stocks minus comparables over the period 1956-2006. 
Other papers on controversial investments have found similar return effects. Kempf 
and Osthoff (2007), Statman and Glushov (2009), and Derwall et al. (2011) all report positive 
abnormal returns for a portfolio of controversial stocks based on KLD STATS’ controversial 
business indicators. Papers that do not rely on a social ratings agency used industry selection 
measures like Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). They also find statistically significant positive 
risk adjusted returns (Table 1.1). Studies specifically into international controversial stocks 
find that a portfolio of European sin stocks minus a portfolio without sin stocks yields a risk 
adjusted 4% annually over the period 1975-2006 (Salaber 2007). And broader domestic 
                                                                                                                                                        
Pouget (2012).  
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portfolios of controversial stocks, producing an average 19% annual return, outperform the 
domestic market indexes in a study that involves 21 countries (Fabozzi et al. 2008).  
However, more recent papers find that the shunned stock effect is in fact country 
specific. Durand et al. (2012) report underperformance for sin industries in 7 Pacific Basin 
markets. They use the cultural Hofstede dimension of individualism to support their argument 
that in more (less) individualistic countries, investors herd away from (towards) sin stocks 
arguably because the more individualistic investors believe they are accountable for their own 
actions. Fauver and McDonald IV (2014) separate the G20 members into “sin” and “non-sin” 
countries by measuring a social norm against sin products. This measure uses the world 
values survey, consumption data of sin products, and legal restrictions towards sin products. 
Sin stocks had abnormal returns of 1-2% annually over the 1995 to 2009 period only in 
countries that view these products as sinful compared to other countries. In addition, they find 
that the sin stock premium only stays in existence over time when there are barriers to capital 
and language. These barriers ensure that not enough arbitrage capital enters those markets to 
offset the shunned stock effect.  
A recent addition to the empirical literature on controversial investment returns is on 
environmental concerns, Chava (2013) reports that the shunned stock effect can also be 
applied to stocks with environmental concerns like pollution or extreme greenhouse gas 
emissions. He uses the internal cost of capital method of Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 
(2001) to estimate the cost of equity capital and the cost of debt capital. Both measures are 
affected by the environmental profile of the firm. Firms with more environmental concerns 
have higher cost of equity and debt capital while firms with more strength indicators only 
have cheaper debt financing. The results support the story that the financial market is able, at 
least to some extent, to let firms pay for their environmental externalities. The difference with 
19 
 
the sin industries is that firms can change their environmental profile while staying in the 
same line of business. 
In contrast to the previously discussed studies that look at neglect of stocks, Galema et 
al. (2008) directly test the hypothesis that CSR of firms affect the demand for their stocks 
leading to higher prices for responsible firms. Therefore, the book to market value is affected 
by CSR scores which lead to the HML factor (based on book to market values) included in 
most SRI performance studies picking up at least part of the return effects that stem from 
demand driven effects. El Ghoul et al. (2011) also test the hypothesis that market values are 
affected by demand for social responsibility. They find that companies with relatively high 
STATS scores (especially Employee relations, Environmental policies, and Product safety) 
have a lower ex ante cost of equity capital (in other words, these stocks trade at higher prices). 
In line with the studies on controversial stocks, they report a higher cost of equity financing 
for Tobacco and Nuclear energy firms. 
 
Table 1.1 Studies on the performance of controversial stocks 
This table is taken from Derwall et al. (2011), slightly modified and extended with more recent studies. 
“Sin” is an acronym for Alcohol, Gambling, and Tobacco.  
Study Region and period Sin Weapons Nucl. Biotech Adult Env. Con. Alpha 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) US 1926-2006 X X 
    
Positive 
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) US 1991-2004 X X X 
   
Positive (NS) 
Statman and Glushkov (2009) US 1991-2007 X X X 
   
Positive (NS) 
Derwall et al. (2011) US 1992-2008 X X X 
   
Positive 
Salaber (2007) Europe 1975-2006 X 
     
Positive 
Fabozzi et al. (2008) 21 Countries 1970-2007 X X X X X 
 
Positive 
Visaltanachoti et al. (2009) China 1975-2006 X 
     
Positive 
Liston and Soydemir (2010) US 2000-2007 X 
     
Positive 
Fauver and McDonald IV (2014) 19 Countries 1995-2009 X 
     
Positive* 
Kim and Venkatachalam (2011) US 1988-2006 X 




Lobe and Walkshausl (2011) 51 countries 1995-2007 X X X X X 
 
Neutral 
Durand et al. (2012) Pacific Basin 1990-2009 X X 
    
Negative 
Chava (2013) US 1992-2007 
     
X Positive 
                  





The effects of tastes described above are at the stock level. Another strand of literature 
looks into the effects of screens on portfolio performance. Hertzel et al. (2012) show that the 
effects on performance are limited, only when the restrictions on the investable universe 
become very severe (at least a 30% reduction) do they find significantly negative effects on 
performance in some cases depending on the screening criteria. Boudt et al. (2013) show that 
SRI screens theoretically lead to the investor being unable to reach all parts of the 
unconstrained efficient frontier. However, in their empirical tests the results are generally not 
statistically significant. Another optimization test using mutual fund returns concludes that 
investing only in SRI mutual funds can have a negative effect on performance depending on 
the investment beliefs of the investor (Geczy et al. 2006).
7
  
Summarizing, according to theory excluding stocks from the investable universe 
should lead to negative effects on the investment portfolio and if enough investors exclude 
certain stocks it can have effects on the cost of equity capital for the excluded companies. 
Empirical studies have found that indeed stock boycotts lead to firms having a higher cost of 
equity capital and consequently produce higher risk adjusted returns. The effects differ 
between regions and the type of business the company operates in as believes about what is 
controversial differs between regions, time periods, and other factors. The effects of tastes 
also work in the opposite direction leading to a lower cost of equity capital for firms with 
good CSR profiles that manifest itself through higher ESG indicators. This lower cost of 
equity capital should lead to these firms having lower expected stock returns. Although there 
is evidence on individual stocks and stock classes (e.g. sin stocks) there is little evidence on 
the effects of tastes on investment portfolios. In Chapter 3 I will investigate to what extent 
                                                 
7
 For an investor who believes in the CAPM and not in fund manager skill the cost of the SRI constraint is just a 
few basis points per month as measured in certainty equivalent loss. While an investor who believes in a 
multifactor asset-pricing model and allows for manager skill loses at least 30 basis points per month. These 
findings can be explained by the fact that less stocks are needed to mimic the optimal CAPM portfolio 
compared to a mean variance optimal multifactor asset pricing model portfolio. 
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SRI related tastes affect the portfolios of all US equity mutual funds and subsequently report 
on the performance effects of tastes as measured by exposures to for instance firms with very 
good/bad CSR profiles.  
 
Effects of mispricing on investment portfolios 
So far I have discussed the effects of tastes on returns of individual companies as well 
as the effects on investment portfolios all of which predict negative effects for SRI portfolios. 
However, integrating ESG information in the investment process can enhance returns through 
a better understanding of firm performance. If ESG information is relevant for firm valuation 
and the market ignores or doesn’t correctly price this information, the investors that do take 
this information into account can outperform the market. In line with this hypothesis 
researchers have reported positive risk adjusted returns for portfolios of equities selected 
using ESG information from different data sources. The first study forming portfolios on 
environmental (E) information finds that an industry adjusted portfolio long “eco-efficient” 
firms and short less “eco-efficient” firms by 4.15% a year from 1995 to 2003. Studies that 
followed used different datasets and a different time span enabling them to form portfolios 
based on other characteristics and to check the robustness of the Derwall et al (2005) study. 
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) also report performance differences between portfolios of stocks 
with high- minus low ESG scores formed using the KLD STATS data from 1992 to 2004. 
They report statistically significant risk-adjusted outperformance for the portfolios formed 
using Community, Employee relations, and Diversity (S) indicators separately. Furthermore, 
they find that more restrictive best-in-class screening (adjusting the firm specific scores for 
the respective industries) leads to the highest alpha. Their combination portfolios that apply 
multiple screens and vary in intensity (Top vs. Bottom 5%, 10%, and 25%) yield abnormal 
returns ranging from 3.6% to 8.7% annually. Statman and Glushkov (2009) use similar data, 
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however they exclude all firms that do not receive a single indicator in the KLD STATS 
database because of the possibility that KLD did not consider these firms in their rankings. 
From their paper I want to highlight that again only particular screens lead to abnormal 
performance as well as the overall strategy (long (short) in stocks with high (low) aggregated 
ratings)  yielding an annual value (equal) weighted four-factor alpha of 5.0% (5.5%).  
These performance studies base their hypothesis for outperformance on mispricing. 
Nevertheless, their focus on portfolio returns is merely an indirect way to test for mispriced 
information, demand effects also have the potential to temporarily drive up stock prices 
leading to abnormally high returns. A more recent study by Edmans (2011) does perform 
direct mispricing tests using Forbes’ list of “Best companies to work for” between 1984 and 
2009. He finds that stocks of the best companies to work for have higher risk adjusted stock 
returns (a value weighted portfolio earns a 3.5% four factor alpha annually), higher earnings 
announcement returns, and higher analyst forecast errors than other stocks.  
In this dissertation I focus on the effects of Environmental and Social performance 
indicators, though a third dimension often considered in SRI is Governance, hence the ESG 
acronym. Gompers et al. (2001) formed portfolios based on their G-index (higher score 
means lower shareholder rights), created using governance indicators. These portfolios are 
long (short) stocks of firms with the strongest (weakest) shareholder rights and yielded an 8.5% 
annual alpha during the 1990’s. Subsequently, Core et al. (2006) tested the effect of the G-
index on accounting returns and if this effect was not well recognized by the market, they 
found the G-index to be negatively related to ROA, stock returns, earnings announcement 
returns, and analyst forecast errors thus supporting their argument of mispriced information. 
These results are confirmed by Bebchuk et al (2009) who create an entrenchment index (E-
index) that uses only the most relevant governance indicators. 
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However, if mispriced ESG information exists, it should eventually be corrected for 
when the market recognizes the benefits of for instance the CSR investments by firms. This 
will not happen overnight but is more likely a gradual learning process. Bebchuk et al. (2013) 
show that the market learned to correctly price governance information somewhere around 
2001 after an increased supply of governance information in for instance academic and news 
articles. Although governance was at first significantly related to abnormal stock returns, 
earnings announcement returns, and analyst forecast errors, these relationships decreased to 
become statistically and economically insignificant after this flow of information. In Chapter 
2, I test if environmental and social information is or has been mispriced by the market by 
performing mispricing tests as in Core et al. 2006. I also test for the possibility that the 
market has learned about ESG information. 
In sum, there is empirical evidence that supports the positive effects on performance 
of mispriced ESG information, some of it direct although mostly indirect. Over different 
timespans and using different screening methods, researchers have shown that portfolios of 
stocks selected using ESG information can generate abnormally high risk-adjusted returns. 
However, even if ESG information is mispriced and an investor can benefit from this 
information, this benefit should eventually cease to exist as the market learns to correctly 
price this information. With this notion I make the bridge to the fifth Chapter of this 
dissertation. Reaping the benefits from SRI implies having a long investment horizon since 
learning does generally not happen overnight, and the investment universe is smaller 
resulting in less alternative investment opportunities. In Chapter 5 I test if institutions with 
tastes against controversial assets respond differently to permanent (cash flow) news as 





Summary of the papers in the dissertation. 
In Chapter 2 I present a paper on the mispricing of stakeholder relations information 
in stock prices. This paper adds to the literature that tries to understand if trading based on 
stakeholder related information is profitable. In Chapters 3 and 4 I look at the effects of the 
values based SR investment style by analyzing the effects of excluding controversial stocks 
from investment portfolios of mutual funds (Chapter 3). And investigate the social and 
environmental investment preferences of Dutch pension fund participants as well as the 
consequences of offering customized investments to pension beneficiaries (Chapter 4). 
Finally, I analyze how preferences against assets with environmental and social controversies 
translate into trading behavior of institutional investors. Chapters 2 and 3 are joint work with 
my supervisors Jeroen Derwall, Kees Koedijk and Jenke Ter Horst. The fourth Chapter is 
with Rachel Pownall. And the fifth Chapter is with Jeroen Derwall, Nadja Guenster and 
Paulo Rodriguez. 
 
2. Stakeholder relations and stock returns: on errors in investors’ expectations and learning  
 In Chapter 2 we analyze stakeholder relations and stock returns because a significant 
number of institutional investors publicly state the belief that corporate stakeholder relations 
are associated with firm value in a manner that the financial market fails to understand. We 
investigate whether stakeholder information predicted risk-adjusted returns due to errors in 
investors’ expectations. However, if this relationship exists, it should ultimately cease to do 
so when attention for such information increases. We build a stakeholder-relations index (SI) 
for a wide range of U.S. firms over the period 1992-2009 and provide evidence that the SI 
explained errors in investors’ expectations about firms’ future earnings. Then we apply a 
Quandt (1960) breakpoint analysis on stock returns of SI based investment portfolios to 
identify a point in time after which the market learned to correctly price stakeholder relations. 
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We find that this breakpoint is around the first quarter of 2004 and assure it is in line with the 
availability of information on stakeholder related business practices measured by shareholder 
proposals filed on stakeholder related issues and the number of firms issuing stand alone CSR 
reports.  
We find that the SI was positively associated with long-term risk-adjusted returns over 
the period 1992-2004. Straightforward and naïve trading strategies generate risk adjusted 
abnormal returns of 3.5 to 5.5% annually. While similar equity portfolios lead to non 
significant abnormal returns over the period thereafter. Since abnormal performance might 
also stem from other factors than errors in investors’ expectations we show in explicit 
mispricing tests that the SI was positively related to earnings announcement returns and 
errors in analysts’ earnings forecasts over the period 1992-2004. However, as attention for 
stakeholder issues became more widespread, subsequently, these relationships diminished 
considerably. These results are consistent with the idea that increased investor attention for 
stakeholder issues eventually eliminates mispricing. Therefore, investors cannot justify using 
stakeholder related information as a source of sustainable outperformance. 
 
3. Can investors profit from social tastes? Evidence from mutual fund holdings 
When tastes affect investment decisions of a significant number of investors they have 
the potential to affect asset prices and consequently also expected returns (Fama and French 
2007). In this paper we evaluate whether tastes for socially sensitive stocks affect holdings of 
US equity mutual funds. We start with a comparison of socially responsible investment funds 
to conventional funds and document on the existence of conventional funds that have “more 
socially responsible” holdings than SRI labeled funds. More specifically, we find that on 
average SRI funds behave “more” socially responsible, yet in a more in depth comparison we 
find that 10% to 30% of all US equity mutual funds is less (more) exposed to controversial 
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firms or firms with many ESG concerns (strengths).  
Subsequently we analyze whether these exposures to socially sensitive stocks affect 
mutual fund performance. Our findings indicate that especially investments in Tobacco, 
Alcohol, and Gambling stocks have the potential to positively affect risk-adjusted fund 
returns, while exposures to the most socially responsible firms negatively affect performance. 
This potential is not fully exploited by the mutual funds in our sample as they hold diversified 
portfolios resulting in small exposure differences between funds. These small exposure 
differences also explain why the literature has generally found no performance differences 
between SRI labeled and conventional funds. Based on our main findings we advice the use 
of holdings based analyses when investigating the effects of social tastes on investment 
portfolios. 
  
4. Attitudes towards socially and environmentally responsible investment 
In the 4
th
 Chapter we look at SR investing from a different angle than the previous 
two Chapters that investigate returns. The Chapter adds to the question on how financial 
institutions can serve their clients with SR investment products. We take a deeper look into 
pension investment products that have the potential to suit individuals’ social norms. This is 
important since institutional investors invest billions of dollars on behalf of investors whilst 
knowing little about investors’ social preferences.  
Motivated by risk adjusted returns, legislative difficulties and evidence of financial 
illiteracy on a large scale, pension funds do not provide differentiated funds to meet the 
values based investment style which beneficiaries desire. Using data from a customized wave 
of the Dutch CentERdata panel for citizens who are required to participate in a pension plan, 
we find significant variation in stated preferences towards proposed social investment screens. 
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Subsequently we show that although individuals are able to express their preferences towards 
social investment criteria they are not able to translate these values into investment decisions 
consistently. This is partially driven by the low financial sophistication of households. Finally, 
to emphasize the importance of these findings we show that the majority of beneficiaries 
derive positive utility from environmental and social pension investment screens and that 
expressing a preference towards screened pension investments is the most important driver of 
this effect.  
Important policy implications follow from this Chapter. First of all we show that 
pension fund participants on average care about how their money is invested. Furthermore, 
they can have contradictive preferences; therefore, some form of customization can be utility 
enhancing. However, giving beneficiaries any freedom of social and environmental choice 
that at the same time has a financial impact is not a feasible solution. 
 
5. Values and investments: Evidence from institutional trading responses to news components 
The 5
th
 and final Chapter reports on an analysis of how institutions trade on different 
kinds of information about the firms they invest in. We know from the literature that norms 
and values driven investment styles lead to investment exclusion of firms that operate in 
controversial business areas or firms with environmental controversies (e.g. Heinkel et al. 
2001, and Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). The literature has linked these exclusions to norms 
and values driven investment styles (see Hong and Kacperczyk 2009, and Hong and 
Kostovetsky 2012). In this Chapter we use the holdings of financial institutions to identify 
socially conscious investors, those with relatively low investments in assets with social 
controversies. We argue that social preferences do not only manifest itself as controversy 
avoidance in the stock selection process but also influence the investment decisions for all 
stocks in the portfolio on average. In line with the United Nations-backed Principles for 
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Responsible Investment and Nevins, Bearden and Money (2007) we argue that socially 
conscious investors are more long term oriented and are therefore less responsive to stock 
return news that is not related to firm fundamentals.     
To test these predictions we use a vector autoregression (VAR) to separate returns 
into a cash-flow news- and an expected return news component following Vuoltheenaho 
(2002). We add institutional ownership data to the VAR as in Cohen et al. (2002) and 
separate institutional ownership into socially conscious institutional ownership and 
conventional institutional ownership. This enables us to observe if socially conscious 
institutions trade differently than do conventional institutions given news events occur. 
Our findings indicate that socially conscious investors respond significantly less to 
expected return (non-persistent) news while these investors respond stronger to cash-flow 
(persistent) news. This evidence is in line with the view that social values do not only 
influence tastes against stocks with social controversies but also the investment decisions for 












“… we believe that, in the long run, an investment approach that identifies and invests in 
companies with sustainable business models serves shareholders best. Towards that end, we 
have developed a process that combines thorough financial analysis with another, critically 





Financial institutions spend considerable time aligning their investment goals with the well-
being of non-financial stakeholders and the community at large, by integrating environmental, 
social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria with their investment decisions. Almost all 
institutions publicly justify those investments based on the argument that ESG information 
positively contributes to their investment performance. For example, more than 850 
institutional investors worldwide, representing about $25 trillion assets under management, 
are signatories of the United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investing (PRI). 
According to PRI, institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to act in the long-term 
interests of beneficiaries, and ESG factors are relevant in this context because of their effect 
on the performance of investment portfolios.
10
 Many of these investors are enamored with the 
                                                 
8
 This Chapter also circulates as Borgers, Derwall, Koedijk, Ter Horst (2013). 
9
 http://www.paxworld.com/investment-approach/ (retrieved in 2010)  
10
 See for example http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/the-six-principles/ 
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idea that when firms improve their stakeholder relations they create intangible long-run 
economic benefits that are neither adequately reflected in firms’ financial statements nor 
properly valued by the capital market.   
This performance-oriented motivation for integrating stakeholder information into 
investments is nevertheless ambitious and remarkable. The notion that such information 
provides investors with a long-term competitive advantage goes against conventional 
economic wisdom and a large body of empirical evidence that active investors fail to beat the 
market consistently (e.g., Carhart 1997).
11
 Even if better stakeholder relations are associated 
with higher future earnings in a manner that the market has not properly understood, 
economic logic predicts that such information provides investors with a competitive 
advantage in the short-run, but not in the long-run. Both theory and empirical evidence 
indicate that the documentation of profitable investment opportunities attracts investor 
attention and eventually contributes to market efficiency (e.g. Schwert 2003, Chordia, 
Subrahmanyam, and Tong 2012, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang 2013). Superior risk-adjusted 
returns that investors can earn by exploiting “mispriced” information, if any, should 
eventually cease to exist as the capital market learns and understands the earnings 
implications of this information.  
This paper provides evidence that the quality of stakeholder relations originally did 
convey information about future risk-adjusted returns due to errors in investors’ expectations, 
but less so as soon as the capital market paid more attention to stakeholder issues. The 
evidence on expectational errors is based on three common analyses that are considered 
complements in empirical studies on stock market anomalies (see Core, Guay, and Rusticus 
(2006); Edmans (2011); Bebchuk et al. (2013)). We first construct an annual stakeholder-
                                                 
11
 Moreover, equilibrium models of asset prices predict that firms with strong stakeholder relations may even 
have lower expected returns if socially responsible investors drive up their stock prices (see, Heinkel, Kraus, and 
Zechner 2001, Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). 
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relations index (SI) for U.S. firms and then estimate risk-adjusted returns on stock portfolios 
that are formed using the SI over the period 1992-2009. We subsequently investigate whether 
stakeholder information predicts future earnings announcement returns. We complement 
these studies with an analysis of the association between stakeholder relations and errors in 
analysts’ forecasts of firms’ long-term earnings growth.  
While our analyses suggest that stakeholder information was associated with risk-
adjusted returns because of unexpected earnings, they also point out that evidence of errors in 
investors’ expectations has weakened in recent times. While the SI positively related to risk-
adjusted portfolio returns, earnings announcement returns, and analysts’ long-term forecast 
errors over the period 1992-2004, these relationships diminished once stakeholder issues 
arguably attracted substantially greater attention in the capital market.  
The conclusion that follows from the analyses is consistent with the learning hypothesis 
of Bebchuk et al. (2013), and has implications for those institutional investors that pursue 
both financial and social goals. On the one hand, the results imply that a performance-
oriented investment case for integrating stakeholder issues in investment decisions has 
weaker empirical foundations than before, at least when it leans on easily obtainable 
information and rather elementary trading rules. But the conclusion that stakeholder 
management nowadays does not contribute to errors in expectations incentivizes company 
managers to place stakeholder issues higher on the corporate agenda. The results also expand 
on those studies on socially responsible investing (SRI) that present evidence to support the 
notion that certain stakeholder information is mispriced.
12
 Especially Edmans (2011) presents 
comprehensive evidence that the stock market does not entirely value the intangible assets 
that companies create through strong relations with their employees.  Our results suggest that 
                                                 
12
  See Derwall, Guenster, Bauer, and Koedijk (2005), Kempf and Osthoff (2007), Galema, Plantinga, and 
Scholtens (2008), Statman and Glushkov (2009), Edmans (2011), Derwall, Koedijk, and Ter Horst (2011). 
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such “mispricing” has diminished over time as the capital market eventually learned about 
the implications of stakeholder relations for corporate valuation. 
This study proceeds as follows. The theoretical foundations of this study are discussed in 
Section 2.2 of the Chapter. Section 2.3 describes the data and variables that we use to 
measure the quality of stakeholder relations. Section 2.4 covers the main empirical analyses, 
and Section 2.5 discusses additional tests. Section 2.6 concludes this study. 
 
2.2. Theoretical background 
 
The idea that firms with better stakeholder relations have higher future earnings can be 
justified by both instrumental stakeholder theory (e.g. Cornell and Shapiro 1987, Zingales 
2000) and the resource based-view of the firm (e.g. Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1991, Hart 1995, 
Russo and Fouts 1997). That these advantages are often intangible, not readily quantifiable, 
and materialize in the long-term provides investors in search of underpriced assets with one 
argument for integrating stakeholder information into investment decisions. Several 
institutional investors, such as various signatories of PRI, contend that financial markets do 
not appreciate these intangibles. For example, the Enhanced Analytics Initiative (EAI) is an 
investor initiative (now merged with PRI) that incentivizes analysts to routinely consider so-
called “extra-financial information”, so that their investment recommendations are improved 
(O’Loughlin and Thamotheram 2006). According to EAI, extra-financial factors are “those 
which are likely to have at least a long-term effect on business results but which seldom get 
integrated into investment decisions…“, ranging from “corporate governance and executive 
remuneration, to occupational health and safety and human capital practices, and to the 




Whether such factors reflect intangibles that are not properly reflected in stock prices has 
also attracted considerable attention in empirical studies over the last years. On the academic 
front, several relatively recent studies have suggested that stocks of companies with better 
stakeholder relations have produced anomalously positive average returns in the U.S. stock 
market. See, for example, Derwall et al. 2005; Kempf and Osthoff 2007; Statman and 
Glushkov 2009, Edmans 2011; Derwall et al. 2011. In particular Edmans (2011) showed that 
companies with stronger employee satisfaction not only had higher risk-adjusted returns in 
the stock market but also exhibited both higher earnings announcement returns and higher 
long-term earnings surprises.   
As Derwall, Koedijk and Ter Horst (2011) point out, if these findings indeed reflect 
mispricing, then it is questionable that they will persist in the long run. Standard economic 
theory predicts that mispriced information eventually disappears as investors learn about the 
anomaly. Prior studies provide evidence that many widely publicized anomaly variables were 
able to predict stock returns during the sample period in which they were first identified, but 
less so after their discovery (e.g. Schwert 2003, Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong 2012). 
There are at least two reasons to expect that the capital market has come to better understand 
the value-relevance of corporate stakeholder relations. 
First, anecdotal evidence points out that investor attention for stakeholder issues has 
risen substantially in recent years. Industry surveys consistently conclude that the amount of 
assets managed by institutional investors that integrate so-called environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) issues has grown considerably over the last decade. For example, 
according to the U.S. social investment forum (2010), about 55 mutual funds (representing 
US$ 12 billion under management) integrated ESG factors into investment choices in 1995, 
while almost 500 funds with US$ 569 billion under management employed such investment 
criteria in 2010. Outside the U.S., several investor initiatives, such as EAI in 2004 and PRI in 
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2006 contributed to the worldwide mainstreaming of ESG, encouraging mainstream investors 
to routinely integrate stakeholder issues with investment decisions.
13
  
Second, in a closely related study, Bebchuk et al. (2013) show that the corporate 
governance index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) originally related significantly to 
risk-adjusted stock returns, analysts’ earnings forecast errors, and abnormal earnings 
announcement returns—but not after 2001, when governance issues attracted structurally 
greater attention among financial media, academic studies, and shareholder proposals issued 
by institutional investors. Consequently, they conclude that investors learned about the 
association between governance indexes and firms’ profitability as a result of this heightened 
attention for corporate governance. The conclusion of Bebchuk et al. (2013) has potentially 
important implications for our study because many investors learn about the value-relevance 
of governance issues in tandem with stakeholder issues, in particular via the ESG acronym.  
In summary, the growth of investors who employ corporate stakeholder information for 
pursuing the goal of superior returns raises two empirical questions. The first question 
addressed in this paper is whether there is justification for the belief that errors in 
expectations causes firms’ stock returns to be associated with the quality of stakeholder 
relations (“the errors-in-expectations hypothesis”). If so, the natural follow-up question is 
whether risk-adjusted stock returns stemming from errors in investors’ expectations 
eventually cease to exist following investors’ heightened attention for stakeholder 
information, in the spirit of the “learning hypothesis” of Bebchuk et al. (2013). The goal of 
                                                 
13
 The “ESG” acronym became widespread due to summits involving large investment companies, and is an 
explicit outcome of investors seeking to “mainstream” the use of stakeholder information by the investment 
community. For a review of alternative terminologies, see also Bessire and Onnée (2010). 
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this study is to investigate whether both hypotheses find support in analyses of risk-adjusted 




2.3. Evaluating corporate stakeholder relations 
 
We annually evaluate firms’ stakeholder relations using the STATS database from Kinder, 
Lydenberg and Domini and co. (KLD), which is the longest-running source of stakeholder 
information and used extensively by investors. STATS summarizes this information for 
mostly Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 constituents as of 1991, the 1,000 largest publicly 
traded U.S. companies from 2001 to 2002, and the 3,000 largest publicly traded U.S. 
companies every year thereafter.  
KLD specializes in evaluating firms regarding issues such as environmental 
performance (e.g. hazardous waste, regulatory problems, emissions and pollution prevention, 
and environmental management systems), community involvement (e.g. charitable and 
innovative giving, support for housing and education, and volunteer programs), diversity (e.g. 
women on the board of directors, CEO gender, the promotion or contracting of women and 
minorities, and work/life benefits), employee relations (e.g. workplace health and safety 
issues, workforce reductions, retirement benefits, worker involvement programs, and union 
relations), product quality (e.g. marketing-contracting concerns, product safety, and benefits 
to the economically disadvantaged), and human rights issues.
15
 For each category, KLD 
                                                 
14
 In principle, heightened attention may also affect the demand for specific stocks, which may influence their 
returns. Edmans (2011) investigates whether increased demand for stocks of America’s Best Companies to 
Work For explains these stocks’ positive risk-adjusted returns, for which he finds little evidence.   
15
 We adjusted the diversity measure to correct for KLD’s overweighting of issues related to female 
representation by setting a maximum of 1 to the sum of all diversity issues related to female representation. 
36 
 
subjects every firm to a number of “strengths” and “concerns” indicators, with “1” (“0”) 
indicating the presence (absence) of a strength or concern.
16
  
For every firm we develop an aggregate stakeholder-relations index (henceforth, SI) 
on a yearly basis, using the strengths and concerns indicators from KLD. To construct the SI, 
we follow the common practice of adding all strengths and subtracting all concerns in a given 
year (see, e.g, Hong and Kostovetsky (2010) and Jiao (2010)). We omit from this procedure 
the indicators of human rights issues, because KLD did not cover these issues consistently 
throughout the sample period. Moreover, we industry adjust these scores by subtracting the 
mean score within an industry from the firms’ score.
17  
From a statistical standpoint, the aggregate of the individual indicators has the most 
desirable distributional characteristics compared to disaggregate measures. For example, 
around 80 percent of all firm-year observations do not experience a single strength or concern 
in the areas of community involvement or environment, whereas this occurs only in 14 
percent of the cases when all stakeholder categories are aggregated. Therefore, undesirable 
distributional features makes the use of too disaggregate measures problematic in common 
tests of errors in expectations.   
Panel A in Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the SI. The SI has a mean of zero 
and has a standard deviation of 1.68. Panel B reports correlations between the SI and a 
number of elementary financial variables based on data from Compustat, which creates a 
basic impression of the financial characteristics of firms with stronger stakeholder relations 
relative to those with weaker relations. These basic statistics support the popular belief that 
firms with better stakeholder relations tend to have larger accounting profits (e.g. Russo and 
                                                 
16
 Next to covering these strengths and concerns indicators, KLD offers a separate analysis of firms’ 
involvement in controversial sectors, specifically, alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power, and 
tobacco. 
17 We use the Fama French 10 industry definition to have sufficient within industry variation. 
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Fouts 1997, King and Lenox 2002, Jiao 2010), higher price-to-book ratios (Galema et al. 
2008), and lower leverage ratios (Verwijmeren and Derwall 2010, Bae, Kang, and Wang 
2011). Whether the SI is also associated with higher risk-adjusted returns in the stock market 




Table 2.1 Summary statistics and correlations  
Reported are descriptive statistics on the SI (Panel A), and pairwise correlations between the SI and several firm 
characteristics (Panel B). Reported in parentheses are the involved numbers of observations. Return on assets 
(ROA) is defined as the ratio of operating income (after depreciation and amortization) divided by total assets, 
the book-to-market equity defined as the book value of equity plus book value of deferred taxes divided by the 
market value of equity (common shares outstanding * share price at the end of the fiscal period). Leverage as 
long-term debt to total assets. 
Panel A: Distributional characteristics of the SI 
  Variable Obs. Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
      SI 22792 0.00 1.68 -9.28 9.18 
            
      Panel B: Correlation between the SI and firm characteristics   
  ROA Log Book/market  Log assets Leverage 1-yr Sales growth 
      SI 0.038 -0.101 -0.079 -0.082 0.017 
 
(22792) (22133) (22512) (22792) (22390) 
            
 
 
2.4. Empirical analysis 
 
We present three complementary analyses of errors in investors’ expectations that are 
common in studies on stock market anomalies. The first analysis revolves around risk-
adjusted returns on investment portfolios that are formed based on the SI. The second 
analysis focuses on stock returns around firms’ earnings announcements. The third analysis 




2.4.1. Portfolios and decreasing risk-adjusted returns 
 
Our empirical analysis starts with an evaluation of the returns on stock portfolios that are 
formed using the SI. Our primary objectives in this Section of the study are to investigate (i) 
whether portfolios composed of stocks that ranked high on the SI earned a significantly 
higher risk-adjusted return than those that score lower on the SI, and if so, (ii) whether the 
difference in risk-adjusted return eventually diminished once investors paid more attention to 
stakeholder information.  
Every year, starting in April 1992, we rank all available stocks on the SI, and then 
allocate those stocks that rank above a specific upper threshold level to a top-ranked portfolio 
and those that rank below a bottom threshold level to the bottom-ranked portfolio.
18
 We 
exclude from the portfolio construction those stocks that belong to KLD’s list of 
controversial businesses, because prior research explicitly attributes their returns to risk 
premiums instead of errors in expectations (see Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)). Using the 
CRSP returns database, we compute the monthly returns on the portfolios during the twelve 
consecutive months after formation until the portfolios are updated based on the latest SI 
values, and we subsequently evaluate the time-series of portfolio returns over the period April 
1992-December 2009.  
 Following previous studies that document significant risk-adjusted returns associated 
with the quality of corporate stakeholder relations, we derive risk-adjusted returns from the 




   (2.1) 
                                                 
18 The starting year in the KLD STATS database is 1991, but KLD usually releases its statistics in the first quarter of the 
subsequent year. 




where is the return on a portfolio that is formed based on the SI, is the return 
on a portfolio composed of all stocks from the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq exchanges minus the 
one-month T-Bill rate from Ibbotson Associates, SMBt is the return difference between a 
small cap portfolio and a large cap portfolio, HMLt
 
is the return difference between a “value” 
portfolio (with a high book/market value ratio) and a growth (low book/market value) 
portfolio, UMDt is the return difference between a portfolio of the past 12-month return 
winners and a portfolio of the past 12-month losers.
 
 A large amount of literature consistently 
points out that the four factors, which are taken from the Kenneth French Data Library, are 




Table 2.2 shows average risk-adjusted returns and four-factor factor loadings 
measured over the entire sample period (April 1992-December 2009) for a number of 
portfolios that are formed using the SI. The regression parameters are largely consistent with 
earlier studies that have documented risk-adjusted returns associated with several of KLD’s 
indicators. A portfolio composed of either the top third, or top fourth, or top fifth of all stocks 
ranked by the SI earned a higher average annualized risk-adjusted return than its bottom-
ranked counterpart. The performance difference is economically significant, and in two of the 
three reported cases statistically significant at the conventional levels of significance. Table 
2.2 also shows that much of the performance difference between the top-ranked and bottom-
ranked portfolios is largely due to positive risk-adjusted returns of top-ranked portfolios. The 
risk-adjusted return on bottom-ranked portfolios are not significantly different from zero.  
                                                 
19 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. See Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
for details on the construction of the four factors.  
tiR , tftm RR ,, 
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We now turn to time variation in the risk-adjusted return on portfolios formed using 
the SI. A visual inspection of rolling-window regressions involving specification (2.1) 
provides the first indication that risk-adjusted returns on portfolios constructed using the SI 
have weakened over time. Figure 2.1 shows that the equal-weighted risk-adjusted return on a 
portfolio that is long in the top one-third of stocks and short in the bottom-third was 
persistently positive for a substantial number of years but eventually decreased considerably.   
 
Table 2.2 Risk-Adjusted returns over 1992-2009  
Every year, starting in April 1992, we rank stocks based on the SI and assign the top (bottom) third, fourth, or 
fifth of all ranked stocks to a top-ranked (bottom-ranked) portfolio. We run Carhart (1997) four-factor 
regressions to estimate risk-adjusted portfolio returns over the period April 1992-December 2009. Reported are 
annualized risk-adjusted returns and factor exposures for equal-weighted portfolios.  
  Alpha Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD R2 
Top-minus-bottom third 
      Top 2.46%** 1.03*** 0.21*** 0.44*** -0.17*** 0.94 
 
(2.27) (41.84) (4.89) (11.70) (-8.24) 
 Bottom 0.89% 1.07*** 0.24 0.45*** -0.23*** 0.91 
 
(0.60) (33.43) (5.09) (6.56) (-7.46) 
 Top-minus-bottom 1.57% -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.06** 0.08 
 




     Top-minus-bottom  fourth 
      Top 3.22%** 1.03*** 0.16*** 0.46*** -0.18*** 0.91 
 
(2.36) (33.10) (2.89) (10.16) (-5.61) 
Bottom -0.30% 1.07*** 0.21*** 0.51*** -0.21*** 0.91 
 
(-0.21) (36.28) (4.45) (8.61) (-6.99) 
Top-minus-bottom 3.52%*** -0.04 -0.06* -0.05 0.04 0.06 
 
(2.75) (-1.48) (-1.71) (-1.01) (1.16) 
 
       Top-minus-bottom fifth 
      Top 2.99%** 1.02*** 0.16*** 0.49*** -0.16*** 0.91 
 
(2.13) (32.87) (2.98) (11.22) (-4.81) 
Bottom 0.10% 1.04*** 0.22*** 0.49*** -0.23*** 0.90 
 
(0.06) (31.82) (4.74) (7.23) (-6.87) 
Top-minus-bottom 2.89%* -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.07 0.06 





Figure 2.1 year-by-year difference in risk-adjusted return between top- and bottom-
ranked portfolios 
Every year, we perform Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions using monthly return differences over the last 4-
years between the portfolio composed of the top third of stocks ranked on the stakeholder relations index and 
the bottom-ranked counterpart. Reported are the annualized yearly risk-adjusted returns derived from equal-
weighted portfolios ending in March of the year (except for 2009* which ends in December). The stakeholder-
relations index SI is based on the sum of all strengths a firm receives in the areas of environment, community, 




To explore more formally the time-variation in returns, we adopt a variant of the 
procedure described in Quandt (1960) and Bebchuk et al. (2013).  The goal of the procedure 
is to identify a date that marks a structural break in risk-adjusted returns of portfolios that are 
formed based on the SI. The date that is identified in this way marks a break in the sense that 
the risk-adjusted returns across the two periods differ the most from a statistical point of view.  
To determine the break date, we estimate a variant of the Carhart (1997) regression, which 
allows risk-adjusted returns and portfolio factor loadings to vary across two periods.  
 
























where        is the return in month t on the top-ranked portfolio,            is the return on 
the bottom-ranked portfolio, and the dummy variable Postt is an indicator variable that 
captures all months including and after a breakpoint date. To determine which break date 
marks the largest difference in risk-adjusted return between two periods, we re-estimate the 
model based on all possible variations of the indicator variable Postt. Like Bebchuk et al. 
(2013), we compute the F-statistic on the coefficient on  * Postt for each regression and then 
determine the break date from the regression that yields the largest F-statistic for this 
coefficient.   
 
Figure 2.2 F-statistics from Quandt test on portfolio returns 
Every year, starting in April 1992, we rank stocks based on the stakeholder-relations index (SI) and assign the 
top (bottom) third of ranked stocks to an equal-weighted top-ranked (bottom-ranked) portfolio. We apply a 
Quandt (1960) procedure to determine the date of a break in the risk-adjusted return difference between the two 
portfolios, which requires estimations model (2.2) using monthly returns from April 1992 to December 2009. 
Our Quandt test involves a re-estimation of model (2.2) based on all possible variations of the indicator variable 
Post. We impose that Post cannot equal 1 for the first 36 and last 36 months of our sample period in order to 
ensure that all factor loadings can be estimated properly. We compute the F-statistic on the coefficient on 
 *Post for each regression, and identify the break date from the regression that yields the largest F-statistic for 






















































































































In Figure 2.2, we give a graphical example of one specific Quandt test result that is 
relevant for break date determination. The F-statistics suggest that August 2004 marks a 
break in the return difference between the equal-weight top-ranked and bottom-ranked 
portfolio. For this month, the F-statistic on  * Postt is 10.77, which is almost twice as large as 
the F-statistic corresponding to the same month one year earlier, and about nine times as large 
as the F-statistic observed 3 years earlier.  
We apply this procedure to determine break dates for a number of “top-minus-bottom” 
ranked portfolios that can be formed using the SI, and then measure risk-adjusted return 
before and after the break-date. In independent analyses, we allow the top and bottom 
portfolios to comprise either the top (bottom) third, fourth, or fifth of all stocks that are 
ranked on the SI. Table 2.3 shows the risk-adjusted returns on both equal-weighted and value-
weighted portfolios, measured over, respectively, the full sample period, the pre-break period, 
and the post-break period. 
Concerning equal-weighted returns, the Quandt test marks as break dates, respectively 
August 2004 for top-minus-bottom third portfolios, July 2004 for top-minus-bottom fourth 
portfolios, and October 2002 for top-minus-bottom-fifth portfolios. As for value-weighted 
returns, the corresponding dates are November 2005, February 2003, and November 2005. 
The average date, then, corresponds to June 2004.  
Finding breakpoints close to 2004 seems consistent with indicators of attention to 
stakeholder issues among companies and investors. For example, in order to explore a proxy 
for attention by investors, we counted the yearly number of shareholder proposals on 
corporate social policy issues that were mainly (co)sponsored by institutions from 1991 
onwards (after removing proposals from individuals, religious groups, special interest groups, 
and unknown sponsors). We derived these results from an analysis of the RiskMetrics 
database of shareholder proposals in the U.S., which involves mostly S&P 1500 constituents. 
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What becomes apparent in Figure 2.3 is that firms received structurally more proposals on 
social policy issues in recent years. Also pointing to heightened attention for stakeholder 
issues is the increasing volume of information that U.S. companies disclose on stakeholder 
relations. Dahliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang (2011) investigated the number of U.S. firms per 
year that voluntarily disclosed CSR information. Their results suggest that aggregate CSR 
reporting increased substantially, first temporarily in 2001 and then more permanently from 
2003 onwards.  
 
Figure 2.3: Number of shareholder proposals on stakeholder issues 
We collect all shareholder proposals involving S&P 1500 firms from Riskmetrics over the period 1991-2008. 
For each proposal, we identify the (co)sponsor and eliminate proposals that are exclusively sponsored by 
individuals, religious institutions, and special interest groups (e.g. PETA, Friends of the Earth). To identify 
stakeholder issues we take all shareholder proposals that Riskmetrics classifies as social policy issues (“SRI”) 






Table 2.3 Quandt test on difference in risk-adjusted returns over time for portfolios based on the SI 
Every year, starting in April 1992, we rank stocks based on the stakeholder-relations index (SI) and assign top-ranked (bottom-ranked) stocks to an equal-weighted or value-
weighted top-ranked (bottom-ranked) portfolio. We explore alternative stock selection rules: top and bottom third, fourth, or fifth of all stocks ranked on the SI. We apply a 
Quandt (1960) procedure to determine the date of a break in the risk-adjusted return difference between the portfolios. We use monthly returns from April 1992 to December 
2009. We re-estimate model (2.2) based on all possible variations of the indicator variable Post. We compute the F-statistic on the coefficient on  *Post for each regression, 
and identify the break date from the regression that yields the largest F-statistic for this coefficient. We impose that Post cannot equal 1 for the first 36 months and last 36 
months of our sample period in order to ensure that all factor loadings can be estimated properly. Based on the break dates, we estimate model (2.1) for the returns on Top-, 
Bottom, and Top minus bottom ranked portfolios, before the breakpoint date and after breakpoint date. The first column reports risk-adjusted returns measured over the entire 
sample period April 1992-December 2009.*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
    
 
Equal-weighted    Value-weighted   
SI portfolio 1992 - 2009 Break date Pre-break Post-break 
 
1992-2009 Break date Pre-break Post-break 
          Top minus bottom third 1.57% Aug-04 4.19%*** -2.76%* 
 


























 0.08%  1.45% 
 
  -0.81% 
 









          Top minus bottom fourth       3.52%*** Jul-04 5.52%*** 0.33% 
 







































          Top minus bottom fifth     2.89%* Oct-02 5.04%*** 0.13% 
 































 (0.06) (-0.40) (-0.34) (-1.11)  (-0.62) (0.40) 
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Using the dates determined by this test, we see in Table 2.3 that the average risk-
adjusted return differences between top- and bottom-ranked portfolios are positive, 
economically large, and statistically significant prior to each break date. In contrast, the post-
break risk-adjusted return is not significantly different from zero in five out of the six 
analyses, and negative (albeit significant at the 10% level) in one case.  
Based on the average of the different Quandt test results, it stands to reason that the 
quality of stakeholder relations at first related positively to (risk-adjusted) stock returns, but 
that such a relation has decreased or diminished as from 2004. Because KLD tends to report 
its yearly evaluation of firms’ stakeholder relations in the first quarter of the next year, we 
would expect that KLD’s indicators released after the first quarter of 2004 conveys less 
information about risk-adjusted returns than indicators released in the years before. For this 
reason, we report in Table 2.4 the difference in risk-adjusted return between top-ranked 
portfolios and their bottom-ranked counterparts during, respectively, the periods April 1994-
March 2004 and April 2004-December 2009.
20
  
The results in Table 2.4 further corroborate that those trading rules based on the SI 
that produced a positive risk-adjusted return have done so significantly only in the first sub-
period. All equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios that score high on SI significantly 
outperformed their bottom-ranked counterparts during the period April 1992-March 2004, but 
most of these portfolios ceased to exhibit significant differential risk-adjusted returns during 
the period April 2004- December 2009.   
At first glance, the results presented in this Section suggest that the financial market 
has temporarily been too pessimistic about the value-relevance of stakeholder performance, 
leading to positive risk-adjusted returns, but then learned about the earnings difference 
among firms that differ in the quality of stakeholder relations. However, because long-term 
                                                 
20
 We also performed all analyses using 2003 as the breakpoint year. These results are available upon request. 
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risk-adjusted returns can also emerge for reasons other than “mispricing”, we now turn to 




Table 2.4 Difference in risk-adjusted return over time: Before and after April 2004. 
Every year, starting in April 1992, we rank stocks based on the stakeholder-relations index (SI). We then assign 
stocks to either an equal-weighted or a value-weighted top-ranked (bottom-ranked) portfolio. We run Carhart 
(1997) four-factor regressions as in model (2.1) to estimate the difference in risk-adjusted return between the 
portfolios over two consecutive periods April 1992-March 2004 and April 2004-December 2009. We explore 
alternative stock selection rules: top minus bottom third, fourth, and fifth of stocks ranked on the SI. *, **, and 
*** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Equal-weighted     Value-weighted   
 SI portfolio 1992-2009 92-04 04-09   1992-2009 92-04 04-09 
                
Top minus bottom third 1.57% 3.52%** -2.30%   2.02% 3.43%* -1.28% 
  (1.19) (2.44) (-1.58)   (1.26) (1.72) (-0.63) 
         
Top minus bottom fourth 3.52%*** 5.24%*** 0.85%  2.96%* 4.36%** -0.30% 
  (2.75) (3.08) (0.60)  (1.80) (2.05) (-0.14) 
        
Top minus bottom fifth 2.89%* 4.36%** 1.33%  3.01%* 4.42%** -0.24% 
  (1.96) (2.59) (0.74) 
 
(1.71) (2.00) (-0.11) 
         
2.4.2. Earnings announcement returns 
 
Researchers have suggested that stock returns around earnings announcements can be used to 
detect more explicitly errors in investors’ expectations investors’ concerning firms’ 
earnings.
22
 In this section, we study abnormal earnings announcement returns to determine 
the extent to which the time-variation in average risk-adjusted returns on the aforementioned 
SI-based strategies represent investors’ initial misunderstanding and subsequent learning 
                                                 
21
 For example, risk-adjusted stock returns may alternatively stem from risk premiums that are overlooked by 
models that researchers use to determine expected returns (see, e.g., Fama and French (1993)), and from data 
snooping (Lo and MacKinlay (1990)). 
22
 See for example Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), Sloan (1996), La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1997), Core et al. (2006), and Bebchuk et al. (2013).   
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about firms’ earnings. If it is true that firms with higher SI values realized higher profits than 
anticipated by investors, we would expect that investors’ surprises are reflected in higher 
abnormal returns around earnings announcements. We would also expect that the SI ceases to 
explain earnings announcement returns in times of heightened capital market attention for 
stakeholder issues. 
We perform an event study to measure firms’ stock returns around the announcements, 
using quarterly earnings announcement dates from I/B/E/S and daily stock returns from 
CRSP. For each stock, we compute daily abnormal returns from various days before until one 
day after each announcement, where the daily abnormal return (AR) is the difference between 
the realized return and the return predicted by the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The 
return prediction model is re-estimated for each firm before every earnings announcement, 
using stock returns observed over a 250-day period that ends 20 days before the 
announcement date. The daily abnormal returns are subsequently converted to cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) over, respectively, three-day (-1,1), five-day (-3,1), seven-day (-
5,1), and twelve-day (-10,1) windows. 
In the tradition of Bebchuk et al. (2013), we derive time-variation in the relation 
between the earnings announcement CAR and corporate stakeholder relations from pooled 
regressions that take the form: 
 
   (2.3)  
where CARi,(tq-s,tq+1) is the cumulative (s+2)-day abnormal return around the earnings 
announcement for firm i in quarter q of year t. The vector of controls includes a dummy 
variable that captures firms’ presence on KLD’s list of controversial businesses and industry 



















interaction with a dummy variable Subsample 2 that equals 1 if earnings announcements 
occurred after March 2004, the period after which we expect that information from KLD 
conveys less information about errors in expectations than before (also see Table 2.4). 
  The estimated relationships between the SI and the earnings announcement CARs are 
reported in Table 2.5.  All coefficients are multiplied by 1000 for expositional convenience. 
The regression results are consistent with the idea that better stakeholder relations was 
associated with higher risk-adjusted stock returns over the period 1992-2004 due to errors in 
investors’ expectations. The coefficients concerning the SI point to a statistically and 
economically significant relationship with cumulative earnings announcement returns, 
regardless of the event window that we consider. For example, a one-point increase in SI is 
associated with roughly a 0.09 percent five-day abnormal return per quarterly earnings 
announcement during the period 1992-2004, which is equivalent to an annualized abnormal 
announcement return of about 0.36 percent. The average difference in SI score between the 
top one-third and bottom one-third bottom-ranked portfolio over this period is 4.33 (not 
tabulated), which multiplied with the estimated earnings announcement effect, implies an 
industry-adjusted difference in abnormal  earnings announcement return of 1.56 percent.  
Table 2.5 suggests not only that earnings announcement effects explain risk-adjusted 
returns associated with the SI over the period 1992-2004 but also that such earnings 
announcement effects have decreased subsequently. Independent of the event window, the 
coefficient on SI*Subsample 2 is consistently negative and significant below the 5% 
significance level of significance. According to F-tests regarding the sum of the coefficients 
on SI and SI*Subsample 2, the decrease in the earnings announcement effect measured over 
2004-2009 is large enough to make the positive earnings announcement effect in the earlier 
period disappear. None of the F-statistics rejects the null of a zero relation between the SI and 
earnings announcement CARs during the period 2004-2009. The decreasing relation between 
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the SI and these CARs over time is consistent with the notion that risk-adjusted returns 
associated with stakeholder information eventually disappear as rising attention causes 
investors to learn about the differential future earnings among firms with different 
stakeholder relations. 
 
Table 2.5 Stakeholder relations and earnings announcement returns 
We estimate the relationship between the stakeholder-relations index and cumulative earnings announcement 
returns using as in model (2.3). The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) realized during 
periods of varying lengths around the quarterly earnings announcement date of each firm. We explain the CAR 
by the SI which is the stakeholder-relations index, Subsample 2 which is a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
earnings announcements occurred during the period April 2004-December 2009 and zero otherwise controls that 
includes a dummy variable that captures firms’ presence on KLD’s list of controversial businesses, and industry 
fixed effects based on the 48 industry classifications from the Kenneth French Data Library. In four independent 
regressions, we analyze the effect of stakeholder relations on CAR measured over, respectively three-day (-1,1), 
five-day (-3,1), seven-day (-5,1), and twelve-day (-10,1) event windows. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
derived from two-way clustered standard errors. The reported coefficients are multiplied by 1000 for 
expositional convenience. The F-test measures for each regression whether the sum of the coefficients on SI and 













  Event window (days before, after) 
  -1,+1 -3,+1 -5,+1 -10,+1 
        
SI 0.889*** 0.895*** 0.758** 0.803** 
  (3.15) (3.20) (2.38) (2.12) 
SI*Subsample 2 -1.032** -1.140*** -1.000** -1.338** 
  (-2.46) (-2.58) (-1.98) (-2.15) 
Subsample 2 -0.722 -0.477 0.318 1.311 
  (-0.60) (-0.29) (0.16) (0.48) 
Controversial business 2.320** 2.124* 1.147 1.246 
  (2.08) (1.67) (0.76) (0.63) 
Constant 10.829*** 6.575 3.714 1.712 
  (3.05) (1.45) (0.76) (0.36) 
        
Observations 78,340 78,323 78,319 78,310 
Adj. R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
F-test (β1+β2=0) 0.220 0.560 0.411 1.356 
Prob. > F 0.639 0.454 0.521 0.244 
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Given that stakeholder issues attracted substantial attention in recent years as part of a 
broader interest in environmental, social and corporate governance issues, one might ask 
whether the diminishing relation between the SI and earnings announcement CAR is driven 
by the learning effect that Bebchuk et al. document for certain corporate governance issues. 
To ensure that the learning effect documented in our study is unique, we also run regressions 
after expanding the vector of control variables with the corporate governance indexes that 
Bebchuk et al. associate with their learning hypothesis. The first governance index measures 
the number of anti-takeover provisions (G Index) developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003), with higher values for the index implying more provisions and hence a weaker 
corporate governance structure. The second index is the entrenchment index (E Index) of 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferell (2009), which is a subset of the G Index that has been shown to 
better predict firm value and abnormal stock returns. Both indexes were taken from the 
authors’ websites.  
 Table 2.6 shows that the diminishing association between the SI and earnings 
announcement returns is present across all models that also contain the corporate governance 
indexes. The diminishing association between the SI and earnings announcement CAR not 
only continues to be significant in all of the models but also appears to be more robust than 
the time-variation in the relation between corporate governance and earnings announcement 
returns during our sample period. Specifically, the coefficient estimates for the SI and the 
SI*Subsample 2 variables are highly stable and statistically significant regardless of the 
model employed, whereas only the coefficient on the entrenchment index differs significantly 
from zero in the first subsample period, at the 10% level. 
Combined with the results from the previous section, the earnings announcement 
regressions yield two important conclusions. First, the results suggest that the risk-adjusted 
returns on trading rules based on the SI originally could be explained by investors’ surprise 
52 
 
about firms’ earnings. Second, the diminishing relation between the SI and earnings 
announcement returns coincides with the decreasing risk-adjusted returns on SI portfolios 
discussed in Section 4.1, as well as with the heightened attention for stakeholder information 
in the capital market in recent years.  
Table 2.6 The SI and earnings announcement returns: with governance indexes 
We estimate the relationship between the stakeholder-relations index and cumulative earnings announcement 
returns using a variant of model (2.3) using cumulative abnormal return realized from 1 day before the earnings 
announcement date to 1 day after the announcement date. SI is the stakeholder-relations index, Subsample 2t is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 when earnings announcements occurred during the period April 2004-December 
2009 and zero otherwise. Controlsi,k,t-1 is a vector of control variables, which includes a dummy variable that 
captures firms’ presence on KLD’s list of controversial businesses, and industry fixed effects based on the 48 
industry classifications from the Kenneth French Data Library. In addition, we include either the G Index of 
Gompers, Ishhi and Metrick (2003) and G-Index*Subsample 2, or the E Index of Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(2009) and E Index*Subsample 2. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are derived from two-way clustered standard 
errors. The reported coefficients are multiplied by 1000 for expositional convenience. The F1-test indicates for 
each regression whether the sum of the coefficients on SI and SI*Subsample 2 are different from zero, and the F2 
test (Governance) indicates whether the summed coefficients on G (E) Index and G (E) Index*Subsample 2 are 
different from zero. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Coefficients 
on the control variables other than those on the governance indexes are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
SI 0.883*** 0.882*** 0.877*** 0.882*** 0.880*** 
 
(3.23) (3.21) (3.17) (3.23) (3.22) 
SI*Subsample 2 -1.270*** -1.267*** -1.264*** -1.262*** -1.271*** 
 
(-2.65) (-2.65) (-2.63) (-2.65) (-2.70) 
Subsample 2 -0.194 -0.206 -1.361 -0.175 -1.889 
 











   
(0.42) 
  E Index 
   
-0.192 -0.596* 
    
(-0.67) (-1.81) 
E Index*Subsample 2 
    
0.713 
     
(1.19) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 53178 53178 53178 53178 53178 
Adj. R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
F1-test (β1+β2=0) 1.132 1.131 1.144 1.120 1.210 










2.4.3. Errors in analysts’ forecasts 
 
We complement our examination into errors in investors’ expectations with an analysis of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Although analysts’ expectations do not necessarily reflect the 
capital market’s expectations, the previous results at the very least raise the question whether 
analysts have misunderstood the association between stakeholder relations and firms’ future 
earnings. Moreover, analysts have been criticized for insufficiently catering to institutional 
investors when it comes to integrating environmental, social, and corporate governance 
information in financial research (e.g. O'Loughlin and Thamotheram 2006). Therefore, if 
investors misunderstood the association between stakeholder relations and profitability, one 
could expect that analysts were at least as surprised.  
In order to be consistent with the analysis of quarterly earnings announcements, we 
first study errors in quarterly earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts, which we define as the 
difference between the actual EPS and the median forecast that I/B/E/S/ released on the 
closest date prior to the last day of the fiscal period. Previous studies have illustrated that 
inferences involving analyst forecast data are sensitive to extreme noise, skewness, outliers, 
and the measurement of the forecasts themselves (see, e.g., Lim (2001); Ljungqvist et al. 
(2009)). We address these robustness issues by analyzing alternative measures of forecast 
errors. Specifically, we follow the literature on analyst forecast errors and consider different 
ways of scaling forecast errors. We scale the errors by, respectively, the price per share at the 
forecast date, the assets per share, the absolute value of the median forecast and the standard 
deviation of the analyst forecasts. To make sure that small sample problems and outliers do 
not distort the median forecasts, we omit observations that either are based on forecasts from 
fewer than five analysts or exceed the bottom (top) 1% of the distribution.  
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The model we estimate takes the form: 
   (2.4)  
where FE is the forecast error for quarter q in year t. As controls, we include a dummy that 
equals one for firms operating in a controversial industry and zero otherwise, the natural 
logarithm of the book to market ratio from the previous fiscal year, the natural logarithm of 
the market value of equity from the previous fiscal year, and industry fixed effects based on 
the Fama-French 48 industry definitions. In line with the previous analysis, time-variation in 
the relation between the SI and earnings forecast errors is estimated by interacting SI with a 
dummy variable that identifies forecast errors realized after March 2004.  
Since earlier studies suggest that investments in stakeholder relations are mainly 
intangible and pay off slowly, we also study forecasts of firms’ long-term earnings growth 
released by sell-side financial analysts in the I/B/E/S universe in order to investigate analyst 
forecast errors. Like Edmans (2011), we first perform pooled OLS regressions involving 
forecast errors defined as the long-term earnings growth that firm i realized at the end of 
fiscal year t minus the corresponding median value of analysts’ forecasts of long-term growth 
made 5 years earlier (we winsorize the errors at the 1% level). Because most annual reports 
are filed within three months after the fiscal year-end, we measure analysts’ forecasts four 
months after the previous fiscal year-end in order to make sure that analysts were aware of 
previous earnings when they made their forecast (see Core et al. (2006); Doukas et al. (2002)). 
Alternatively, we estimate ordered probit models after converting the earnings forecast errors 
to discrete variables in order to deal with the extreme noise and outliers that are common with 
earnings surprise data. In the probit model (Probit), the discrete variable has a value of 1 
when the forecast error is greater than or equal to 10 percent, 0 when the error is between 10 



















  According to all models of quarterly forecast errors presented in Table 2.7, firms with 
higher SI values experienced significantly higher earnings surprises over the period 1992-
2004. In the subsequent years, the relationship between the SI and quarterly forecast errors 
decreased significantly under three specifications. Based on F-tests, the null hypothesis that 
the sum of the coefficients    and    is zero is not rejected in two specifications, which 
suggests that the SI is not significantly related to forecast errors in recent years. Under one 
other model, the relation between the SI and quarterly forecast errors reversed from positive 
to slightly negative. Indeed, it has been shown that inferences about expectational errors 
derived from scaled-errors in short-term analyst forecasts might be sensitive to the choice of 
scaling variable (see, Bebchuk et al. (2013)). 
Our models of long-term forecast errors, which are presented in Table 2.8, reach a 
consensus. According to the OLS model, the relation between the SI and errors in analysts’ 
forecast of long-term earnings growth was positive over the period 1992-2004 but close to 
zero and statistically not significant over the period 2004-2009. Under the ordered probit 
model, firms with stronger stakeholder relations were more likely to produce higher surprises 
in the first part of the sample period. But after the March 2004, firms with better stakeholder 
relations were less likely than before to have beaten analysts’ long-term growth forecasts. 
Furthermore, we also find no evidence that potential learning effects concerning 
corporate governance variables subsume the association between the SI and earnings 
surprises in models of analysts forecast errors. Table 2.9 shows that even in the presence of  
the G index and E index, the coefficient on the SI and the SI*Subsample 2 variables are 
highly similar to those reported in Tables 2.8 and 2.9.
23
 The coefficients on the governance 
variables are sensitive to the choice of earnings surprise measure, which is consistent with the 
results on analyst forecast errors reported in Bebchuk et al (2013). 
                                                 
23
 Due to space constraints, we do not report on OLS regression of errors in forecasts of long-term earnings 
growth. The results are available upon request. 
56 
 
Taken as a whole, the analyses of errors in analysts’ forecasts produce results that 
display similarities with tests of errors in investors’ expectations derived from risk-adjusted 
portfolio returns and abnormal earnings announcement returns.  
 
 
Table 2.7 Stakeholder Index and Quarterly Errors in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 
The error in quarterly forecast is defined as the actual level of quarterly earnings minus the I/B/E/S median 
analyst long-term forecast closest to the error date. We report quantile (median) regressions to take the skewed 
distributions of the errors into account. As independent variables, we include the stakeholder-relations index (SI), 
a dummy variable (Subsample 2)  that is equal to 1 whenever a forecast error is realized during the period April 
2004-December 2009, an interaction term SI*Subsample 2 that captures time variation in the relation between 
stakeholder relations and the dependent variable, and control variables. Sample period: April 1992 - December 
2009. The t-statistics, derived from two-way clustered standard errors (on year-quarter and firm), are presented 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Variables Percentage Assets Price St. Dev 
          
SI 1.382*** 0.009*** 0.006* 48.229*** 
 
(3.99) (3.28) (1.90) (7.60) 
SI*Subsample 2 -1.653*** -0.001 -0.017*** -45.071*** 
 
(-3.42) (-0.10) (-3.84) (-5.08) 
Subsample 2 17.039*** 0.299*** 0.316*** 133.819*** 
  (17.59) (38.76) (34.88) (7.53) 
Controversial business -5.130*** -0.089*** -0.052*** -90.727*** 
 
(-3.25) (-7.12) (-3.53) (-3.14) 
Log book / market equity 4.576*** -0.069*** 0.090*** -102.107*** 
 
(6.78) (-12.78) (14.32) (-8.24) 
Log market value of equity -0.849** 0.008*** 0.010*** 97.054*** 
 
(-2.50) (3.01) (3.04) (15.57) 
Constant 14.587** -0.162*** -0.098* -649.716*** 
  (2.39) (-3.33) (-1.72) (-5.80) 
          
Observations 59,320 59,320 59,320 59,320 
Pseudo R-squared 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.006 
F-test (β1+β2=0) 0.593 9.508 11.620 0.238 
Prob. > F 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.63 





Table 2.8 Stakeholder Index and Errors in Analysts’ Forecasts of Long-Term Earnings 
Growth 
The error in long-term growth forecast is defined as the actual five-year annualized EPS growth rate minus the 
I/B/E/S median analyst long-term growth forecast 56 months before the error date. We report on an OLS 
regression (OLS), and an ordered probit model (Probit) after we convert the forecast errors to discrete variables. 
In the ordered probit model, the discrete variable has a value of 1 when the forecast error is greater than or equal 
to 10 percent, 0 when the error is between 10 percent and -10 percent, and -1 if it is equal to or below -10 
percent. As independent variables, we include the stakeholder-relations index (SI), a dummy variable 
(Subsample 2)  that is equal to 1 whenever a forecast error is realized during the period April 2004- December 
2009, an interaction term Stakeholder*Subsample 2 that captures time variation in the relation between 
stakeholder relations and dependent variable, and control variables. Sample period: April 1992-December 2009. 
The t-statistics (z-statistics) in parentheses are derived from two-way clustered standard errors (on year and 
firm). *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
OLS Probit 
      
SI 0.267** 0.012* 
 
(1.97) (1.69) 
SI*Subsample 2 -0.388 -0.026** 
 
(-1.55) (-1.96) 
Subsample 2 3.647 0.206* 
 
(1.54) (1.70) 
Controversial business 0.442 -0.011 
 
(0.42) (-0.21) 
Log book / market equity -5.156*** -0.286*** 
 
(-8.11) (-8.58) 







 Observations 15,191 15,191 
Adj ./Pseudo -R-squared 0.080 0.043 
F test / Chi-square test (β1+β2=0) 0.362 1.929 









Table 2.9 The SI and earnings forecast errors: controlling for governance indexes 
For table description see table 2.7 for the OLS results using quarterly forecast errors en table 2.8 for the ordered probit models that analyze long term forecast errors. In all 
analyses we add governance indexes (and an interaction with Subsample 2) to the set of controls. 
  OLS   Ordered probit 
 
Percentage Percentage Assets Assets Price Price St. Dev. St. Dev. 
 
Long-term Long-term 
                        




(5.30) (5.77) (4.21) (4.37) (3.51) (3.34) (7.29) (6.52) 
 
(1.70) (1.70) 




(-3.35) (-3.79) (0.64) (0.67) (-3.70) (-3.78) (-4.42) (-3.97) 
 
(-1.55) (-1.60) 






















































































(6.25) (9.71) (15.09) (24.12) (12.85) (21.21) (0.10) (2.28) 
 
(1.10) (1.10) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
            Observations 43,554 43,554 43,554 43,554 43,554 43,554 43,554 43,554 
 
12,197 12,197 
Pseudo R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.013 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 
0.040 0.041 
F1-test (β1+β2=0) 0.169 0.065 22.041 23.770 2.814 3.791 0.668 0.488 
 
0.871 0.991 
P > F1 0.68 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.41 0.49 
 
0.35 0.32 
F2-test (Governance) 8.429 4.047 67.101 68.913 5.435 2.882 0.182 1.906 
 
1.023 3.543 
P > F2 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.67 0.17   0.31 0.06 
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2.5. Additional tests 
  
2.5.1. Alternative factor models 
 
Up to this point, our estimates of average risk-adjusted return on top- and bottom-ranked 
portfolios have been derived from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. To ensure that the 
observed decreasing risk-adjusted returns documented in Section 4.1 are not an artifact of that 
specific model, we report the estimates of risk-adjusted returns that we obtain under alterative 
specifications in this section.  
The first two models we report on in Table 2.10 are a one-factor model, and the three-
factor model of Fama and French (1993). The third model presented in Table 2.9 is an alternative 
four-factor model brought forward by Cremers, Petajisto and Zitzewitz (2013), who argue that a 
model containing the momentum factor augmented with market, size and value premiums based 
on tradable indexes better captures returns than the standard multifactor models from Fama and 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The last model we use to measure risk-adjusted returns is the 
Carhart (1997) model extended with the traded liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).  
Taken together, the intercepts from these alternative factor regressions reinforce the idea 
that positive risk-adjusted returns associated with the SI eventually ceased to exist. Independent 
of the factor model, the difference in average risk-adjusted return between top-ranked and 
bottom-ranked portfolios was positive, economically large, and significant at the conventional 
cut-off levels during the period 1992-2004. For the period April 2004-December 2009, none of 







Table 2.10 Performance under alternative factor model specifications 
Every year, starting in April 1992, we rank stocks based on the stakeholder-relations index (SI) and assign the top 
(bottom) third, fourth, or fifth of all ranked stocks to a top-ranked (bottom-ranked) portfolio. Using alternative factor 
models, we then estimate differences in risk-adjusted portfolio returns between top and bottom ranked portfolios over 
the period April 1992-December 2009 and the subperiods April 1992-March 2004 and April 2004–December 2009. 
The factor models we consider for performance evaluation are, respectively, a 1-factor model that includes as 
explanatory variable the CRSP value-weighted return described in equation (2.1), the three-factor model of Fama and 
French (1993), the four factors proposed by Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2012), and the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model augmented with the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor (Pastor-Stambaugh). Reported are 
annualized risk-adjusted returns for equal-weighted portfolios, with t statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Factor model  1-factor Fama-French Cremers et al. Pastor-Stambaugh 
Top minus bottom third 
1992-2009   2.10%    2.29%* 1.73%  1.61% 
 
(1.56) (1.72) (1.31) (1.22) 
     1992-2004      3.88%**        5.38%***   2.83%*       3.49%** 
 
(2.18) (3.35) (1.94) (2.41) 
     2004-2009 -1.40% -1.90% -1.43% -2.06% 
 
(-0.73) (-1.17) (-0.89) (-1.39) 
     Top minus bottom fourth 
1992-2009       3.48%***        3.89%***         3.37%***         3.43%*** 
 
(2.78) (3.18) (2.68) (2.70) 
     1992-2004       4.76%***        6.36%***      4.38%**         5.22%*** 
 
(2.76) (3.86) (2.60) (3.06) 
     2004-2009 0.99% 0.86% 0.92% 0.79% 
 
(0.68) (0.60) (0.64) (0.55) 
     Top minus bottom fifth 
1992-2009      3.44%**       3.62%**      3.04%**     2.81%* 
 
(2.31) (2.52) (2.00) (1.93) 
     1992-2004      4.69%**        6.32%***      3.56%**      4.33%** 
 
(2.35) (3.49) (2.16) (2.58) 
     2004-2009 1.51% 1.36% 1.46% 1.24% 
  (0.82) (0.74) (0.80) (0.69) 
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2.5.2. Alternative firm scores based on KLD data 
 
This section examines alternative firm scores derived from KLD (henceforth, Alternative 
KLD) data that have been associated with positive abnormal returns in the literature. In 
particular, we pay attention to measures used by Kempf and Osthoff (2007) who document 
positive risk-adjusted returns associated with several different stock ranking approaches 
based on a composite of indicators from KLD. They use indicators from six KLD categories: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product. To get an 
overall score for each firm called “Combination 1”, they transform the concerns by taking the 
binary complements, then sum up the scores from all KLD criteria, and normalize this sum so 
that the score ranges from zero to one. In addition, they also create an overall score that is 
first subject to a so-called “negative screen” (“Combination 2”), by excluding all firms that 
are involved in at least one of the controversial business areas that are identified by KLD. We 
also consider a “Best-in-Class” version of their Combination 1, where we rank firms on 
Combination 1 relative to the industry average Combination 1 scores (using the Fama-French 
10 industry classifications). Our fourth alternative measure is obtained by simply taking the 
sum of all strengths that KLD identified for a firm in a given year minus the sum of all 
concerns that KLD identified across all possible indicators (“Strengths – concerns”). 
Panel A in Table 2.11, shows that all of these alternative measures for ranking stocks 
lead to top-minus-bottom third portfolios that produced positive risk-adjusted returns during 
the period April 1992-March 2004, but which did not deliver positive risk-adjusted returns 
during the remainder of the sample period. In Panel B, we show the results of replacing the SI 
by, respectively, Combination 1, Combination 2, and Strengths-Concerns measures in 





 Consistent with diminishing errors in expectations, the 
coefficient estimates suggest that all three alternative measures were positively related to 
earnings announcement returns prior to April 2004 but not in the period thereafter. 
Table 2.12 reports on the inclusion of the Alternative KLD measures in the different 
models of quarterly and long-term analyst forecast errors. Although the results are more 
mixed than those from portfolio analyses and earnings announcement regressions, the 
coefficients in twelve out of the fifteen specifications in Table 2.12 suggest that these 
alternative measures related positively to forecast errors during the period 1992-2004. In nine 
specifications, the coefficients on the interaction term Alternative KLD*Subsample 2 suggests 
that the relation decreased significantly during the period April 2004-December 2009. 
 
2.5.3. Stakeholder relations and future profitability 
 
For investors to overlook the difference in future profits between top- and bottom-ranked 
firms, it is important to verify that an association between the SI and future profitability exists 
to begin with. For this reason, we also show results of regressing firms’ future operating 
performance, as measured by return on assets, on the lagged SI and a set of control variables:  
 
       (2.5)  
where ROAi,t is the accounting return on assets (defined as either operating income after 
depreciation and amortization divided by total assets, or net income divided by assets) for the 
fiscal year subsequent to the year for which KLD reports its information; and Controlsit-1 is a 
vector of control variables. The vector of control variables includes a dummy for 
                                                 
24
 The Combination 2 measure is not included in the earnings announcement regressions since a controversial 




ControlsSIROA ,1 1,,1,1,     
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controversial industries, the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio, the natural 
logarithm of total assets, the natural logarithm of firm age identified as the number of months 
the firm first appeared in the CRSP returns database until December of the year, a dummy for 
Delaware incorporation, R&D divided by total sales, capital expenses divided by total assets 
in conjunction with dummy variables that identify non-reported R&D and capital expenses, 
and year- and industry-fixed effects (also see Jiao 2010)). All variables that are not reported 
as a natural logarithm are winsorized at the 1% level to account for outliers.
25
 These variables 
(except firm age) are constructed using data from Compustat.  
Table 2.13 shows the coefficients from the regressions together with t-statistics 
derived from two-way clustered standard errors.  The coefficients on the control variables 
have signs that are consistent with the majority of studies on the determinants of profitability. 
Most important to this study is the coefficient on the SI. Independent of the model employed, 
we find that the relation between the SI and ROA is positive and statistically significant at the 
conventional significance levels. Hence, these results suggest that information about 











                                                 
25
 Winsorizing or trimming at different levels does not qualitatively alter our results.  
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Table 2.11 Risk-adjusted portfolio returns and earnings announcement returns: 
alternative measure of stakeholder relations 
In Panel A, we report on top-ranked and bottom-ranked portfolios that are formed based on alternative firm-
level measures derived from the KLD database. Starting in April 1992, we rank stocks based one of four 
alternative measures based on KLD indicators and assign the top (bottom) third
 
of all ranked stocks to an top-
ranked (bottom-ranked) portfolio. Using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, we then estimate differences in 
risk-adjusted portfolio returns between top- and bottom-ranked portfolios over the period April 1992-December 
2009 and the subperiods April 1992-March 2004 and April 2004–December 2009. The alternative measures are, 
respectively, Kempf and Osthoff’s (KO, 2007) Combination 1, Combination 2, and Best-in-class measures, and 
an industry-unadjusted version of the SI (which thus simply aggregates all strengths and subtracts all concerns 
reported by KLD). Reported are annualized risk-adjusted returns for equal-weighted portfolios, with t statistics 
in parentheses. In Panel B we report on estimating three-day earnings announcement returns (-1,+1) using 
model (2.3) after replacing the SI by one of four alternative measures that are based on KLD indicators. 
(Alternative KLD). The F-test and corresponding p-value indicate for each regression whether the sum of the 
coefficients on the Alternative KLD measure and Alternative KLD*Subsample 2 are different from zero. *, **, 
and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Risk-adjusted portfolio returns, top minus bottom third 
      Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha 
Cut off   1992-2009 92-04 04-09 
          
KO Combination 1   1.14%       2.88%** -2.30% 
    (1.03) (2.38) (-1.53) 
KO Combination 2   1.30%      2.78%** -2.04% 
    (1.11) (2.07) (-1.25) 
KO Best-in-class   1.44%       2.36%** 0.07% 
    (1.35) (2.00) (0.05) 
Strenghts - Concerns   1.94%        4.27%***     -3.01%* 
    (1.54) (2.67) (-1.86) 
     Panel B: Earnings announcement returns (-1,+1)     




Strenghts – concerns 
   
 
      
Alternative KLD 
 
        19.378***          22.713***        0.843*** 
  
 
(2.70) (2.88) (3.07) 
Alternative KLD*Subsample 2 
 
       -27.527***       -28.215**       -1.070*** 
  
 
(-2.63) (-2.29) (-2.91) 
Subsample 2 
 
     18.819** -0.378 -0.062 
  
 
(2.45) (-0.33) (-0.05) 
Controversial business 
 
    2.564**      2.574**       2.298** 
  
 
(2.37) (2.38) (2.06) 
Constant 
 
-3.924        10.222***         10.078*** 
  
 
(-0.65) (3.04) (2.83) 
  
 
      
Observations 
 
91,290 91,290 78,340 
Adj. R-squared 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 
F-test (β1+β2=0) 
 
1.030 0.336 0.681 
Prob. > F   0.31 0.56 0.41 
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Table 2.12 Analysts forecast errors and alternative measures of stakeholder relations 
The error in quarterly forecast is defined as the actual level of quarterly earnings minus the I/B/E/S median analyst long-term forecast closest to the error date, scaled by 
either the absolute value of the median forecast (Percentage), assets per share (Assets), price per share (Price), or the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts (St. Dev.). The 
error in long-term growth forecast is defined as the actual five-year annualized EPS growth rate minus the I/B/E/S median analyst long-term growth forecast 56 months 
before the error date. We estimate models of quarterly and long-term forecast errors, using alternative measures based on KLD and a set of control variables as explanatory 
variables. The alternative measures (Alternative KLD) are, respectively, Kempf and Osthoff’s (2007) Combination 1 and Best-in-class measures, and an industry-unadjusted 
version of the SI (i.e., the sum of all strengths minus the sum of  all concerns reported by KLD). Coefficients on the control variables are not reported due to space constraints. 
 
Forecast error Alternative KLD Alternative KLD*Subsample 2 Subsample 2 Observations Pseudo R2 F-test (β1+β2=0) Prob. > F 
Percentage 
       
Combination 1 34.800*** -4.070 22.193*** 66843 0.007 17.139 0.00 
Best-in-Class 46.821*** -29.051** 17.177*** 66843 0.007 3.719 0.05 
Strenghts - concerns 0.975*** -1.000** 17.631*** 59320 0.007 0.008 0.93 
         
Assets 
        
Combination 1 0.228*** -0.053 0.350*** 66843 0.013 9.541 0.00 
Best-in-Class 0.287*** 0.132 0.292*** 66843 0.013 34.430 0.00 
Strenghts - concerns 0.005** 0.010** 0.303*** 59320 0.012 24.490 0.00 
         
Price 
        
Combination 1 0.136* -0.229** 0.465*** 66843 0.007 1.858 0.17 
Best-in-Class 0.259*** -0.085 0.301*** 66843 0.007 4.487 0.03 
Strenghts - concerns 0.003 -0.013*** 0.319*** 59320 0.007 9.265 0.00 
         
St. Dev. 
        
Combination 1 834.612*** 635.355*** -205.667 66843 0.006 82.563 0.00 
Best-in-Class 1,025.933*** -639.855** 126.001*** 66843 0.007 3.917 0.05 
Strenghts - concerns 30.467*** -23.548** 158.035*** 59320 0.007 1.012 0.31 
         
Long-term  
      
Combination 1 -5.411 -43.063*** 30.451*** 17,347 0.101 38.972 0.00 
Best-in-Class 0.320 -16.832** 3.346 17,347 0.086 8.432 0.00 
Strenghts - concerns 0.495*** -0.692** 4.042* 15,191 0.081 0.862 0.35 
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Table 2.13 Stakeholder relations and profitability 
This table reports on pooled regressions with accounting return on assets (ROA) as dependent variable and the 
SI in conjunction with control variables as independent variables as in model (2.5). Return on assets (ROA) is 
defined as either the ratio of operating income (after depreciation and amortization) divided by total assets or net 
income divided by total assets. The control variables include a dummy variable capturing firms’ controversial 
business involvement (alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power, tobacco) according to KLD, the 
logarithm of the book-to-market ratio, the logarithm of total assets, R&D expenses scaled by sales, capital 
expenditures scaled by total assets, dummy variables that identify non-reported R&D and capital expenditures, 
and year fixed-effects, and industry-fixed effects based on 48 industry classifications from the Kenneth French 
Data Library. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are derived from two-way clustered standard errors. Sample 
period 1992-2009. *, **, *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Operating income / assets Net income / assets 
      
SI 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(4.81) (4.01) 
Controversial business -0.003 -0.005 
 
(-0.87) (-1.19) 
Log book / market equity -0.025*** -0.011*** 
 
(-6.60) (-2.98) 
Log total assets 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 
(3.36) (3.65) 
Log age 0.006*** 0.005** 
 
(4.41) (2.33) 
Delaware -0.009*** -0.012*** 
 
(-3.63) (-4.86) 
CAPEX / assets  0.030* 0.010 
 
(1.76) (0.68) 
R&D / sales -0.083*** -0.060*** 
 
(-21.73) (-13.75) 
R&D Dummy  0.012*** 0.011*** 
 
(3.35) (3.05) 
CAPEX / assets dummy -0.001 -0.000 
 
(-0.34) (-0.05) 
Constant -0.001 -0.055** 
 
(-0.07) (-2.19) 
   Observations 21,310 20,643 
Adj. R-squared 0.348 0.233 
Year FE YES YES 






Many investors justify the integration of stakeholder information – nowadays under the 
heading of “ESG” information – in portfolio selection by the view that corporate stakeholder 
relations are associated with (intangible) value in a manner that is not fully understood by the 
financial market. Although this view is not necessarily counterintuitive in the short run, 
investors’ public hunt for “mispriced” information that generates superior risk-adjusted 
returns eventually comes as a double-edged sword. Economic logic teaches us that increased 
attention to value-relevant information makes potential “mispricing” short-lived. 
This paper shows that trading strategies that use a stakeholder-relations index 
generated risk-adjusted returns that were economically and statistically significant over the 
period 1992-2004, but that were largely non-significant over the period 2004-2009. This 
finding is in line with our premise that a stakeholder-relations index predicted risk-adjusted 
returns due to errors in investors’ expectations, but ultimately ceased to do so as attention for 
stakeholder issues increases.  
Our findings are based on three complementary approaches, commonly used in 
empirical studies on stock market anomalies. A portfolio approach, an event study around 
quarterly earnings announcements, and an analysis of errors in analysts’ forecasts all point in 
the same direction, and show that errors in expectations that arise due to difficulties in 
assessing the value of stakeholder relations investments, are not persistent.  
Furthermore, the paper suggests, using a statistical procedure described in Quandt 
(1960), that a break in the analysis occurred around the year 2004. This seems in line with 
annual statistics on the number of shareholder proposals on stakeholder issues, and with 




The implications of our findings are that those institutional investors that pursue both 
financial and social goals have empirical foundations for integrating stakeholder issues in 
investment decisions. However, the contribution of stakeholder information to generating 
abnormal returns does not persist in the long term. Our findings also imply that companies 
should place stakeholder issues higher on the corporate agenda given that stakeholder 












Mutual fund attributes are important for investors as they use these attributes to select and 
evaluate investment products. Well-known examples are past return, investment style, risk 
profile, fund family brand, fund size, and fund age (e.g. Sirri and Tufano 1998). Another 
attribute bundle that is increasingly receiving attention is the social responsibility of the 
mutual fund (e.g. Bollen 2007, Renneboog et al. 2011). To investigate this attribute bundle, 
researchers have compared funds with a socially responsible investment (henceforth SRI) 
label to funds without one (henceforth conventional funds). The consentient findings show 
that SRI and conventional funds have earned similar risk-adjusted returns (see Derwall, 
Koedijk, and Ter Horst (2011) for a review), though, fund flows can be affected by an SRI 
label (Bollen 2007, Benson and Humphrey 2008, and Renneboog et al. 2011).
26
 In this paper 
we differentiate on two aspects by evaluating multiple social responsibility attributes for all 
U.S. equity mutual funds. Holdings-data enables us to identify exposures to several social 
responsibility attributes. Using this approach, we provide novel insights into funds’ exposures 
to social controversies and social responsibility as well as performance aspects of these 
attributes. 
                                                 
26
 Benson and Humphrey (2008) and Renneboog et al. (2011) find that SRI investors are less sensitive to fund 
flows. Whereas Bollen (2007) reports that investors are more sensitive to past positive returns and there is no 
difference when considering past negative returns. 
70 
 
The mutual fund literature up to date has compared SRI and conventional funds as if 
they differ substantially on several social responsibility characteristics. However, we take a 
different approach to identify a fund’s social responsibility by looking at exposures to several 
company-characteristics associated with SRI. This method enables us to take into account 
that social responsibility is a multi-facetted concept meaning that mutual funds can be 
considered socially responsible on one area and irresponsible on another. In addition, we 
explore the possibility that conventional fund holdings are affected by managers’ tastes for 
companies with social responsibility characteristics. Papers that have compared holdings of 
SRI to conventional funds have reported that on average SRI funds have lower exposure to 
stocks that are deemed socially irresponsible (e.g. Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014, Kempf and 
Osthoff 2011) and that these funds have higher exposures to stocks of firms with high scores 
from social responsibility rating agencies, so called environmental, social, and governance 
(henceforth ESG) scores (Kempf and Osthoff 2011) on average. 
Social responsibility attributes can also affect mutual fund returns through tastes for or 
against assets. A growing body of studies suggests that societal norms can influence the 
capital market due to investors’ tastes against (for) assets of companies they deem socially 
objectionable (desirable). The general prediction is that tastes can affect asset prices because 
investors see the assets as consumption goods (Fama and French 2007). In other words, 
attributes other than the payoff structure can matter to investors. More specifically, asset 
prices can be affected when a significant number of investors have similar tastes (Fama and 
French 2007). In this paper we consider social responsibility attributes that could matter to 
investors through societal norms. Common examples of such social responsibility attributes 
are companies that earn revenues from the tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and weapons 
industries (e.g. Hong and Kacperczyk 2009), companies with relatively good corporate social 
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responsibility practices (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra 2011) or stocks of heavily 
polluting firms (Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 2001)
27
.  
Despite the notion of a “social premium” in academic studies, it remains an open 
empirical question whether U.S. investors can profit from social norms by investing in stocks 
that are sensitive to social tastes through the lens of a significant number of investors. On the 
one hand, evidence teaches us that socially controversial stocks have either higher expected 
returns as implied by stock prices or earned higher realized returns than socially acceptable 
stocks (e.g. Fabozzi, Ma, and Oliphant 2008, Hong and Kacperczyk 2009, El Ghoul et al. 
2011, Derwall et al. 2011, Chava 2013). On the other hand, there is overwhelming evidence 
that so-called socially responsible (i.e. SRI-labeled) mutual funds, which explicitly proclaim 
to screen out controversial assets, have not underperformed conventional mutual funds over 
various investment horizons; see e.g., Derwall al. (2011) for a review. This evidence could be 
taken to imply that the effects of social tastes on stock prices have no meaningful investment 
implications once trading costs, benchmark constraints, and illiquidity are accounted for. 
In this paper, we aim to determine the true economic significance of social investment 
decisions by studying the actual holdings of U.S. equity mutual funds over the period January 
2004 to December 2012. For the entire universe of mainly domestic U.S. equity funds, we 
transform mutual fund holdings to scores that measure a fund’s exposures to oft-cited socially 
sensitive assets: stocks from tobacco, alcohol, and gambling (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009), 
weapons manufacturers and nuclear operations (Statman and Glushkov 2009, Derwall et al. 
2011), and firms with ESG concerns or strengths (e.g. El Ghoul et al. 2011, or specifically 
environmental concerns and strengths; Chava 2013). Using these scores, we estimate the 
payoff that mutual funds in reality enjoy for every fraction of wealth that is invested in 
socially sensitive stocks. We are able to contrast these estimates with the returns of 
                                                 
27
 Other related theoretical studies include Angel and Rivoli (1997) and Gollier and Pouget (2012).  
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hypothetical portfolios that are formed by ranking stocks on their social responsibility 
attributes, and with the conclusions reached by studies on SRI mutual funds.   
We document an economically and statistically significant payoff associated with 
mutual funds’ exposure to stocks from tobacco, alcohol and gambling sectors, often referred 
to as “sin stocks” (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). Pooled regression estimates indicate that a 
100 percentage-point increase in the fraction of wealth invested in sin stocks is associated 
with a higher risk-adjusted return of about 4% to 5% on an annualized basis, which is roughly 
similar to that suggested by analyses of hypothetical sin stock portfolios. We do not find 
statistically significant payoffs associated with funds’ exposures to the other types of 
controversies. In addition we find some evidence that exposure to firms with very strong 
social responsibility profiles has a negative effect on performance.  
While these performance effects are statistically significant, we find that most mutual 
funds do not display full exposures to the socially sensitive assets we consider. Due to limited 
cross-sectional variation in socially sensitive investment exposures, the annualized risk-
adjusted return spread between a portfolio of funds with highest fund scores and the lowest-
ranked counterparts was not significant for all measures over the period January 2004 – 
December 2012.  
We also use the same logic to explain why SRI-labeled funds have not performed 
differently from non-SRI funds (see Derwall et al. (2011) for a review). We show that neither 
the “SRI” label nor the type of screen that SRI funds disclose in prospectuses and other 
public sources is adequate for distinguishing mutual funds along their socially sensitive 
investments like sin stocks. A significant part of conventional funds in our sample have 
significantly lower exposures to sin stocks (30%), a broader definition of sin stocks that 
includes firms in the weapons/defense and nuclear energy industries (10%) and firms with 
ESG concerns (10%) score of the average SRI fund.  
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These findings make several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the 
literature on social tastes in markets. Our results suggest that the effects of tastes have a 
material impact on mutual fund holdings of both socially responsible investment funds and 
conventional funds. The advantage of studying mutual fund holdings is that these funds have 
traded stocks based on real prices and their returns are generated in the presence of real-time 
transaction costs and trading restrictions.   
Second, we contribute to the literature on socially responsible investing. Our results 
make a case for studying the effects of social tastes on performance based on the actual 
holdings of mutual funds. Although it has been common practice to compare explicit SRI 
funds and their stated social investment screens with conventional funds in order to determine 
the influence of social investing on performance, we show that such a comparison masks the 
true role of social dimensions in explaining investment returns. This evidence supports the 
view that the effects of social tastes on investments reach beyond explicitly SRI labeled 
investments. 
Third, we contribute to the literature that uses mutual funds to assess the economic 
significance of return predictor variables that are uncovered in studies on the cross-section of 
stock returns. Previous studies that use mutual funds have shown that common stock 
anomalies such as size, value, momentum, and accruals effects in stock returns are different 
on paper than in reality (e.g. Ali et al. 2008; Huij and Verbeek 2009).  We find that exposure 
to sin stocks and exposure to firms with good social responsibility profiles (meaning few 
ESG concerns and many ESG strengths) incrementally explains variation in mutual fund 
performance. 
The next section of this Chapter describes the data we use to identify socially 
controversial stocks, the exposures to socially sensitive stocks of U.S. mutual funds, and 
financial data on the stocks, mutual funds, and benchmark portfolios that are central to this 
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study. Section 3.3 outlines the computation of mutual funds controversial investment scores 
and presents initial evidence on social tastes in investment portfolios. In Section 3.4 we 





Using the CRSP Mutual Funds Database, we gather information about the holdings, monthly 
returns, and characteristics of mainly domestic U.S. equity mutual funds from January 2004 
up to December 2012. We exclude funds that had less than 75 percent of their assets invested 
in U.S. equities, index funds, specialty funds, global funds, micro cap funds, and ETFs.
28
 In 
order to identify which of the securities held by the funds are socially controversial, we match 
all their equity holdings with the MSCI STATS database. The MSCI STATS database 
(formerly known as Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD)) has since 2003 provided, on an 
annual basis, more than 50 indicators from 7 broader “Environmental, Social, and 
Governance” (ESG) categories covered for all constituents of the Russell 3000 universe.  
Among the indicators that STATS covers are controversial business indicators that span a 
firm’s involvement in tobacco, alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, and nuclear power, as 
well as “concerns” and “strengths” indicators in ESG areas beyond the aforementioned 
controversial businesses. We require at least 25 stocks and 75 percent of the equities of each 
fund to have a successful match with STATS. We also match the firms covered in STATS 
with the CRSP stocks database in order to obtain monthly stock returns and market 
capitalization at the security level from January 2004 to December 2012. Furthermore, we 
measure risk-adjusted returns of mutual funds and stocks by using Cahart’s (1997) four-factor 
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 We keep funds with the following investment objectives (retained from Lipper data as well as Fund names): 
Capital Appreciation, Growth, Growth Income, Income, Mid Cap, Small Cap.  
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model, with the factor data taken from the Kenneth French Data Library.
29
 Finally, we 
require the Carhart (1997) asset-pricing model to explain at least 50% of the variation in the 
mutual fund returns. This requirement serves as the gatekeeper to ensure we are using only 
U.S. domestic equity funds. The selection procedure results in a sample of 6647 mutual fund-
year observations that represent the degree of controversial investments from January 2004 to 
December 2012. Considering that we initially rank 17504 fund-year observations from the 
holdings files we exclude a big part of the sample. However, we take comfort in the fact that 
our final sample covers over 89% of the total market capitalization of all STATS ranked fund 
equities. This implies that we drop very small funds and funds with few equity investments 
under management. 
Among the set of mutual funds in the U.S. are certain funds that explicitly state the 
use of social screens in investment decisions. These “so-called” socially responsible mutual 
funds (SRI funds) have traditions of adopting “negative screens” to their investable stock 
universe, which involves the exclusion of stocks that are inconsistent with either societal 
norms or with the personal, religious, or political values of the funds’ clientele. In order to 
determine which of the mutual funds in our sample are explicit SRI funds, we use 
Morningstar Premium, the U.S. Social Investment Forum, SocialFunds.com, and previous 
studies on SRI mutual funds. To determine the accuracy of these sources, we hand-collected 
information about the social responsibility screens that the funds claim to apply in their 
investments, using the funds’ websites, prospectuses, and occasionally email correspondence 
with fund managers. A fund is confirmed to be explicitly socially responsible (SRI = 1) if the 
fund indicates that it applies at least one of the screens that we consider to the investment 
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 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#HistBenchmarks, these factors are 





 The number of U.S. SRI equity funds with confirmed investment screens 
increases over time, from 52 in 2004 to 72 in 2012.  
 
3.3. Empirical analysis: Socially sensitive investments 
 
3.3.1. Measuring mutual funds’ SR investment exposure 
 
For every mutual fund in our sample, we determine their scores quarterly along four 
dimensions of stock investment associated with investor tastes. The first dimension covers 
“sin stocks”, defined as the stocks of companies that according to STATS earn revenues from 
the sectors tobacco, alcohol and gambling. According to Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), 
especially sin stocks are shunned by investors because of societal norms against funding 
“vice”. We also consider a broader set of “sin stocks”, which additionally includes stocks of 
companies that are involved either in the firearms and military industry or with nuclear 
operations (see, e.g., Statman and Glushkov 2009, Derwall et al. 2011). In addition to these 
controversial business areas, we also consider ESG indicators since investors’ tastes for 
assets can be influenced by the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of firms (Fama French 
2007). Both theoretical and empirical studies suggest that environmental concerns may be 
associated with higher expected returns due to norms against these assets (e.g. Heinkel et al. 
2000, Chava 2013). In addition, El Ghoul et al. (2011) find that a broader set of CSR 
indicators are related to firms’ cost of capital. Firms with better (worse) ESG scores have a 
lower (higher) cost of equity capital, which is in line with the view that investor tastes are 
relevant for firms financing costs and thus for investors. 
                                                 
30
 We verify the responsible investment screens applied by the funds in this set on the presence of screens 
concerning alcohol, gambling, tobacco, weapons, and nuclear operations. In addition to these screens we 
evaluate the presence environmental, social, and governance screens, and other “social” screens (community, 
diversity, employee, environment, human rights, and governance). 
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To derive the four scores for mutual fund i, we use the fund’s quarterly holdings and 
value weight the firm level j. Using the controversial business indicators and ESG indicators 
from STATS, we arrive at the following mutual fund scores.  
 
                                          ∑                               
 
      (3.1a) 
                                ∑                                   
 
                 (3.1b) 
                                          ∑                                 
 
      (3.1c) 
                                          ∑                                 
 
                 (3.1d) 
 
where           is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stock j held by the fund is associated 
with tobacco, alcohol, or gambling sectors according to STATS,                is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if stock j is associated with tobacco, alcohol, gambling, 
firearms and military, or nuclear operations, and        measures the fraction of Russell 
3000 total net assets under management that fund i is invested in stock j. We also created two 
measures of a fund’s exposure to ESG concerns and strengths using all ESG indicators from 
STATS adjusted for industry and market capitalization since these are known to affect the 
number of ESG indicators (e.g. Kempf and Osthoff 2007, Statman and Glushkov 2009). For 
example, large firms in the natural resources industry have more ESG concern and strength 
indicators than do small and midsized financial services firms. The adjustment is done 
through year-by-year OLS regressions of the total number of ESG concerns (strengths) on 
market capitalization, squared market capitalization, and Fama French 48 (minus one) 
industry dummies. We predict a firms ESG concerns (strengths) using the coefficients of 
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these regressions forming E(firm_CON) and E(firm_STR).
31
 Subsequently we calculate the 
adjusted ESG measures as follows: 
 
                                                 (3.2a) 
                                                            (3.2b) 
 
These adjustments give us a measure for ESG performance relative to industry and size peers. 
Without these adjustments we would be picking up firm size and industry effects in both the 
concern and strengths measures. Because we observe that the quarterly holdings data is not 
complete for all funds (funds tend to report only (semi-)annually especially in the earlier 
years of our sample) we use the yearly average of all quarterly available fund scores for each 
mutual fund and retain all funds that have at least two quarterly scores available. 
Descriptive statistics on the mutual fund score-year observations from 2004 up to 
2012 are presented in Table 3.1, along with other characteristics of the mutual funds in our 
sample. Table 3.1 shows that the average fund has 4.1 percent of all assets under management 
invested in sin stocks (mean FundSIN = 0.041) and 13.4 percent invested in a broader set that 
additionally covers firearms and military and nuclear operations (mean FundBROADSIN = 
0.134). Furthermore, 2.6 percent of all fund-year observations trace back to explicitly SRI-
labeled funds. A further breakdown of these SRI funds by the types of social investment 
screens they claim to employ indicates that almost all of the funds state some form of sin 
stock screening, with 2.1 percent employing at least one screen within the “narrow” 
definition of sin stocks (SRI SIN screen = 0.021), and 2.2 percent employing at least one 
screen within the broader definition that also include weapons and nuclear operations (SRI 
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BROADSIN screen = 0.022). Explicit ESG portfolio screening is a little less common as it is 
done in 1.7% (SRI ESG screen = 0.017) of all fund-years.   
Table 3.1 also shows that the average domestic equity fund is 178 months old, has 1.6 
billion of assets under management, and charges 1% of expenses excluding 12b1 fees. Of all 
funds in our universe, 52.1 percent of the fund-year observations correspond to funds that 
have at least one class with load fees. 
The histograms A to D of annual mutual fund scores reported in Figure 3.1 indicate 
that U.S. mutual funds are to a varying degree invested in controversial stocks, with a few 
funds having more than 50 percent of their total assets under management invested in 
controversial firms. Among those that score high on FundSIN and FundBROADSIN are the 
well-known VICE Fund, Fidelity’s Defense & Aerospace Portfolio, and several Industrial 
funds. On the other hand, a significant number of mutual funds had no capital invested in 
companies that STATS associates with Tobacco, Alcohol, Gambling, Weapons and Military, 
and Nuclear operations related businesses (Figures 3.1A and 3.1B).
32
 A closer look at 
FundCON shows that at least some funds with ESG screens follow through on their 
prospectus. Amongst the group with the lowest FundCON (meaning lowest exposure to ESG 
concerns) we find fund-years from the following SRI funds: Calvert, Parnassus, and 
Professionally Managed Funds: The Women’s Equity Fund. However within the group with 
the lowest FundCON we also observe numerous growth equity funds like the John Hancock 
Growth Trends Fund and the Barrett Growth Fund. These observations hint in the direction of 
two conclusions. First, there are conventional funds that invest relatively few assets in 
controversial stocks. And second, the fund scores are likely correlated with investment style. 
Another interesting finding is that we find significantly lower representation of SRI funds 
amongst the funds with the highest FundSTR score.  
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 Histograms 1C and 1D are harder to interpret as these scores are not between 0 and 1 due to the underlying 





Table 3.1 Mutual fund summary statistics.  
This table presents descriptive statistics on the sample of mutual funds that received scores concerning 
controversial investments. FundSIN measures the fraction of total net assets that a fund is invested in stocks 
associated with tobacco, alcohol, and gambling according to STATS. FundBROADSIN measures the fraction of 
total net assets that a fund is invested stocks associated with tobacco, alcohol, gambling, weapons/defense, and 
nuclear operations. FundCON (FundSTR) is obtained by computing for each stock j the fraction a fund holds in 
stock j times the total number of size and industry adjusted ESG concerns (strengths) that are reported for stock j, 
and taking the sum of the weighted scores of all stocks in the fund in a given year. The fund characteristics are 
presented for the period 2004-2012. A fund is defined SRI if it has at least one social investment screen. An SRI 
fund employs a SIN screen (SRI SIN Screen) if at least one stated screen involves tobacco, alcohol, or gambling. 
An SRI fund employs a BROADSIN screen (SRI BROADSIN Screen) if at least one stated screen involves 
tobacco, alcohol, gambling, weapons/defense, or nuclear operations. An SRI fund employs an ESG screen (SRI 
ESG Screen = 1) if at least one stated screen involves environmental issues.            is the natural logarithm 
of the age of the oldest share class of the mutual fund,              is the natural logarithm of the total net assets 
(TNA) of the fund,                     is the natural logarithm of accumulated TNAs of funds that belong to 
the same fund family,            is a dummy for the presence of load fees, the natural logarithm of 12b1 fees, 
(             and that of other expenses (                 , past month mutual fund flow (log 1+flowi,t-1) 
inferred from total net assets using the approach suggested in Sirri and Tufano (1998). 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
FundSIN 6647 0.041 0.038 0.000 0.749 
FundBROADSIN 6647 0.134 0.080 0.000 1.000 
FundCON 6647 -0.085 0.520 -2.372 2.308 
FundSTR 6647 0.037 0.538 -2.246 3.417 
      Explicit SRI fund statistics 
    SRI 6647 0.026 0.160 0.000 1.000 
SRI SIN Screen 6647 0.021 0.144 0.000 1.000 
SRI BROADSIN Screen 6647 0.022 0.146 0.000 1.000 
SRI ESG Screen 6647 0.017 0.128 0.000 1.000 
      Fund characteristics 
     Fund size 6647 1617 5809 5 161912 
Family size 6647 146530 309094 5 3007970 
Age (months) 6644 178 152 20 1021 
Flow 6527 -0.005 0.043 -0.297 0.572 
12b1 6647 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.010 
Expense ratio  6647 0.010 0.006 0.000 0.089 
D load fee 6647 0.521 0.500 0.000 1.000 






Figure 3.1 Histograms of fund scores 
Every year, we create Fund scores for all U.S. equity mutual funds in our sample with available holdings 
information. These fund scores measure exposures to socially sensitive business practices or industries 
(A=FundSIN, B=FundBROADSIN, C=FundCON, and D=FundSTR). In sextion 3.1 we explain how these scores 
are created.  
 
Figure A: FundSIN histogram           Figure B: FundBROADSIN histogram 
      
 
Figure C: FundCON histogram           Figure D: FundSTR histogram 





3.3.2 SRI labeled funds in the cross-section of mutual fund social exposures 
 
Before we go into the performance effects of social tastes, we analyze the cross section of our 
Fund scores. Because SRI funds explicitly claim to screen their investments on the areas we 
consider (sin stocks, weapon and nuclear stocks, and the CSR profiles of the underlying firms 
































































industries and firms with bad CSR profiles as measured by FundSIN, FundBROADSIN, and 
FundCON. Similarly we expect SRI funds to invest more in firms with strong CSR profiles 
as measured by our FundSTR score. To test this we will perform OLS regressions of the 
following form: 
 
                                 ∑   
 
                          (3.3) 
 
Where FundSCORE is one of our four social scores measured at the latest month available in 
the year for mutual fund i. Dummy SRI indicates whether the fund explicitly claims to have 
social investment screens. Included in the vector                 are fund-specific 
characteristics and year-fixed effects. Other controls, which are common in the literature, 
include a dummy variable that indicates load fees, the natural logarithm of fund age (the age 
of the oldest share class of the mutual fund measured in months since the inception date), 
fund size (the natural logarithm of total net assets (TNA) in million US$), family size (the 
natural logarithm of the sum of TNAs of all funds that belong to the same family), fund flow 
(following the approach of Sirri and Tufano (1998)), 12b1 fees, a fund’s expense ratio 
(excluding 12b1 fees)
33
, and 9 investment style dummy variables (derived by estimating 
sensitivities of funds’ past 24-month returns to the four factors from Carhart (1997)).
34
  
 The results of these regressions are displayed in the first four columns of Table 3.2. 
We find that, in line with expectations, SRI fund portfolios have a 1.43% lower sin stock 
exposure on average. Considering the broader set of sin stocks, with firms in the nuclear 
energy and weapons industries, this difference increases to a 5.53% lower exposure. 
                                                 
33
 Since the fee data is on fund class level, we value-weight the fees. 
34
 We create style dummies based on a 3x3 grid of investment styles, determined using the distribution of funds’ 




 percentiles as cut-off levels. To estimate the factor 
loadings we use returns over the past 2 years and require that for each fund month we have at least 20 monthly 
returns. See section 3.4 for an explanation of the Carhart  (1997) model.  
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Interestingly, the SRI funds are significantly less invested in firms with ESG concerns (t-
statistic = 4.70), while these funds do not have higher exposure to firms with more ESG 
strengths in their portfolios. These findings support the view that SRI funds tend to avoid 
firms with operations that go against social tastes or norms, but do not overweight firms with 
strong corporate social responsibility. 
All but the style controls consistently explain the exposures. The style fixed effects 
load significantly on the exposures as can be seen in Table 3.2. The sin stock exposure is 
driven by firm size exposure. Compared to the Large Blend funds, all but the Large Value 
funds have lower sin stock exposures and the effect is exceptionally large for Small cap funds 
that have 2.4% to 3.5% lower sin stock exposure on average. Similar effects can be found for 
the broader sin definition. On the other hand, the exposure to the adjusted ESG concerns and 
strengths are driven more by underlying firms’ book-to-market ratios. This is not surprising 
as these measures are already size adjusted at the firm level. Funds classified as Growth funds 
(lowest 1/3
rd
 HML beta from the Carhart (1997) fund level regressions) have lower exposures, 
while Value funds (Highest 1/3
rd
 HML beta) have higher exposures compared to funds 
classified in the “Blend” category (Middle 1/3
rd
 HML beta). To better control for the style 
effects, we run independent regressions involving model (3.3), where we allow for 
permutations of the abovementioned                 measures: FundSIN, FundBROADSIN, 
FundCON, and FundSTR, by subtracting the mean within each style group. The results, that 
confirm our earlier findings, are displayed in the four final columns of Table 3.2. 
84 
 
Table 3.2. Mutual funds socially sensitive investment exposures 
We perform pooled cross-section regressions, with monthly risk-adjusted fund returns as dependent variable and as independent 
variables: one the funds’ controversial investment measures (FundSIN, FundBROADSIN, FundCON, and FundSTR),  a dummy for 
explicit SRI funds (SRI), a fund’s age,            (the natural logarithm of the age of the oldest share class of the mutual fund),  
            (the natural logarithm of the total net assets (TNA) of the fund),                     (the natural logarithm of accumulated 
TNAs of funds that belong to the same fund family), a dummy for the presence of load fees,             , the natural logarithm of 
12b1 fees, (             and that of other expenses (                 , past month mutual fund flow (log 1+flowi,t-1) inferred from 
total net assets using the approach suggested in Sirri and Tufano (1998), year-month fixed effects, and style fixed effects derived from 
funds’ four-factor betas. T statistics derived from two-way clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. Coefficients are 
multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  Raw fund scores   Style adjusted fund score  
 
SIN BROADSIN CON STR 
 
SIN BROADSIN CON STR 
 
        
 
        
SRI -1.425*** -5.528*** -30.346*** 9.875 
 
-1.326*** -5.295*** -27.270*** 10.056 
 
(-2.755) (-5.506) (-4.700) (1.293) 
 
(-2.654) (-5.696) (-4.489) (1.405) 
          Large Growth -0.676** -2.602*** -52.744*** -31.196*** 
 
-0.070 -0.045 -1.390 -1.754 
 
(-2.017) (-7.161) (-12.600) (-6.628) 
 
(-0.345) (-0.186) (-0.677) (-0.679) 
Large Value 0.327 1.882*** 43.251*** 24.108*** 
 
-0.083 0.089 -0.529 -1.188 
 
(1.200) (3.710) (8.989) (6.505) 
 
(-0.511) (0.416) (-0.270) (-0.703) 
Mid Blend -1.160*** -2.742*** -4.389 8.055** 
 
-0.048 0.241 0.183 -1.295 
 
(-4.054) (-5.277) (-1.038) (2.558) 
 
(-0.372) (1.037) (0.078) (-0.719) 
Mid Growth -0.926*** -3.790*** -51.930*** -24.451*** 
 
0.039 0.300 -2.196 -0.544 
 
(-2.771) (-8.021) (-9.975) (-3.967) 
 
(0.224) (0.966) (-1.039) (-0.250) 
Mid Value -0.996** -2.492*** 30.790*** 31.706*** 
 
-0.127 0.318 -1.409 -1.320 
 
(-2.065) (-2.615) (5.970) (5.158) 
 
(-0.526) (0.862) (-0.517) (-0.426) 
Small Blend -3.098*** -9.178*** -11.264*** -10.915*** 
 
-0.066 0.387 -2.997 -2.294 
 
(-6.894) (-6.518) (-4.484) (-3.011) 
 
(-0.517) (1.264) (-0.954) (-0.854) 
Small Growth -2.395*** -8.775*** -22.673*** -16.286*** 
 
0.043 0.461 -4.358 -2.317 
 
(-5.073) (-6.147) (-5.816) (-4.114) 
 
(0.272) (1.464) (-1.531) (-0.877) 
Small Value -3.521*** -9.038*** -6.256 -12.956*** 
 
0.021 0.637** -3.917 -1.067 
 
(-7.872) (-7.101) (-1.554) (-4.339) 
 
(0.155) (2.079) (-1.041) (-0.334) 
l_age -0.007 0.231 -2.202 -0.371 
 
-0.003 0.241 -2.366* -0.438 
 
(-0.062) (1.285) (-1.550) (-0.222) 
 
(-0.031) (1.351) (-1.938) (-0.270) 
l_size -0.012 -0.211** -0.044 -0.709 
 
-0.018 -0.237** 0.158 -0.745 
 
(-0.186) (-1.962) (-0.060) (-0.721) 
 
(-0.281) (-2.211) (0.250) (-0.758) 
l_12b1 124.219*** 164.706** -83.944 -304.405 
 
133.397*** 201.207*** -13.771 -334.505 
 
(2.669) (2.490) (-0.168) (-0.540) 
 
(2.953) (3.341) (-0.030) (-0.588) 
l_exp_ratio -16.512 -61.217* -266.602 -117.859 
 
-27.075 -102.342*** -186.265 -100.182 
 
(-0.681) (-1.826) (-1.023) (-0.315) 
 
(-1.130) (-3.587) (-0.819) (-0.277) 
D load_fees -0.035 -0.063 2.726 -1.256 
 
-0.054 -0.130 2.663 -0.904 
 
(-0.225) (-0.270) (1.438) (-0.583) 
 
(-0.359) (-0.535) (1.428) (-0.405) 
l_family_size 0.038 0.017 0.805* 0.471 
 
0.028 0.003 0.705* 0.533 
 
(0.887) (0.267) (1.873) (0.715) 
 
(0.656) (0.043) (1.815) (0.817) 
Constant 5.297*** 16.974*** -7.478 2.543 
 
0.368 2.683*** -5.775 -2.431 
 
(5.555) (12.633) (-0.705) (0.281) 
 
(0.452) (2.686) (-0.598) (-0.285) 
          Observations 6,287 6,287 6,287 6,287 
 
6,287 6,287 6,287 6,287 
R-squared 0.205 0.437 0.368 0.138 
 
0.013 0.034 0.024 0.003 




Table 3.3.  
See Table 3.2. We replace the SRI dummy by indicators for specific screens. An SRI fund employs a SIN screen (SRI SIN Screen) if 
at least one stated screen involves tobacco, alcohol, or gambling. An SRI fund employs a BROADSIN screen (SRI BROADSIN 
Screen) if at least one stated screen involves tobacco, alcohol, gambling, weapons/defense, or nuclear operations. An SRI fund 
employs an ESG screen (SRI ESG Screen = 1) if at least one stated screen involves environmental issues. 










    
 
    
 
    
 
    












































































Style FE YES YES   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
 
 
SRI is a multi facetted approach to investing; therefore the finding that FundSTR is 
not higher for SRI funds might be driven by the type of SRI screens applied. Since most SRI 
funds in our sample apply sin screens, some of these funds do not explicitly state to take the 
corporate social responsibility of firms into account. To control for the possibility that the 
type of screens influences our findings, we rerun the regressions with dummies for specific 
SRI screens.  
The results, presented in Table 3.3, confirm our earlier findings and show that the 
screens work well since SRI (BROAD)Sin Screened portfolios have lower (broad)sin stock 
exposure while not affecting the exposure to ESG indicators. SRI ESG Screened portfolios 
have lower exposure to firms with more ESG concern indicators while not significantly 
affecting the exposure to sin stocks. Again, no screening method results in a higher exposure 




3.3.3 Differences in mutual fund social exposures: SRI labeled vs. conventional funds 
 
Although SRI funds might on average score lower on controversial investments, it has been 
suggested that the effect of social norms and values on investments are not confined to 
explicit SRI funds (see e.g. Morse and Shive 2011, Hong and Kostovetsky 2012, Hong and 
Kacperczyk 2009, Kumar, Page and Spalt 2011).  In order to formally test for the possibility 
that conventional funds have “more social” holdings than do SRI funds, we allocate non-
explicit funds to one of ten decile portfolios based on style-adjusted FundSIN, 
FundBROADSIN, FundCON, or FundSTR. Subsequently we compute for each decile the 
difference between the average style-adjusted score of all explicit SRI funds in our sample 
and the decile score. Table 3.4 presents these differences concerning FundSIN, 
FundBROADSIN, FundCON, or FundSTR, along with t-statistics in parentheses.  
A global comparison of the first four columns (Raw fund scores) of test statistics to 
the second four columns (Style Adjusted fund scores) confirms our earlier findings that it is 
important to control for fund style when comparing exposures to controversial industries or 
socially desirable/controversial business practices. Controlling for fund style leads to a more 
fair comparison of fund scores as the differences are influenced by fund investment style. 
The t-statistics reported in the style adjusted columns of Table 3.4 demonstrate that 
the group of explicit SRI funds scores significantly higher on FundSIN than the bottom three 
deciles of conventional funds, significantly higher on FundBROADSIN than the bottom decile 
of conventional funds, and significantly higher on FundCON than the bottom two deciles of 
conventional funds. For FundSTR we find that the top three deciles of conventional funds 
score significantly higher. We indicated the previously mentioned deciles by printing them in 
bold.  
In addition to our SRI label, we also use dummies for the screens that match the fund 
scores tested (e.g. SRI Sin Screen for FundSIN). We confirm our results that there exists a 
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significant group of conventional funds that scores lower on FundSIN, FundBROADSIN, and 
FundCON, and there are three deciles that have a higher FundSTR. The magnitudes are 
economically significant, the top FundSIN (FundBROADSIN) decile of conventional funds 
have an 8.2% (16.7%) higher fund style adjusted (broad)sin stock exposure than SRI funds 
with the specific screens on average. However, the bottom FundSIN (FundBROADSIN) 
decile of conventional funds have an 2.8% (2.8%) lower fund style adjusted (broad)sin stock 
exposure on average. 
These results demonstrate the existence of conventional U.S. equity mutual funds that 
are less exposed to controversial firms or more exposed to firms with ESG strengths than 
explicit SRI funds. This means that investors in mutual funds can consider a larger set of 
funds than just SRI funds when their social tastes affect their investment decisions. Especially 
investors into mutual funds who get utility from exposure to ESG strengths should look into 




3.4. Empirical analysis: Do social tastes affect investment performance? 
 
3.4.1 Performance of stock portfolios potentially affected by social tastes  
 
To understand the payoff associated with controversial stock investments witnessed in mutual 
fund holdings, we first perform a portfolio study on stocks that determine the fund scores. 
Consistent with our procedure to rank mutual funds, starting in January 2004, we build 
annually rebalanced stock portfolios based on previous years STATS information and collect 
their monthly returns. The first is a hypothetical SIN stock portfolio that comprises all stocks 
for which           =1. The second is a BROADSIN portfolio, composed of stocks for 
                                                 
35
 Since most mutual funds report their top 10 holdings it is not impossible, even for individual investors into 
mutual funds, to assess the socially sensitive investment exposures of a mutual fund. 
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which                =1. The third group of portfolios is formed on basis of the 
distribution of the Adj_firm_CON measure and contains all stocks in the respective quartile 
of the distribution. The fourth portfolio is created using a similar approach for the 
Adj_firm_STR measure. Doing so for consecutive years ultimately yields monthly post-rank 
returns from January 2004 to December 2012, which we subsequently use to determine the 
portfolios’ average four-factor risk-adjusted return (see specification (4)).  
We test the returns of these portfolios against the Carhart (1997) model. This four-factor 
model takes the form: 
 
                  (         )                                              (3.4) 
 
where      represents each mutual portfolio’s monthly return,           is the return on a 
value-weighted portfolio composed of all stocks from the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq exchanges, 
in excess of a risk-free rate of return from Ibbotson. SMBt is the return difference between a 
small cap portfolio and a large cap portfolio; HMLt
 
is the return difference between a “value” 
portfolio (with a high book/market value ratio) and a “growth” (low book/market value) 
portfolio; MOMt is the return difference between a portfolio of past 12-month winners and a 
portfolio of past 12-month losers.
36
 
Table 3.5 shows the annualized alpha coefficient from the regressions following 
model (3.4) on value-weighted portfolios. Because in practice many mutual fund managers 
are required to hold larger firms, we consider not only hypothetical portfolios derived from 
stocks in the entire STATS (i.e., Russell 3000) universe but also portfolios derived from 
stocks that belong to the S&P500. Concerning the SIN portfolios reported in Panel A of Table 
                                                 
36
 Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) provide more details on the construction of the factors and the 
performance evaluation model.  
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3.5, the average risk-adjusted return over the period 2004-2012 is 4.7% and significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. A portfolio long in SIN stocks and short in all other 
Russell 3000 (S&P 500) stocks earned 5.0% (6.1%) over the same period. The value-
weighted BROADSIN portfolio earned an economically significant risk-adjusted return of 
about 1.9%, which is not statistically significant at conventional levels. We report similar 
returns for the difference portfolios with an economically significant alpha of 2.2% for 
Russell 3000 and 2.3% for S&P 500 stocks.  
The Adj_firm_CON and STR measures selected portfolios do not yield statistically 
significant returns. However, the high minus low Adj_firm_CON portfolio earned 1.5% using 
the Russell 3000 and 3.7% for the S&P 500 universe, both not statistically significant at 





Table 3.4. Differences in scores between SRI funds and deciles of all other funds 
We report the difference between the raw and style-adjusted scores of SRI funds and those of deciles of all other funds concerning the four areas of socially sensitive 
investment. The fund deciles are formed by ranking all non-SRI funds based on one of the three style-adjusted scores: FundSIN, FundBROADSIN,  FundCON, or FundSTR. 
The t statistics on the difference in score between the SRI class and a decile is derived from a two-tailed test, and is presented in parentheses. Besides testing the difference of 
SRI funds and conventional funds we also test the differences using the SRI funds that specifically screen on the exposures tested. That is; FundSIN and SRI SIN Screen, 
FundBROADSIN and SRI BROADSIN Screen, FundCON and SRI ESG Screen, and FundSTR and SRI ESG Screen. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively.  
  Raw fund scores   Style adjusted fund scores   Style adjusted fund scores by specific screens 
 
SIN BROADSIN CON STR 
 
SIN BROADSIN CON STR 
 
SIN BROADSIN CON STR 
SRI-Bottom 
decile 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.675*** 0.975*** 
 
0.029*** 0.037*** 0.442*** 0.899*** 
 
0.028*** 0.028*** 0.283*** 0.975*** 
 
(37.16) (36.67) (38.09) (54.98) 
 
(32.04) (21.60) (27.27) (52.20) 
 
(28.93) (16.62) (15.13) (47.49) 
SRI-2nd 0.0184*** 0.025*** 0.221*** 0.576*** 
 
0.014*** -0.000 0.089*** 0.499*** 
 
0.012*** -0.010*** -0.068*** 0.574*** 
 
(22.68) (18.37) (16.22) (43.49) 
 
(16.78) (-0.322) (7.674) (38.94) 
 
(14.60) (-8.037) (-5.741) (40.20) 
SRI-3rd 0.011*** 0.004** -0.004 0.438*** 
 
0.006*** -0.017*** -0.063*** 0.348*** 
 
0.005*** -0.027*** -0.220*** 0.424*** 
 
(14.09) (3.046) (-0.324) (34.30) 
 
(7.226) (-13.09) (-5.638) (27.82) 
 
(5.436) (-22.69) (-19.98) (30.60) 
SRI-4th 0.003***  -0.016*** -0.116*** 0.348*** 
 
0.000 -0.030*** -0.160*** 0.259*** 
 
-0.001 -0.040*** -0.317*** 0.334*** 
 
(4.174) (-9.921) (-9.080) (27.58) 
 
(0.559) (-22.83) (-14.54) (20.92) 
 
(-0.869) (-33.93) (-29.29) (24.47) 
SRI-5th  -0.004***  -0.037*** -0.201*** 0.258*** 
 
-0.005*** -0.042*** -0.239*** 0.180*** 
 
-0.006*** -0.051*** -0.396*** 0.254*** 
 
(-5.179) (-20.03) (-15.76) (20.52) 
 
(-6.425) (-31.57) (-21.69) (14.64) 
 
(-7.538) (-44.02) (-36.68) (18.89) 
SRI-6th  -0.013***  -0.058*** -0.285*** 0.149*** 
 
-0.011*** -0.053*** -0.316*** 0.093*** 
 
-0.012*** -0.062*** -0.474*** 0.166*** 
 
(-14.20) (-28.03) (-22.30) (11.86) 
 
(-13.91) (-40.23) (-28.72) (7.650) 
 
(-14.70) (-53.85) (-43.83) (12.57) 
SRI-7th  -0.021***  -0.080*** -0.392*** 0.007 
 
-0.018*** -0.066*** -0.404*** -0.013 
 
-0.019*** -0.076*** -0.562*** 0.061*** 
 
(-22.95) (-35.41) (-30.36) (0.502) 
 
(-22.33) (-49.99) (-36.50) (-1.037) 
 
(-22.69) (-64.61) (-51.43) (4.593) 
SRI-8th  -0.031*** -0.101*** -0.562*** -0.152*** 
 
-0.026*** -0.082*** -0.512*** -0.153*** 
 
-0.027*** -0.092*** -0.670*** -0.078*** 
 
(-32.10) (-43.35) (-42.19) (-10.97) 
 
(-32.61) (-60.93) (-45.25) (-12.18) 
 
(-32.45) (-76.30) (-59.23) (-5.651) 
SRI-9th  -0.045*** -0.124*** -0.810*** -0.374*** 
 
-0.039*** -0.103*** -0.663*** -0.343*** 
 
-0.040*** -0.112*** -0.821*** -0.268*** 
 
(-44.24) (-52.71) (-58.02) (-24.72) 
 
(-46.86) (-74.58) (-56.46) (-25.45) 
 
(-45.75) (-90.31) (-68.33) (-17.63) 
SRI-Top decile  -0.089*** -0.181*** -1.197*** -0.858*** 
 
-0.081*** -0.157*** -0.993*** -0.786*** 
 
-0.082*** -0.167*** -1.151*** -0.711*** 
 
(-37.80) (-53.17) (-68.01) (-37.67) 
 
(-35.91) (-55.99) (-63.48) (-37.53) 
 
(-33.10) (-56.54) (-64.53) (-27.87) 
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Table 3.5. Stock portfolios formed using controversial business indicators  
Every year, starting in January we rank stocks based on controversial business indicators or ESG indicators from 
MSCI STATS of the previous year. Immediately following the ranking, we assign stocks to a value-weighted 
portfolio and rebalance the portfolio every year with the latest indicators. Doing so ultimately yields monthly 
post-formation returns from January 2004 to December 2012. We run Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions to 
estimate the risk-adjusted average return. A SIN portfolio contains stocks that have been associated by STATS 
with one of the following categories: alcohol, tobacco, and gaming. A BROADSIN portfolio comprises all SIN 
stocks in addition to stocks associated with military, weapons, and nuclear operations. Adj_firm_CON 
(Adj_firm_STR) is the size (market capitalization and market capitalization squared) and industry adjusted 
number of concern indicators from stats. We report on analyses performed on the entire STATS universe 
(Russell 3000 stocks), and on analyses performed using S&P500 firms exclusively. Panel A reports the risk-
adjusted returns associated with (BROAD)SIN, all firms that are Not (BROAD)SIN, and difference portfolios 
(BROAD)SIN minus Not (BROAD)SIN. Panel B reports the risk-adjusted return difference of portfolios of all 
stocks in the respective quartiles of the distribution of Adj_firm_CON (Adj_firm_STR) as well as the difference 
between the Highest and Lowest quartiles. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Russell 3000   S&P500 
Panel A: Sin stock portfolios 






































        Panel B: Adjusted ESG score ranked portfolios 



































                 
 
 
3.4.2 SR holdings and the cross-section of mutual fund performance  
 
The analyses in the previous section lead us to expect that only sin stock exposure is 
associated with mutual fund returns. Although we tested hypothetical portfolios of equities, 
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the effects of fund scores on diversified equity funds might be different. In this section we 
will directly test for the effects of socially sensitive investment exposures on mutual fund 
performance. Our formal tests contain pooled cross-section regressions with monthly risk-
adjusted fund returns         as dependent variable and the fund scores as the independent 
variables that are central to this study. Our regression models are written as: 
 
                              ∑   
 
                            (3.5) 
 
where         is the monthly return before expenses
37
 of mutual fund i in excess of the risk 
free rate predicted by the Carhart (1997) factor model as in (3.4). Using this asset pricing 
model,         is then defined as:  
 
                            (3.6) 
 
In independent regressions involving model (3.4), we use the abovementioned style 
adjusted                measures: FundSIN, FundBROADSIN, FundCON, and FundSTR. 
Included in the vector                 are fund-specific characteristics, style fixed effects, and 
month-fixed effects. One particularly relevant control variable is an indicator variable for 
explicit SRI funds, which enables us to investigate the returns on explicit SRI funds relative 
to funds without SRI label. Other controls, which are common in the literature, include a 
dummy variable that indicates load fees, the natural logarithm of fund age (the age of the 
oldest share class of the mutual fund measured in months since the inception date), fund size 
(the natural logarithm of total net assets (TNA) in million US$), family size (the natural 
logarithm of the sum of TNAs of all funds that belong to the same family), fund flow 
                                                 
37
 We derive these returns by subtracting 1/12
th




(following the approach of Sirri and Tufano (1998)), 12b1 fees, a fund’s expense ratio 
(excluding 12b1 fees)
38
. Finally, we run rolling 24-month Carhart (1997) regressions to 
obtain style tilts (SMB and HML betas) and R-squared of these regressions as a measure of 
selectivity (Amihud and Goyenko 2013). From the betas we create 9 investment style dummy 
variables and include those in the analyses (for more detail see footnote 8). We derive the 
standard errors in two ways; first we use clusters by time and mutual fund, second we use 
autocorrelation-adjusted standard errors over the past 24 months following Newey and West 
(1987).  
The results presented in Table 3.6 point to a positive association between FundSIN 
and mutual funds’ risk-adjusted return
39
. The coefficient on sin-stock exposure is 0.32 (0.44 
in the regressions without control variables), which suggests that an increase from zero 
controversy exposure to full controversial investment is associated with an annualized 
increase in risk-adjusted return of about 3.8% (5.3%) keeping all else equal. This return is 
remarkably close to the 4.7% abnormal return on the hypothetical SIN stock portfolio (Panel 
A of Table 3.5). The coefficient on FundBROADSIN is economically smaller than the 
coefficient on FundSIN, and statistically not significantly different from zero (given the 
conventional levels of significance). In addition, FundCON and FundSTR are not 
significantly related to risk-adjusted mutual fund returns over the period we investigate.  
Note that in Table 3.6, the coefficient on the dummy variable for explicit SRI funds is 
not significantly different from zero, which is consistent with the vast majority of studies that 
compare the returns of SRI-labeled funds in the U.S. with those of conventional funds; see, 
e.g., Derwall et al. (2011) for a review of the SRI literature. The finding that risk-adjusted 
mutual fund return is predicted by an actual holdings-based measure of sin stock investment 
and not by an SRI label could be taken to imply that an SRI classification alone insufficiently  
                                                 
38
 Since the fee data is on fund class level, we value-weight the fees. 
39
 Using raw monthly fund returns instead of risk-adjusted returns yields qualitatively similar results. 
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Table 3.6. Mutual funds socially sensitive investment exposures and risk-adjusted returns 
We perform pooled cross-section regressions, with monthly Carhart risk-adjusted fund returns from rolling 24 month 
regressions as dependent variable and as independent variables: one of the funds’ style adjusted socially sensitive investment 
measures (FundSIN, FundBROADSIN, FundCON, and FundSTR), a dummy for explicit SRI funds (SRI), a fund’s age, 
           (the natural logarithm of the age of the oldest share class of the mutual fund),              (the natural logarithm of the 
total net assets (TNA) of the fund),                     (the natural logarithm of accumulated TNAs of funds that belong to the 
same fund family), the R-squared from the four-factor model over the past 24 monthly returns (R2 Carhart), a dummy for the 
presence of load fees,             , the natural logarithm of 12b1 fees, (              and that of other expenses 
(                 , past month mutual fund flow (l_flowi,t-1) inferred from total net assets using the approach suggested in Sirri 
and Tufano (1998), year-month fixed effects, and style fixed effects derived from funds’ rolling 24 month four-factor betas. T 
statistics derived from two-way clustered standard errors are presented in round brackets and derived from Newey-West 
corrected standard errors with 24 lags in squared brackets. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience.  *, 
**, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  Dependent variable risk adjusted return  








    
 
    
 
    
 
    




































































































































































































































































































Style FE NO YES   NO YES   NO YES   NO YES 
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distinguishes mutual funds along social dimensions.
40
 Section 4 will more explicitly elaborate 
on the usefulness of the SRI label relative to that of holdings-based information in assessing 
the effects of social preferences or tastes on risk-adjusted return.  
Given the precise definition of what stocks are considered sin stocks in our paper, the 
FundCON and FundSTR measures are derived indirectly from firm level ESG indicators. 
Therefore, we violate the assumption that the independent variables are measured without 
error. To mitigate this issue we will consider several measures that suffer less from 
estimation error. The first measure considered is when we use quintiles of the firm-level 
distributions of Adj_firm_CON and STR to form FundCON and FundSTR as in (1c) and 
(1d). The results presented in Table 3.7 confirm our findings from Table 3.6 that there is no 
significant effect of ESG concerns on risk-adjusted returns of diversified U.S. equity funds. 
However, FundSTRgroups is significantly negatively related to mutual fund performance in 3 
out of 4 regressions. This result is in line with tastes for stocks of companies with strong 
corporate social responsibility driving up the prices of these companies and consequently 
leading to lower expected returns. 
Second we test for the possibility that social tastes for firms with much ESG strength 
indicators are particularly positive when these firms do not have a lot of concerns. A similar 
argument can be made for social tastes against firms with a high number of concerns, those 
firms might try (and succeed) to compensate with a high number of ESG strengths. Therefore 
we create firm level dummies that are equal to one when a firm is in the top (bottom) 40% of 
Adj_firm_CON and in the bottom (top) 40% of Adj_firm_STR to form the fund-level 
measures: FundCONtop_STRbottom (FundCONbottom_STRtop). We repeat this exercise for 
top and bottom 20% firms. The results indicate that the negative returns associated with 
exposure to firms with more strengths are driven by firms in the top quintile of strengths and 
                                                 
40
 The coefficient on the SRI dummy continues to be not significantly different from zero if we drop the three 
holdings-based measures of controversial investment. 
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bottom quintile of concerns. Broadening this definition to the top and bottom two quintiles 
results in all coefficients losing their statistical significance and decreasing in magnitude as 
well. 
 
Table 3.7 Mutual funds ESG rating exposure and risk-adjusted returns  
See Table 3.6. We consider variations on the Fund scores. First we replace Adj_firm_CON (Adj_firm_STR) 
with quintiles of Adj_firm_CON (Adj_firm_STR), firms in the third quintile receive a firm level score of 3. We 
use these quintile measures to rank the mutual funds as in (1c) and (1d) to form FundCONgroups and 
FundSTRgroups. Second we consider firm level dummies for firms that are both in the Top (Bottom) quintiles 
of Adj_firm_CON and in the bottom (Top) quintiles of Adj_firm_STR to form Fund CONtop STRbottom 
(FundCONbottom STRtop). We perform this exersize for firms in the Top and Bottom 40% as well as for the 
Top and Bottom 20%.  
  Dependent variable risk adjusted return  
                     
FundCONgroups -0.006 -0.013 
    
 
(-0.182) (-0.388) 
    
 
[-0.473] [-1.001] 
    FundSTRgroups -0.040 -0.037 
    
 
(-1.701)* (-1.604) 
    
 
[-2.516]** [-2.379]** 
    Fund CONtop STRbottom  
  
0.037 0.005 




   
[0.274] [0.036] 
  FundCONbottom STRtop  
  
-0.174 -0.145 




   
[-1.241] [-1.082] 
  FundCONtop STRbottom  
    
-0.347 -0.383 
20% 
    
(-0.671) (-0.750) 
     
[-1.215] [-1.366] 
FundCONbottom STRtop  
    
-0.625 -0.475 
20% 
    
(-1.789)* (-1.492) 
     
[-2.402]** [-1.903]* 
       Observations 52,321 51,984 52,321 51,984 52,321 51,984 
R-squared 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.081 
Month FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Style FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 
Taken together, this section provides evidence that social tastes can affect returns. The 
findings in this section are consistent with the notion of Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) that in 
particular investor boycotts of classical sin stocks from the tobacco, alcohol and gaming 
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sectors are material enough to influence asset prices. Similarly, our findings are consistent 
with tastes for socially responsible firms leading to lower returns for firms with many 
strength indicators and few concern indicators. However, although the estimated payoffs that 
mutual funds can enjoy for a full unit of investment exposure is large, it is not entirely clear 
at this point to what extent mutual funds realized higher (lower) returns by taking full 
exposure to controversial (socially responsible) assets. How much factor exposure mutual 
funds adopted throughout our sample period and the effects on realized pre-expense returns is 
addressed in the next section of the paper.   
 
3.4.3 Socially sensitive investment and performance of portfolios of mutual funds 
 
We now investigate to what extent mutual funds’ risk-adjusted returns are affected by the 
degree of their actual investment in socially sensitive securities. Every year, we rank all funds 
on one of their style-adjusted fund scores and then allocate funds to several ranked mutual 
fund portfolios. In independent analyses, we rank funds on one of the four style-adjusted 
scores of socially sensitive investment. We collect monthly returns on each portfolio for the 
next twelve months. By annually ranking funds using updated mutual fund scores, we 
eventually obtain monthly returns on mutually exclusive portfolios, which differ along the 
aforementioned scores, for the period January 2004-December 2012. Our principal goal is to 
assess the risk-adjusted return difference between high- and low-ranked mutual funds, where 
the risk-adjusted average return is based on the intercept from a four-factor model (as in 
specification (3.4)). If mutual funds can profit from social controversies, we expect to see a 
positive risk-adjusted return difference between high-ranked and low-ranked (“high minus 
low”) portfolios. Similarly, funds with the highest exposures to firms with good CSR profiles 
might gain lower risk adjusted returns than their low exposure peers.  
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Table 3.8 shows the results of ranking funds based on the style-adjusted fund scores 
and assigning the highest (lowest) one-fourth of all ranked funds to high (low) ranked 
portfolios.
41
 In Panel A of Table 3.8, we show the results of portfolios where mutual funds 
receive a weight in the portfolio based on their total net assets (TNA) relative to the TNA of 
all funds in the portfolio in addition we provide high minus low (HML) equal weighted 
portfolios of mutual funds.   
The results in Panel A of Table 3.8 show that the annualized risk-adjusted return 
differences between top- and bottom-ranked funds are small and not statistically significant 
for all fund-scores we consider. The observation that the risk-adjusted return differences 
between top- and bottom-ranked funds in Table 3.8 are smaller than the payoff per unit of 
fund score exposure as reported in Tables 6 and 7, is arguably because mutual funds with 
relatively high scores are still not fully invested in sin stocks or stocks with many ESG 
strengths due to benchmark (tracking error) constraints and other trading restrictions as 
shown in Table 3.4. Evidently, the spread in mutual fund scores between top and bottom-
ranked funds is considerably smaller than the 100-percent spread that is implicitly required to 
reap the estimated payoffs that are reported in Tables 6 and 7. 
In Panel B we complete this analysis by a consideration of the exposures to firms with 
good (poor) social responsibility profiles, defined as having many (few) ESG strengths and 
few (many) concerns. In line with the cross-sectional analyses we find that a TNA weighted 
(equal weighted)  High minus Low portfolio of funds ranked on their exposure to firms in the 
top 40% of Firm_adj_STR and simultaneously in the bottom 40% of Firm_adj_CON yields a 
negative alpha of -0.90% (-0.55%) which is not statistically significant. When considering the 
very best corporate citizens by considering top and bottom 20% cut offs, the statistical 
significance increases and we find a negative alpha of -1.08% on the TNA weighted portfolio 
                                                 
41
 We also considered tercile and quintile portfolios of mutual funds, the results remain virtually unchanged for 
these fund selection procedures. 
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that is significant at the 10% level. The equal weighted counterpart is not statistically 
significant at the levels we consider. 
In a nutshell, the exposure differences between mutual funds are not large enough to 
lead to convincing significant performance differences between high vs. low exposure groups 
of funds. Only sporadically do we find funds that are fully invested in controversial or most 
socially responsible assets. Social tastes have the potential to influence investment 
performance, however, the exposures are too low for us to find large and consistent 
differences between large numbers of mutual funds. 
3.4.4 Socially sensitive investment exposures and performance of SRI labeled funds 
 
The analysis of mutual fund holdings indicates that the extent of investment in sin stocks and 
socially progressive stocks influences mutual fund performance. At first glance, this 
conclusion appears to contrast with studies on the performance of explicitly socially 
responsible mutual funds, also known as SRI funds. The typical U.S. fund with SRI label 
explicitly conducts exclusionary screens on stocks from tobacco, alcohol and gambling 
sectors, among other types of social investment screens. Yet the majority of empirical studies 
on SRI-labeled mutual fund performance concludes that SRI funds and conventional funds 
earn similar risk-adjusted returns; see, e.g., Derwall et al. (2011) for a review of empirical 
studies. In Table 3.9, we corroborate this conclusion based on our sample of SRI funds over 
the period 2004-2012. Reported is the four-factor alpha for a portfolio of all SRI funds 
relative to that of a portfolio of funds that do not carry an SRI label, as well as the alphas for 
portfolios of SRI funds that employ specific socially responsible investment screens. The 
alphas in Table 3.9 are not significantly different from zero. Thus, unlike evidence from 
actual holding in socially sensitive assets, evidence from SRI-labeled funds and their stated 
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investment screens would suggest that responsible investment screens do not influence fund 
performance. 
 
Table 3.8. Risk-adjusted returns of exposure ranked fund portfolios: alternative cut-off levels of 
socially sensitive investments 
Every year, we rank all mutual funds in our sample for which holdings information is available on their most 
recent Fund score, using one of four style-adjusted measures (FundSIN, FundBROADSIN, FundCON, and 
FundSTR). We style adjust the scores by subtracting the mean of the score within each style group. Immediately 
following the ranking, we assign funds with high (low) scores to a portfolio composed of Top (Bottom) ranked 
funds. We form quartile portfolios based on the Fund score distributions of all ranked funds. We compute the 
portfolios’ monthly returns for the next twelve consecutive months. This procedure ultimately yields monthly 
post-formation returns from January 2004 to December 2012. We run Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions to 
estimate the risk-adjusted average return. We report the complete set of results for value weighted portfolios 
based on total net assets (TNA) and the difference portfolios (HML) for both TNA and equal weighted scemes. 
T statistics are presented in parentheses.  
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Table 3.9. Difference in four-factor alphas between SRI-labeled funds and all other funds 
Reported are four-factor risk-adjusted returns based on specification (3.3), derived from monthly returns of 
explicit SRI fund and all other (“no-SRI”) funds in the sample over the period January 2004 – December 2012. 
Panel A reports on a total net assets (TNA) weighted portfolio of SRI-labeled funds minus a portfolio of all 
other funds in the sample, and on an equal-weighted portfolio of SRI funds that employ sin screens minus a 
portfolio of all funds that do not employee sin screens. Panel B reports four-factor alphas concerning these fund 
portfolios when funds receive equal portfolio weights. T statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  Alpha Mkt-Rf SMB HML MOM R-squared 
              
Panel A: TNA weighted 
      SRI - No SRI -0.77% -0.053** 0.066* 0.098*** -0.053*** 0.228 
 
(-0.833) (-2.310) (1.686) (3.355) (-3.454) 
       Sin Screen – No Sin Screen -0.77% -0.052** 0.063 0.098*** -0.053*** 0.224 
  (-0.832) (-2.274) (1.612) (3.359) (-3.380) 
       ESG Screen – No ESG Screen -1.30% -0.028 0.110** 0.104*** -0.085*** 0.250 
 
(-1.165) (-0.836) (2.274) (2.974) (-3.510) 
       Panel B: Equal weighted 
      SRI- No SRI -0.53% -0.049** -0.036 0.056* -0.034*** 0.200 
 
(-0.748) (-2.108) (-1.103) (1.816) (-3.078) 
       Sin Screen- No Sin Screen -0.70% -0.037* -0.049 0.058** -0.029*** 0.207 
 
(-1.067) (-1.835) (-1.656) (2.138) (-2.863) 
       ESG Screen - No ESG Screen -1.08% -0.031 -0.004 0.050* -0.069*** 0.338 
 
(-1.296) (-1.282) (-0.091) (1.664) (-3.591) 
              
 
 
  However, one explanation that reconciles these different findings is that various non-
explicit SRI funds experience lower controversial scores than the typical SRI fund (Table 3.4). 
Although SRI funds might on average score lower on controversial investments, it has been 
suggested that the effect of social norms and values on investments are not confined to 
explicit SRI funds (see e.g. Morse and Shive 2011, Hong and Kostovetsky 2012, Hong and 
Kacperczyk 2009, Kumar et al. 2011). According to our findings, excluding sin stocks and 
overweighting socially progressive stocks (many strengths and few concerns) both could 
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result in lower SRI fund performance. However, in Tables 2 to 4 we report that the exposure 
differences between SRI and conventional funds are generally small mitigating the effects of 
social tastes on SRI fund performance.  
These findings have implications for determining whether investors can profit from 
social tastes in markets with the use of mutual funds. While the predominant approach in the 
literature involves contrasting explicit SRI funds with conventional funds, our results imply 
that such a comparison leads to biased inferences about the practical implications of social 
dimensions regarding investment performance. If several conventional funds score at least as 
low as SRI funds in terms of controversial investments, then a comparison of returns between 
SRI and conventional funds will mask the true relation between social dimensions in fund 
holdings and fund performance. These results reinforce the case for studying actual fund 




Theories predict that due to social tastes a significant number of investors abstain from 
holding stocks that are deemed socially controversial or overweight stocks from socially 
responsible firms (e.g. Fama and French 2007, Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). So far, there has 
been mixed empirical evidence on the question whether these social tastes have an impact on 
the prices and returns of socially sensitive stocks. Can investors profit from social tastes? 
We started our analyses with a comparison of fund exposures to socially sensitive stocks. 
We show that there is significant variation in the extent to which funds are exposed to 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Gambling firms (“sin” firms), a broader sin definition that also 
includes Weapons, and Nuclear energy stocks, as well as variation in exposure to firms with a 
high number of ESG concern or strength indicators. As expected, SRI funds hold fewer assets 
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in controversial industries and firms with ESG concerns on average. However, an 
investigation of the distribution reveals that there exists a large group, ranging from 10% to 
30%, of the conventional mutual funds that is less exposed to these types of “bad” firms. On 
the contrary, they do not differentiate themselves on the level of social and environmental 
strengths.  
These findings support our view of a holdings-based analysis instead of comparing SRI 
labeled funds to conventional funds to test the effects of social tastes on investment 
performance. Based on the actual holdings and pre-expense returns of domestic U.S. equity 
mutual funds over the period 2004-2012, we provide evidence that social tastes can affect 
investment performance, yet to a very limited extent. This finding contrasts studies based on 
hypothetical stock portfolios with full exposure to socially sensitive stocks (like sin stocks) 
that have provided economically large and statistically significant returns (e.g. Fabozzi et al. 
(2008), Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), and Derwall et al. (2011)).  
We find that differences in mutual funds’ risk-adjusted returns can be explained by 
differences in their ‘sin stock’ scores (the fraction of assets invested stocks from alcohol, 
tobacco, and gambling sectors), and their exposure to socially responsible firms (those that 
simultaneously score high on our measure of ESG strength indicators and low on the 
concerns measure). We conclude that the effect of social tastes on asset prices is 
economically and statistically significant in the presence of actual trading costs and trading 
restrictions for sin stocks, as predicted by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), and for stocks with 
very strong social responsibility profiles as predicted by El Ghoul et al. (2011). Beyond these 
social dimensions, we do not find evidence that exposure to a broader set of sin stocks and 
stocks with ESG concerns have influenced risk-adjusted mutual fund returns.  
To build the bridge from these cross-sectional results to a profitable investment strategy 
we should find an abnormal risk adjusted return for a portfolio long (short) in mutual funds 
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with high (low) sin stock exposure. Or a portfolio of mutual funds that is short (long) in firms 
with a high (low) number of ESG strengths and a low (high) number of concerns. Our 
evidence however shows that the cross-sectional results do not work through into high minus 
low portfolio returns due to low exposure differences between funds. Subsequently, we use a 
similar logic to explain why the literature has found that SRI fund performance is not 
different from conventional fund performance even though they explicitly state to exclude 
(profitable) controversial stock investments. 
Although the performance differences between SRI and conventional funds are small, 
we do find some potentially interesting avenues for further research into SRI funds. The 
combined findings that SRI funds do not overweight firms with a higher number ESG 
indicators, and that it is exactly this exposure that leads to (slightly) lower risk adjusted 
returns, could support the conclusion that SRI funds better understand the effects of corporate 
social responsibility on performance and therefore do not overweight firms with very strong 
corporate social responsibility policies. On the other hand, SRI funds can also act as merely 
social concern avoiders like they do, to some extent, for sin stocks. 
Taken as a whole, a holdings-based analysis of mutual funds provides valuable new 
insights into the factor exposures and payoffs associated with socially sensitive assets in 
practice. Based on our main findings we suggest using actual holdings data for analyses into 











There has been an increasing interest in the effects of social values on investment behavior 
and decision making. In this paper we empirically test whether the utility obtained from 
investing in socially responsible pension investments is significantly positive. If so, pension 
funds face the challenge of implementing a responsible investment strategy on behalf of their 
beneficiaries. If this is the case, we first need to investigate if and to what extent individuals 
value social responsibility in their pension investments because beneficiaries do not have full 
information on and control over their pension investments. At the same time the pension 
funds have significant market power. 
The rationale behind the introduction of more socially responsible pension products 
initiates in the observation that people are increasingly buying socially responsible products. 
The market share of green energy in the Netherlands has risen from below 2% in 1990 to 
over 11% in 2008
43
. The UK Fair-trade foundation
44
 claims to have labeled over 3000 
products as Fair trade in 2011. From 2009 onwards more than 100 million pounds of Fair 
Trade certified coffee was imported into the U.S. alone of which 62% was organic
45
. These 
numbers reveal non-ignorable preferences towards socially responsible consumer product 
features. 
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Nevertheless, the current economic literature on pensions focuses on risk and return. 
Utility from non-pecuniary aspects is largely left out of consideration while the pension fund 
managers should maximize the utility of their beneficiaries. If individuals on average derive 
positive utility from more socially responsible pension investments, pension fund managers 
should incorporate these values of their beneficiaries into their investment schemes. This is 
not an easy task, Barber (2007) points out: “Once considerations other than wealth 
maximization are relevant for investors, aligning the interests of portfolio managers and 
investors becomes extremely difficult”. Think about regulatory difficulties concerning 
heterogeneous preferences (Richardson 2011) or the interpretation of fiduciary duties 
(Richardson 2007, 2009). However, these difficulties cannot be an argument to refrain from 
taking environmental and social preferences into account at all. 
 Despite theoretical difficulties, we have seen in practice that tobacco stocks are 
excluded from investment portfolios in the U.S. (e.g. CalPERS, LA, Seattle, Chicago, and 
NY pension fund), some of these funds also exclude assault weapon related companies, or 
companies with business in Sudan. A number of Northern European pension funds have 
committed to responsible investment practices like the exclusion of cluster bomb 
manufacturers. The two largest pension funds in the Netherlands (ABP and PGGM) divested 
Walmart in 2013 due to unsuccessful engagement with the firm concerning questionable 
employee relations. These examples show that pension funds do take into account social 
responsibility, although, these practices are also highly debated. Restrictions on the investable 
universe can harm risk adjusted returns which is not in line with the fiduciary duty of pension 
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funds and the beneficiaries within funds have different social preferences which can lead to 
protests
46
.   
The examples above show that some pension funds take social preferences into 
account in pension fund investments. However, in the conventional pension fund setting, 
participants do not invest themselves. Pension funds fulfill a fiduciary role in that they invest 
on behalf of their participants. Because the participants have very limited power to influence 
the investment decisions of fund managers and the mandates dictate fund managers to invest 
prudently (meaning highest possible return for lowest possible risk) there is an inherent 
agency problem whenever a socially desired investment choice would have a negative impact 
on expected returns. For this reason it is important to understand if beneficiaries want their 
money to be invested more in line with their social preferences. The first aim of this paper is 
to provide descriptive information on attitudes towards social responsibility in pension 
investments. Subsequently, we compare stated preferences by investigating willingness to 
pay for socially responsible investments while taking these attitudes into account.  
Taking preferences into account makes the investment strategies of fund managers 
extremely difficult due to heterogeneity (Barber 2007). A straightforward solution would be 
to give beneficiaries greater freedom of choice or even full investor autonomy. This is only 
possible if investors are financially responsible and capable of making sound financial 
decisions. Our second aim is to understand to what degree beneficiaries are able to translate 
their stated preferences into financial decisions. 
Using unique field data on Dutch households from CentERdata that was gathered in 
the first quarter of 2011 we are the first to investigate environmental and social preferences of 
                                                 
46
 E.g. when two Dutch pension funds (PGGM and ABP) donated 1.5 million Euro to IFKO (an international 
fund for vulnerable elderly) after the tsunami of 2004, complaints were made by their beneficiaries in different 
types of media. They did not want the pension fund to decide how their money should be donated. 
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pension fund beneficiaries. We investigate the extent to which beneficiaries claim to value 
several environmental and social characteristics of companies and test if they are able to 
translate these preferences into financial decisions consistently. Subsequently we validate our 
findings by looking into the effects of social and environmental screening on utility. Our 
contributions can be separated into three categories.  
First, we compare attitudes of Dutch household members in 2011 towards socially 
responsible investment practices. In contrary to the conventional practice in the U.S. it would 
not be optimal to exclude the sin companies (alcohol, tobacco, and gambling) from pension 
investments. On average, the Dutch favor the exclusion of companies that violate human 
rights and companies operating in the weapons industry. Although there are some 
commonalities, there is significant variation in the attitudes of the beneficiaries. To validate 
the reported scores we show that the respondents were able to express their attitudes to- 
wards social responsibility screens as their self assessed levels correspond with their daily 
behavior, such as those who consume alcohol or smoke. 
Second, we report that the respondents experience difficulties making financial 
decisions while at the same time taking their attitudes towards social responsibility screens 
into account. Specifically, over one third of the respondents reported decisions inconsistent 
with rational behavior. We show that these inconsistencies are partially explained by low 
levels of financial sophistication. 
Third, to measure the effect of socially responsible in- vestment screening on utility 
we examine willingness to pay and find that around three quarters of the respondents are 
willing to give up pension income to get their investments more in line with their social and 
environmental preferences. The likelihood to be willing to pay is lower for men, and rises in 
education, income, and especially in having a positive attitude for social and environmental 
screening, the latter leads to a 40% increase in willingness to sacrifice pension income. These 
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stated preferences are not easily explained, however, results lead us to advise pension funds 
to reveal social and environmental preferences by directly engaging with beneficiaries. 
Our research suggests a number of important points for policymakers and pension 
funds which should optimally execute their fiduciary duty. Finally, the paper can help ethical 
investment funds to identify potential customers. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we show that the literature 
finds that people do not only wish to maximize wealth but are likely to value social aspects in 
their pension investments. We question if respondents might even want to give up income for 
the socially responsible dimension in their pension, though, individuals are likely to have 
heterogeneous preferences. The final part of Section 2 explains that the low financial literacy 
of household members imposes restrictions on the degree of pension portfolio customization. 
Section 3 presents and describes the data used. Section 4 presents tests on non-financial 
preferences and financial decision- making. The fifth Section validates the paper by showing 
that beneficiaries on average have utility defined over the level of social responsibility in 




4.2.1. Willingness to pay for social and environmental screening 
 
The literature on pension fund investments is focused on risk and returns while non-
pecuniary utility is largely left out of consideration. This is unsurprising as pension funds 
exist foremost to provide income after retirement for their beneficiaries. However, most 
individual investors consider investments as consumption goods and not just as investment 
products (Keloharju et al. 2012), meaning that non-financial attributes can influence the 
decision to invest or not. 
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This view towards investments can explain findings of socially responsible 
investment research. Segments of mutual fund investors gain non-pecuniary benefits from in- 
vesting in socially responsible investments (e.g. Bollen 2007, Nilsson 2009), the same holds 
for socially responsible banking clienteles (Bauer and Smeets 2013). From owner- ship 
studies we know that such investors are less focused on past return performance (e.g. 
Renneboog et al. 2011). Analogously, the consumer literature finds segments of consumers 
with varying attitudes to or stated preferences for ethical product features. For example, 
Auger et al. (2008) report that within their specific sample 40% is classified as a socially 
conscious buyer of soap bars and/or athletic shoes. Furthermore, De Pelsmacker et al. (2005) 
report that within their sample 50% of consumers attached importance to the fair trade 
attribute of coffee. These findings together with the evidence on the socially responsible 
investor and banking clienteles lead to our first hypothesis. 
H1: Beneficiaries have heterogeneous attitudes towards socially responsible pension 
investments. 
 
To justify social responsibility in pension investments, it is important to investigate 
whether the attitudes of beneficiaries factor into their utility functions. This can be done by 
analyzing willingness to pay for changing pension investments to be more in line with the 
reported attitudes. For social choices to be reflected into investments, fund managers need to 
collect information on firms’ activities and in addition try to reveal preferences of the 
individuals and take them into account in the best possible way. Given the preferences of the 
beneficiaries, the manager can either screen companies and/or engage with companies to 




Screening is selecting companies to invest in with certain criteria, for instance based 
on social or environmental performance measures. The investment literature reports mixed 
results for the effects of screening on returns. In theory the screening process itself is costly, 
in addition limiting the investment space might harm returns (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009, 
Statman and Glushkov 2009).
47 Keeping all else equal, returns drop as the investable universe 
decreases due to the responsible investment constraint (Boudt et al. 2013). However, 
empirical evidence also shows companies that engage in different forms of social 
responsibility beat their benchmarks in the stock market but only for specific screens (e.g. 
Derwall et al. 2005, Kempf and Osthoff 2007). Borgers et al. (2013) show that these positive 
effects vanish in the long term as attention for social and environmental business practices 
increases. Consequently, the negative effects may prevail in the long term. However, we 
acknowledge that even if the screening process is costly, the effects for individual pension 
beneficiaries are negligible as long as the screens do not significantly reduce the investable 
universe. Therefore, we want to stress here that we merely use willingness to pay as a means 
to test if the common mans’ utility is at all influenced by social and environmental factors in 
investments. 
Empirical studies that have looked into willingness to pay report that significant 
segments of consumers are readily willing to pay for non-product environmental (Laroche et 
al. 2001) or ethical (Auger et al. 2003, 2008) features. In an experimental study Andreoni and 
Miller (2002) identify a quarter of the investigated population as pure money-maximizers 
which implies that three quarters do give up income for non-pecuniary utility. Since the 
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 We assume that pension fund managers (try to) maximize returns within the freedom of their mandates. The 
mandates make sure that the investments comply with prespecified demands of governments and other 
stakeholders. This means that if the pension investments are further screened on social issues the investment 
performance will at best be the same as in the current situation since screening will limit the investment space. 
The same reasoning can be applied for engagement strategies. If engagement adds to the risk return performance 
of the pension investments, the manager should already be doing this. 
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amount of pension investments is enormous, it is relevant to investigate if pension 
beneficiaries gain utility from incorporating their non-financial preferences into their pension 
investments. One way to do this is by looking at willingness to pay for socially responsible 
investment screens. Leading to our second hypothesis. 
H2: Beneficiaries are willing to give up pension income to better align their pension 
investments with their social attitudes. 
 
4.2.2. Financial literacy and socially responsible investing  
 
If beneficiaries derive positive utility from more socially responsible pension investments and 
the preferences are heterogeneous, a straightforward solution is to increase the level of 
investment autonomy. Allowing the common man to have greater freedom of choice on his 
preference for responsibly investing pension fund money on his behalf. This strongly requires 
a high level of financial literacy. Therefore, we investigate if beneficiaries are actually able to 
make financial decisions while at the same time taking their non-financial preferences into 
account. Currently the Dutch pension system works with defined benefits with very limited 
influence from beneficiaries. 
Moreover, Benartzi and Thaler (2005) find that many defined contribution pension 
funds doubt the quality of investment strategies of their beneficiaries. Van Rooij et al. (2007) 
show that people are on average not able to make consistent choices in a risk-return tradeoff 
universe. This effect is even stronger for beneficiaries with limited financial knowledge. 
In this respect, it is important to take financial literacy into account as more financially 
literate individuals are more involved with their financial decisions and make more 
sophisticated financial choices. Some examples, they are more prone to plan for their 
retirement (Van Els et al. 2004, Lusardi and Mitchell 2007a,b, Van Rooij et al. 2011a), they 
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hold more diversified portfolios (Calvet et al. 2009a,b), have higher levels of savings 
(Bernheim et al. 2001, Bernheim and Garrett 2003), and they are more likely to participate in 
the stock market (Van Rooij et al. 2011b). 
As we use a sample of Dutch households, we know from Van Rooij et al. (2011a,b) 
that the respondents do under- stand basic financial and economic concepts, though, when 
financial products become more complex there is very little knowledge at hand. Since, 
introducing a social responsibility attribute to the choice framework complicates financial 
decisions by introducing an extra dimension we expect that the average respondent will not 
be able to make financial choices while simultaneously taking their reported attitudes into 
account. A consequence would be that giving respondents more freedom of choice is not the 
optimal way to implement their non-financial preferences into their pension investments. This 
reasoning is in line with our third and fourth hypotheses. 
H3: Beneficiaries are unable to make consistent financial decisions while simultaneously 
taking their non-financial preferences into account. 
H4: Beneficiaries with low levels of financial literacy are less capable of making financial 




To test our hypotheses we use a unique dataset on Dutch households. The data are derived 
from a customized questionnaire, matched to a wide range of demographics from the 
CentERdata Databank at Tilburg University. Respondents are members of the CentERpanel
48
 
                                                 
48
 Our survey is sent out once so we cannot benefit from the panel structure of the data. We translate the 
questions used throughout this paper into English and present them in appendix A. 
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who participate in weekly surveys over the internet using a computer. When a computer is 
not available, the members are provided with a television set up box which makes the sample 
selection exogenous from the availability of an internet connection. The members of the 
CentERpanel also participate in the DNB household survey that is run by CentERdata as 
well. This survey gathers information on the financial situation and investment choices of the 
households. The sample is updated semi-annually with new panel members to keep the 
sample representative of the Dutch population. ‘‘The collection and availability of a wide set 
of psychological factors makes the DHS data set unique and particularly suited to studying 
individual preferences and financial choices.’’ (Teppa and Vis 2012). As evidenced by 




The Dutch pension system
50
 provides an ideal situation to investigate to what extent 
values drive financial decision-making. Since the Dutch pension system up to date is a 
defined benefit (DB) culture the individuals do not have to take riskiness into account, only 
the final payments matter. We define a setting in which we ask respondents how much they 
value typically applied socially responsible investment screens. In the next step we ask the 
respondents if they are willing to give up a small part of their pension for the application of 
these screens. We state explicitly that it will cost them money, reflecting the direct costs of 
screening and the sacrificed return from reducing the investable universe (Hong & 
Kacperczyk 2009). Because we assume pension fund managers maximize returns within the 
boundaries of their mandates, screening can never lead to an increase in expected financial 
returns. This line of questioning provides us with a way to test if beneficiaries are willing to 
give up some of their wealth in order to (partially) align the pension investments with their 




 For an elaborate description of the Dutch pension system see Van Rooij et al. (2007). 
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values. Alternatively stated, we test the disutility from investments in undesirable financial 
products. 
We focus on stated preferences towards social and environmental screening. Since we 
investigate a financial product we avoid the difficulties that a lot of studies into ethical 
products have regarding longer travel distance and availability of the products (e.g. Laroche 
et al. 2001, Becchetti and Rosati 2007). 
The main theme of the questionnaire is sustainable behavior of households, and was 
sent to a representative sample of the Dutch society by CentERdata at the fourth of March 
2011. The respondents were given until eight March 2011 to answer the questions. While the 
response rate concerning the entire survey was 63% (1843 out of 2878 members) we focus in 
this study on those household members of at least 20 years of age
51
 (1766 members). The 
average participant is a little over 55 years of age, the average household has a total 
household net income that is €2837 per month, and 54% is male. We also obtain information 
on drinking and smoking behavior. 18% are smokers, and 27% never drink alcoholic 
beverages.   
Furthermore, we asked the respondents to self asses their risk tolerance when it comes 
to decision making in the pension domain. In addition to self assessed risk tolerance we use 
another measure introduced by Barsky et al. (1997). This measure uses forced choices 
between gambles over a lifetime income to measure risk tolerance. The correlation between 
the two risk tolerance measures is only slightly above 20% therefore we follow Van Rooij et 
al. (2007) and use both measures as control variables in our analyses since they apparently 
measure different dimensions of risk tolerance.  
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 We also repeat all our analyses on a sample of individuals who have at least 20 years of age and cannot be 
older than 65, which is the legal retirement age. As a result, this sample consists out of 926 participants. All 
reported results are robust to using this sample. 
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Besides risk tolerance, the household members estimate their own level of financial 
sophistication. Around 6% of the respondents claim to be in the two highest categories of 
financial expertise. However, self assessed financial literacy might not be optimal so we 
match our original data to a questionnaire that covered financial literacy sent out by 
CentERdata in May 2011. We are able to match roughly 77% of all (1766) observations. The 
variables we use include the three basic questions on financial literacy originally designed by 
Lusardi & Mitchell (2008) expanded with two additional questions on mortgage rents and the 
relation between interest rates and bond prices
52
. Only 15.4% of the respondents were able to 




4.4.1. Measuring social responsibility; Exclusionary strategies 
 
We use several approaches to measure the extent to which people value social responsibility 
in their pension investments. For the groundwork we use typically applied exclusionary 
strategies from socially responsible investment practices. The companies excluded operate in 
the so-called “sin” industries, i.e., alcohol, tobacco, and gambling. Companies operating in 
these industries are often excluded from the investment portfolios of large institutions that are 
subject to social norms in the U.S. (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). The other exclusions are 
companies that (in)-directly violate human rights or operate in the nuclear energy, weapons 
manufacturing
53
, or pornography industries, since these issues have been increasingly 
receiving attention in the European institutional investment environment in recent years. This 
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 For exact specification of the financial literacy questions see Appendix B. 
53
 Not cluster bombs and nuclear weapons since they are already excluded by the Dutch pension funds. 
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concept of excluding assets from the investable universe is referred to as exclusionary 
screening. We let the respondents rate the exclusionary screens on a seven point Likert scale 
from “very unimportant” to “very important”.  
From panel A in Table 4.1 we find, on average, respondents deem the exclusion of 
human rights offenders and the weapon industry as more important than other types of 
exclusionary screens. On average households seem to care the least about screening 
investments in the alcohol industry. Interestingly, the lowest ranked screens show the highest 
standard deviation, which means that respondents’ values tend to be more consistent for 
exclusionary screens which were more highly ranked on average. Applying these investment 
screens is one approach to capture the values of a larger part of society. However, before 
drawing inferences from these statistics we want to verify if the reported values make sense. 








Table 4.1 Importance of exclusionary screens 
This table summarizes the self reported importance level of several exclusionary screens often applied in 
practice by (social) investment funds. The answers range from 1=very unimportant to 7=very important. Panel 
A contains basic summary statistics. Panel B until D compare the answers over different groups of respondents 
testing the uncontrolled mean differences based on gender, smoking, and drinking behavior. Panel reports on the 
importance of the alcohol exclusionary screen and drinking behavior. *, **, *** represent significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Summary statistics for the Exclusionary screens           
          
Panel A          
Variable Obs. Mean   Std. Dev. Min. Max.    
          
Weapons 1766 5.58  1.93 1 7    
Alcohol 1766 4.11  1.90 1 7    
Tobacco 1766 4.54  1.94 1 7    
Gambling 1766 4.95  1.97 1 7    
Sexind 1766 5.10  2.02 1 7    
Nuclear_en 1766 4.52  2.12 1 7    
Human 1766 5.89   1.77 1 7    
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Table 4.1 Continued        
 
Panel B      
  Female (815 obs.)   Male (951 obs.)   Difference   Tests 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.      t-stat 
          
Weapons 5.88 1.76  5.32 2.03  0.56 *** 6.14 
Alcohol 4.44 1.86  3.83 1.89  0.62 *** 6.88 
Tobacco 4.77 1.89  4.35 1.97  0.42 *** 4.57 
Gambling 5.25 1.88  4.70 2.01  0.56 *** 5.98 
Sexind 5.53 1.88  4.73 2.07  0.80 *** 8.50 
Nuclear_en 5.08 1.97  4.04 2.12  1.04 *** 10.63 
Human 6.08 1.66   5.74 1.85   0.34 *** 4.01 
          
Panel C          
  Smoker (316 obs.)   Non-smoker (1450 obs.) Difference   Tests 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.      t-stat 
          
Weapons 5.47 1.96  5.60 1.92  -0.14  -1.14 
Alcohol 3.71 1.82  4.20 1.91  -0.48 *** -4.13 
Tobacco 3.82 1.77  4.70 1.95  -0.88 *** -7.44 
Gambling 4.75 1.97  5.00 1.97  -0.24 ** -1.98 
Sexind 4.97 2.01  5.13 2.03  -0.16  -1.26 
Nuclear_en 4.37 2.11  4.55 2.12  -0.18  -1.37 
Human 5.82 1.77   5.91 1.77   -0.09   -0.86 
          
Panel D          
  Drinker (1285 obs.)   Non-drinker (481 obs.)   Difference   Tests 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.      t-stat 
          
Weapons 5.62 1.90  5.48 2.01  0.14  1.35 
Alcohol 3.97 1.86  4.49 1.95  -0.53 *** -5.21 
Tobacco 4.50 1.94  4.65 1.96  -0.15  -1.46 
Gambling 4.97 1.95  4.90 2.03  0.07  0.73 
Sexind 5.09 1.99  5.12 2.12  -0.04  -0.37 
Nuclear_en 4.42 2.11  4.79 2.11  -0.37 *** -3.30 
Human 5.93 1.74   5.80 1.85   0.13   1.36 
          
Panel E        
Units of alcohol per week   Obs. Percent Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
        
None  481 27% 4.49 1.95 1 7 
1 to 5   705 40% 4.12 1.88 1 7 
6 to 10   353 20% 3.94 1.86 1 7 
11 to 20   189 11% 3.68 1.81 1 7 
>20   38 2% 2.92 1.40 1 5 
 
 
As alluded in our introduction, we expect smokers and drinkers to have different values 
towards the exclusion of the respective industries from their pension investments. Panel C of 
Table 4.1 displays the results of differences in mean values with the accompanying test 
statistics for the tobacco industry screen between smokers and non-smokers. The difference is 
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negative and highly statistically significant with a t-statistic of -7.44. It is also a natural step 
to compare how the alcohol exclusionary screen is valued by drinkers (people who consume 
at least one glass of alcohol a week) and non-drinkers. Again, the difference in importance is 
statistically significant with a t-statistic of -5.21 (see panel D of Table 4.1). More specifically, 
for drinkers we observe that the mean values people attribute to the alcohol industry 
exclusionary screen gradually decrease in the amount of alcoholic beverages consumed per 
week (see Table 4.1 panel E). We interpret this as evidence that peoples’ reported attitudes 
correspond with their day-to-day behavior. In addition, similar to studies of consumer 
products (e.g. Auger et al. 2008, De Pelsmacker et al. 2005), we find significant gender 
differences. On average women account higher values to all exclusion criteria than do men 
(see panel B of Table 4.1). In sum, Table 4.1 shows that there is significant (between groups) 
variation in the attitudes towards environmental and social screens in pension investments, 
which is in line with our first hypothesis. 
 
4.4.2 Are pension investment decisions influenced by social investment preferences? 
 
Our survey results show conclusive evidence of variation in the valuation of several social 
investment strategies. We now turn to focus on financial decisions people make and 
specifically if those decisions change when offered a more socially responsible alternative. It 
is also important to check if the respondents are able to make financial decisions while 
simultaneously taking their non-financial preferences into account. 
 
4.4.2.1. Positions in stocks vs. bonds 
At the start of the survey the respondents fill out what part of their pension allowance they 
would like to invest in stocks given that currently the average pension fund invests 40% of 
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the investment in stocks and 60% in bonds. For the sake of simplicity we refrained from 
considering other types of investments following Van Rooij at al. (2007). To overcome 
confusion about stocks and bonds we state that bonds are characterized as low risk, low 
expected return investments and stocks as high risk, high expected return investments
54
.     
In a next step we introduce a stock portfolio that has exactly the same characteristics 
as the current portfolio the pension fund holds for the participant. It offers the same payment 
and is exposed to the same amount of risk, but applies all the described exclusionary screens 
to the investment portfolio. We ask if they would like to invest more, the same, or less if the 
basket of stocks they are offered is socially screened.  
In panel A of Table 4.2 we show that 17.5% of our respondents answer this question 
with “less”. This result suggests that if all respondents were rational agents, at least this 17.5% 
derive negative utility from excluding the controversial industries because the screens are 
applied with ceteris paribus conditions.
55
 Nevertheless, the sum of stated preferences towards 
the exclusionary screens for this group is higher than for the beneficiaries who want to invest 
an equal amount given the screened portfolio. Therefore, it is plausible that on average these 
beneficiaries experience problems in making financial decisions. In support of this suggestion, 
unreported tests show that this group has significantly lower financial expertise and a lower 
level of education than other respondents.  
On average, people who want to invest more in stocks given the portfolio is screened 
have significantly stronger stated preferences towards the exclusionary screens (Table 4.2 
panel A). Put differently, they assess higher values of importance to the exclusionary screens 
than all other respondents. In unreported analyses we verify that this group consists out of 
                                                 
54
 Van Rooij et al. (2011b) reports that around 40% of household members do not know the difference between 
the risk-return characteristics of stocks and bonds. 
55
 At least 17.5% since risk aversion might withhold beneficiaries from switching their holdings. 
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individuals who are more risk tolerant therefore they are more eager to shift their portfolio to 
more stockholdings. 
Table 4.2 Financial choices and screening valuation, three candidates.  
This table summarizes the sums of self reported importance level of screens (often applied in practice by social 
investment funds) sorted by three financial choice variables. The answers range from 1=very unimportant to 
7=very important per screen. Panel A compares the answers between the groups that want to invest less, the 
same, or more in stocks if the portfolio applies the exclusionary screens. Panel B does the same for portfolio 
preferences “screened”, “indifferent”, and “conventional”. Panel C reports the differences of the self reported 
important levels between the group willing to pay for screening and the group that is not as well as summary 
statistics on the willingness to pay variable. This is done using two different definitions of the WTP variable. In 
each panel we test difference between the outer categories and report the two tailed t-statistics. Standard 
deviations are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
                      
Panel A: % of stock invested                 
  More  The same  Less  More-Less Tests (t-stat) 
           
Sum excl. screens 38.20  34.13  35.19  3.01 *** 2.62 
Std. Dev.  9.26  10.69  12.57     
           
Observations 153  1304  309     
Percentage  8.66%  73.84%  17.50%     
           
Panel B: Preferred portfolio                
  Screened  Indifferent  Conventional  Screen.-Conv. Tests (t-stat) 
           
Sum excl. screens 36.91  30.47  33.91  3.00 *** 4.85 
Std. Dev.  9.31  12.59  11.35     
           
Observations 964  451  351     
Percentage  54.59%  25.54%  19.88%     
           
Panel C: Willingness to pay (WTP)              
           
WTP(a)  Yes = 5-7  Neutral = 4  No = 1-3  Yes-No Tests (t-stat) 
           
Sum excl. screens 37.57  34.6  30.96  6.61 *** 11.49 
Std. Dev.  9.13  9.68  12.60     
           
Observations 805  336  625     
Percentage  45.58%  19.03%  35.39%     
                     
           
WTP(b)  Yes = 6-7  Neutral = 3-5  No = 1-2  Yes-No Tests (t-stat) 
           
Sum excl. screens 38.44  34.59  30.89  7.55 *** 10.38 
Std. Dev.  8.94  9.70  13.36     
           
Observations 494  795  477     
Percentage  27.97%  45.02%  27.01%     




The most important result from panel A in Table 4.2 is that almost all participants 
answer “the same amount of stocks” meaning that they are indifferent between their current 
holdings and the holdings of the screened portfolio. Another interpretation of this result is 
that they have such high levels of risk aversion that the gain in utility is not large enough for 
them to switch to a slightly riskier portfolio (more stock holdings).  
Summarizing, these findings suggest that financial il- literacy is prevalent as a large 
group of the respondents report questionable financial choices given their attitudes towards 
social screening. We can see this from the reluctance of respondents to change hypothetical 
stock holdings and from difference tests in stated screening preferences. 
 
4.4.2.2. Preference between stock baskets 
 
Analyzing percentages invested in hypothetical stock portfolios seems not to be the optimal 
way to investigate the effects of values on financial decisions. Therefore we also included a 
more simple measure in which we ask the respondents directly for their preferences between 
stock baskets. A basket that is equal to the current portfolio of their pension fund and one that 
applies the exclusionary screens, holding all characteristics like risk and return equal. Almost 
55% of the respondents prefer the screened basket of stocks given equal characteristics. In 
panel B of Table 4.2 we show that these respondents account a higher importance level to the 
sum of all exclusionary screens than all other participants on average.  
Other respondents prefer their conventional portfolio or do not have a preference. The 
difference in importance levels between those two groups points into the opposite direction 
from what we would expect (the group that is indifferent reports lower values than the group 
that prefers the conventional portfolio). In an unreported test we verify that this difference is 
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significant at the 1% level. Again these results hint towards an explanation in which a large 
part of the participants are not able to make these simplistic financial decisions. Besides that 
we take from this question that the majority of the respondents positively value social 
responsibility in their pension decisions as 55% prefer the screened portfolio.  
 
4.4.2.3. Willingness to pay  
 
We also measure if the values of the beneficiaries towards the screening criteria translate into 
a willingness to pay (henceforth WTP) for these values. Put differently, is the net gain in 
utility (if any) enough to lead to the participants accepting a lower pension income? In 
defined benefit pension plans the pension funds have the duty to invest the allowances for 
participants. This makes it possible to extract values from the answers the respondents give 
because they do not have to take riskiness into account. We explicitly explain to the 
respondents that only their monthly pension entitlements will vary. 
The respondents rate their willingness to pay on a seven point Likert scale that ranges 
from “No, certainly not” to “Yes, certainly”. From these seven point scales we create two 
indicators of WTP, WTP(a) and (b), with the outcomes “Yes”, “Neutral”, and “No”. For 
WTP(a) we assign “Neutral” if the value is 4, and “Yes” (“No”) if the value is higher (lower) 
than 4. For WTP(b) we are more conservative by assigning “Neutral” if the value is 3, 4, or 5. 
The results can be seen in panel C of Table 4.2. Beneficiaries who are willing to give up 
pension income have the highest stated preferences towards the proposed screens compared 
to the other groups. The differences between the beneficiaries who want to pay and the ones 
who do not are statistically significant with t-statistics higher than 10 for both the 
conventional WTP(a) and the more conservative WTP(b).     
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From Section 4.4.2 it follows that the three financial choices made do not always match with 
the behavior of a rational agent. On the one hand this is to be expected since previous 
research reports low levels of financial literacy among household members (e.g. Van Rooij et 
al. 2011a,b). On the other hand we posed the questions in such a way that only very limited 
financial knowledge is needed to answer them. Therefore this section takes a deeper look into 
the relationship between financial decision making consistent with economically rational 
behavior and financial literacy. 
A first glance at the answers shows that it is difficult to explain the answers to the 
different questions using economic rationale. For instance, the significant variation in the self 
reported preference levels of the applied exclusionary screens between groups leads us to 
expect different in- vestment preferences when these screens are applied. In contrast we see 
that the vast majority of individuals make the same hypothetical investment decision. 
Therefore, to relate the answers of the percentage invested in stocks question to the stated 
preferences towards the social screens, individuals should have an extreme aversion against 
in- vesting in stock market for example due to risk aversion or distrust (e.g. Guiso et al. 
2008).
57  Another more plausible explanation is that beneficiaries are simply not able to 
translate their preferences into a rational utility maximizing financial choice when at the same 
time taking risk and return into account. Remember, that the other two financial choice 
measures (preferred basket and WTP ) are not influenced by risk aversion in this setting. 
                                                 
56
 All multivariate results reported in the remainder of this paper are robust to using category dummies instead 
of ordered variables for education, age, and income. 
57
 The disutility from investing in the stock market should be very high since the beneficiaries can change the 




To measure if the respondents make rationally consistent financial choices we create 
four different dummy variables that measure if the financial choices of beneficiaries are 
consistent with rational behavior.
58
 We assume a very general additive utility function where 
agents get positive utility from expected returns, negative utility from risk, and 
neutral/positive/negative utility from exposure to the social and environmental attributes of 
the portfolio of stocks (the screens in our setting). Therefore, the consistent answers can be 
summarized as follows: the type whose utility is not influenced by social and environmental 
screens should have no preference between the screened and unscreened portfolio, he should 
not be willing to pay and the percentage invested in stocks should be the same under the 
screened and unscreened portfolio situations since the screens were applied with ceteris 
paribus conditions. We perform this exercise for all three rational agent types in Appendix D. 
When the stated financial choices are not in line with any of the three types, the choices are 
inconsistent with rational behavior. We define Inconsistency1 to be one if the answers to the 
percentage invested in stocks and the WTP(b) question are not consistent with rational 
behavior (e.g. ‘‘I want to invest less in stocks’’ and ‘‘yes, I am willing to pay for 
screening’’).
59
 Inconsistency2 is one if the answers to the percentage invested in stocks and 
the preferred basket question are not consistent with rational behavior (e.g. ‘‘I want to invest 
less in stocks’’ and ‘‘I prefer the socially screened basket’’). Inconsistency3 is one if the 
answers to the WTP(b) and the preferred basket question are not consistent with rational 
behavior (e.g. ‘‘I have no preference between baskets and yes, I am willing to pay for 
screening). Finally, Inconsistency4 is one if at least one inconsistency from rational mean–
variance behavior is observed. 
 
 
                                                 
58
 See appendix D for the exact description of the how the Inconsistency variables are defined.  
59
 All our results are robust to using the less conservative WTP(a) to create the ERROR variables. 
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Table 4.3 Financial literacy and making consistent financial choices 
This table presents marginal effects measured at mean values after a probit estimation on four different 
Inconsistency dummies that take on a value of one if the respondent makes a choice that is not consistent with 
the previously made financial choice. Inconsistency1 measures the consistency of answers between the ““% of 
stock invested” and “WTP(b)”, Inconsistency2 between “% of stock invested” and “preferred portfolio”, 
Inconsistency3 between “WTP(b)”,  and “preferred portfolio”, Inconsistency4 measures is only 0 for those who 
make consistent choices for all three variables. See appendix D for the exact specification of the Inconsistency 
measures. Panel A and B use the sum of the correct answers to the financial literacy questions as independent 
variables. Panel C and D include a factoring method explained in detail in Appendix C. In the first step of the 
two-step regression model the standard errors are clustered by household. We report the R-squared of the first 
stage. Z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  Inconsistency1 Inconsistency2 Inconsistency3 Inconsistency4 
 11% 15% 26% 37% 
Panel A: Without controls       
Finlitsum -0.019** -0.042*** -0.008 -0.048*** 
 (-2.158) (-4.110) (-0.621) (-3.366) 
     
1st stage pseudo-R2 0.005 0.015 0.000 0.007 
Test Fin. Literacy=0 4.654 16.920 0.385 11.330 
P-value 0.031 0.000 0.535 0.001 
     
Panel B: With controls         
Finlitsum -0.012 -0.029*** -0.008 -0.037** 
 (-1.377) (-2.702) (-0.598) (-2.389) 
l_hhnetincome 0.003 -0.009 -0.016* -0.024** 
 (0.406) (-1.160) (-1.704) (-2.277) 
Education -0.015** -0.019*** -0.022** -0.034*** 
 (-2.548) (-2.831) (-2.498) (-3.577) 
Age 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002* 0.004*** 
 (3.153) (2.351) (1.878) (3.382) 
Rural 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.008 
 (0.772) (0.742) (1.033) (0.751) 
Hhsize -0.014 0.005 0.012 0.009 
 (-1.535) (0.460) (0.987) (0.704) 
Male 0.008 0.002 0.059** 0.065** 
 (0.459) (0.083) (2.388) (2.353) 
Dsmoker -0.011 -0.025 -0.003 -0.014 
 (-0.513) (-1.002) (-0.086) (-0.370) 
Drinker -0.002 -0.006 0.013 -0.005 
 (-0.218) (-0.603) (1.101) (-0.381) 
Finexpert_self -0.003 -0.011 0.003 -0.005 
 (-0.565) (-1.608) (0.355) (-0.544) 
Risktol_Barsky 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.006 
 (0.160) (0.573) (0.530) (0.558) 
Risktol_self 0.007 0.006 0.030*** 0.028** 
 (0.994) (0.694) (2.904) (2.412) 
l_time 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.016 
 (0.840) (0.856) (0.513) (0.787) 
     
1st stage pseudo-R2 0.047 0.044 0.026 0.038 
Test Fin. Literacy=0 1.903 7.360 0.358 5.703 
P-value 0.168 0.007 0.550 0.017 
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Table 4.3 continued    
 
  Inconsistency1 Inconsistency2 Inconsistency3 Inconsistency4 
Panel C: Factor variables without other controls      
Factor1 -0.013* -0.019** -0.011 -0.033** 
 (-1.705) (-2.137) (-0.957) (-2.454) 
Factor2 -0.011 -0.035*** -0.001 -0.032** 
 (-1.279) (-3.501) (-0.077) (-2.399) 
     
1st stage pseudo-R2 0.005 0.015 0.001 0.007 
Test Fin. Literacy=0 4.727 16.790 0.920 11.750 
P-value 0.094 0.000 0.631 0.003 
     
Panel D: Factor variables with other controls      
Factor1 -0.007 -0.009 -0.004 -0.017 
 (-0.885) (-0.996) (-0.309) (-1.244) 
Factor2 -0.008 -0.028*** -0.006 -0.031** 
 (-1.018) (-2.750) (-0.496) (-2.197) 
l_hhnetincome 0.003 -0.009 -0.016* -0.024** 
 (0.404) (-1.134) (-1.702) (-2.275) 
Education -0.015** -0.020*** -0.022** -0.035*** 
 (-2.540) (-2.969) (-2.499) (-3.613) 
Age 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002* 0.004*** 
 (3.152) (2.398) (1.876) (3.391) 
Rural 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.008 
 (0.753) (0.650) (1.020) (0.706) 
Hhsize -0.014 0.005 0.012 0.009 
 (-1.537) (0.482) (0.986) (0.704) 
Male 0.008 0.004 0.060** 0.067** 
 (0.458) (0.192) (2.385) (2.390) 
Dsmoker -0.011 -0.025 -0.003 -0.014 
 (-0.512) (-1.011) (-0.084) (-0.373) 
Drinker -0.002 -0.006 0.013 -0.005 
 (-0.219) (-0.631) (1.099) (-0.382) 
Finexpert_self -0.004 -0.012* 0.003 -0.006 
 (-0.596) (-1.654) (0.342) (-0.587) 
Risktol_Barsky 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 
 (0.167) (0.669) (0.535) (0.592) 
Risktol_self 0.007 0.006 0.030*** 0.028** 
 (0.991) (0.698) (2.908) (2.414) 
l_time 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.016 
 (0.840) (0.773) (0.504) (0.758) 
     
1st stage pseudo-R2 0.046 0.045 0.026 0.038 
Test Fin. Literacy=0 1.781 8.281 0.330 6.097 
P-value 0.410 0.016 0.848 0.047 
Observations 
 
1368 (1363 with controls)   
 
This results in four variables that measure the consistency of financial decisions in 
different ways. The correlation is highest among the first and the second in- consistency 
(0.58), and lowest between the second and the third inconsistency (0.01). This implies that we 
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are not measuring the same thing in three different ways. 11% of the respondents make the 
first inconsistency, compared to 15%, 26% and 37% reporting the second, third and the 
fourth inconsistency respectively. These results show that a considerable part of our sample is 
not able to consistently incorporate their preferences into their financial decisions in different 
situations, confirming our third hypothesis. 
Furthermore, to measure if the financial choices are related to financial literacy we use 
the expanded literacy questions from Lusardi and Mitchell (2008). Using the answers to five 
questions we create two different literacy indexes. The first one is simply the sum of all 
correct answers to the five literacy questions (Finlitsum). The second index is created using a 
principal component factoring analysis retaining only the components with an eigenvalue 
greater than one (Factor1 and Factor2).
60
 
To test our hypothesis that less financially sophisticated individuals are less capable of 
making financial decisions while taking social and environmental preferences into account 
we estimate several probit models with the In- consistency measures explained by the 
financial literacy variables defined as Finlitsum, Factor1 and Factor2. In Table 4.3 we report 
marginal effects estimated at mean values. 
For all specifications reported in Table 4.3 we find negative coefficients on the 
financial literacy variables, which are significant at the 5% level in three out of four 
specifications.
61  These results strongly support our fourth hypothesis. The model 
specifications that include control variables have lower loadings on the literacy variables. 
This is not surprising as education is among the most important drivers of financial literacy 
(Van Rooij et al. 2011a,b). 
                                                 
60
 See appendix C for more information on the creation of the financial literacy variables. 
61
 Financial literacy is not significant in explaining an inconsistent choice between the willingness to pay and the 
preferred basket questions. It seems that financial illiteracy does a better job at explaining the inconsistencies 
resulting from a combination with the more ‘‘complicated’’ question. Whereas education is significant in 
explaining all inconsistency variables. 
129 
 
As expected, the coefficients on education load significantly negative indicating that 
on average people who en- joyed a higher level of education are less likely to make financial 
choices that contradict with economically rational behavior. Income has a negative effect 
while age has a strong positive effect on all four inconsistency dummies. In addition we find 
that being male and having a higher self assessed risk tolerance increases the likelihood of 
making the third and fourth inconsistency. 
Summarizing, we have shown that over one third of the beneficiaries do not 
incorporate their preferences into their financial decisions consistent with rational behavior 
and that a lack of financial sophistication can partially ex- plain this. These findings have 
important consequences, if the fiduciaries want to take the preferences of beneficiaries into 
account they need to be very careful in designing a solution to both the problems of 
heterogeneous preferences and the low financial literacy of the households. In addition, 
governments who want to give their population more financial responsibility should also take 
great care to make sure that individuals are well prepared with good skills and the tools to 
make financial decisions. 
 
4.5. Additional analyses 
 
In this section we provide further evidence that Dutch pension beneficiaries have positive 
preferences to several socially responsible investment screens. 
 
4.5.1. Measuring social responsibility; Best practices 
 
Taking the same approach as for the exclusionary screens we ask the respondents to value 
certain best practices as selection criteria for stocks. Similar to most socially responsible 
mutual funds we do not explain the details of the criteria as these are rather subjective, and 
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difficult for respondents to interpret. We only provide the basic idea of the screening process 
explaining that the companies that are selected perform above average on that practice. This 
gives us the opportunity to refrain from the numerous possibilities to apply best practices 
screening. We argue that this is an issue on the implementation of the screens which suits 
investors who are willing to use these types of investment screens to maximize returns while 
we investigate if individuals’ decisions are driven by their non-financial preferences. 
Table 4 panel A shows that from the possible best practices criteria, participants rate 
employee relations (e.g. pension, health and safety, schooling, anti-discrimination, and work 
atmosphere) as most important and with the lowest deviation in their responses. While 
selecting firms based on their charity policy is rated as least important. This is striking since 
the Dutch gave around €4.3 billion to charities in 2007 which is 0.8% of the GDP (Schuyt et 
al. 2009). This might have several reasons. Some charities have suffered from bad press due 
to high salaries paid to their directors. Another reason can be that people prefer to choose 
themselves which charities to support. 
For completeness we compare the average stated preferences towards these screens 
over different groups, as we did in Table 1 (see panels B to D of Table 4.4). Most striking is 
that (again) women value all screening criteria significantly higher than men, except for the 
profit screen. We can conclude that female beneficiaries have a fixed positive effect towards 
social and environmental screening. 
For completeness we compare the average stated preferences towards these screens 
over different groups as we did in Table 4.1 (see panels B to D of Table 4.4). Most striking is 
that (again) women value all screening criteria significantly higher than do men, except for 
the profit screen. Therefore, female beneficiaries have a fixed positive effect towards social 





Table 4.4 Importance of best practices screens 
This table summarizes the self reported importance level of several best practices screens often applied in 
practice by (social) investment funds. The answers range from 1=very unimportant to 7=very important. Panel 
A contains basic summary statistics. Panel B until D compare the answers over different groups of respondents 
testing the uncontrolled mean differences based on gender, smoking, and drinking behavior. *, **, *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Summary statistics for the Positive screens             
          
Panel A          
Variable Obs. Mean   Std. Dev. Min. Max.    
          
Recycling 1766 5.53  1.43 1 7    
CO2 1766 5.44  1.49 1 7    
Employees 1766 5.76  1.37 1 7    
Community 1766 5.33  1.46 1 7    
Charity 1766 4.82  1.62 1 7    
Profit 1766 5.15   1.44 1 7    
          
Panel B          
  Female (815 obs.)   Male (951 obs.)   Difference   Tests 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.      t-stat 
          
Recycling 5.66 1.37  5.43 1.48  0.22 *** 3.29 
CO2 5.63 1.41  5.28 1.54  0.35 *** 4.99 
Employees 5.94 1.28  5.61 1.42  0.33 *** 5.11 
Community 5.47 1.41  5.20 1.49  0.27 *** 3.93 
Charity 4.99 1.56  4.67 1.67  0.32 *** 4.14 
Profit 5.21 1.42   5.11 1.45   0.10   1.44 
          
Panel C          
  Smoker (316 obs.)   Non-smoker (1450 obs.) Difference   Tests 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.      t-stat 
          
Recycling 5.30 1.48  5.59 1.42  -0.29 *** -3.25 
CO2 5.26 1.51  5.48 1.48  -0.22 ** -2.38 
Employees 5.62 1.43  5.79 1.35  -0.17 ** -2.02 
Community 5.15 1.56  5.37 1.43  -0.21 ** -2.35 
Charity 4.65 1.72  4.85 1.60  -0.20 ** -2.02 
Profit 5.12 1.49   5.16 1.43   -0.05   -0.52 
          
Panel D          
  Drinker (1285 obs.)   Non-drinker (481 obs.)   Difference   Tests 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.      t-stat 
          
Recycling 5.58 1.40  5.41 1.53  0.16 ** 2.15 
CO2 5.45 1.49  5.41 1.49  0.04  0.50 
Employees 5.75 1.36  5.79 1.39  -0.04  -0.54 
Community 5.30 1.45  5.39 1.47  -0.09  -1.14 
Charity 4.79 1.62  4.89 1.65  -0.10  -1.19 




4.5.2. Are beneficiaries willing to pay? 
 
In total we now have two sets of social investment screens and the stated preferences towards 
these screens. We continue by investigating if beneficiaries actually get positive utility from 
investing their pension endowments more responsibly. We do this by asking the respondents 
if they are willing to sacrifice pension income for the application of the screens that they 
valued higher than 4 out of 7. When no screen was ranked higher than 4 we select all criteria 
(this happens in 38% of all cases). We do this for both the exclusionary screens presented in 
Table 4.1 and the best practices screens presented in Table 4.4. 
In two steps the respondents had to fill out if they would accept a monthly pension 
entitlement that is lower than their expected entitlement they receive under the current 
investment policy. Panel A of Table 5 shows that 25.72% (28.71%) do not want to give up 
anything or only a negligible part of their pension for the exclusionary (best practices) 
screens that they personally scored earlier in the survey. Roughly 40% of the respondents are 
willing to give up 5% of their pension income after retirement. Since it is well known that 
framing can influence the outcome of the results with these types of questions we refrain 
from interpreting these percentages too closely.
62 These numbers do inform us that we can 
confirm our second hypothesis that individuals derive positive utility from the social 
responsibility attribute since over 70% of our respondents claims to be willing to give up a 
considerable part of their pension income for such an alignment. 
                                                 
62
 The percentages are chosen in consensus with the CentERdata staff. More realistic (lower) percentages would 




4.5.3. Determinants of willingness to pay 
 
To analyze willingness to pay we generate a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if 
the respondent is willing to give up pension income for (a partial) alignment of pension 
investments with his social and environmental preferences. First we verify that the 
beneficiaries who rate the screens as more important are also more likely to be willing to pay 
for the implication of these screens (Table 4.5 panel B). The sum of attitude scores for all 
exclusionary screens is significantly higher (t-statistic of 10.49) among the respondents who 
want to give up part of their pension income. Also the number of screens rated higher than 4 
is significantly higher. In panel C of Table 4.5 we verify these results for the best practices 
screens. Moreover, the correlation between the dummy on willingness to pay for exclusionary 
screens and the dummy for best practices criteria is 85% implying that the respondents who 
get positive utility from screening obtain this for different types of social screening. 
In Table 4.6 we make explicit for which type of person the surplus utility of screening 
is high enough to overcome any pecuniary motives. Therefore we use the WTP(p) dummy in 
a probit regression framework with the log of net monthly household income, gender, and 
some other controls often used in household finance studies (e.g. Van Rooij et al. 2007, Van 
Rooij et al. 2011a,b, Renneboog and Spaenjers 2011). In addition we add a dummy that takes 
on the value of one if the respondent scores at least one screen higher than four out of seven 
(Dimportant). Finally, we add risk tolerance and financial expertise variables. The first 4 
columns of Table 4.6 show the marginal effects predicted at the mean value. Individuals who 
enjoyed a higher level of education and individuals from higher income categories are 
significantly more likely to be willing to pay for personalized social screening. The most 
significant result is that individuals who have a positive stated preference towards at least one 
of the social screens are 40% more likely to sacrifice pension income. This finding confirms 
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results from studies on consumer products that find a higher likelihood of willingness to pay 
for non-product attributes when a positive attitude to that attribute is displayed (Auger et al. 
2003, 2008). Our results are robust to excluding respondents who make inconsistent financial 
choices and in unreported analyses we show that excluding measures of financial expertise 
and risk tolerance or using different variables to measure preferences does not materially alter 
the results. 
Table 4.5 Willingness to pay for personalized social pension investments 
This table reports the willingness to pay for personalized social pension investment screening. We personalize 
the investments by selecting only those screens valued higher than four on a seven point Likert scale. If none of 
the screens is valued higher than four we select all screens. Panel A reports the fractions of the sample and the 
accompanying answers. Panel B and C report the average sum of values sorted by willingness to pay and the 
number of screens valued higher than 4. The differences and two tailed t-statistics are reported in the most right 
columns. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
                    
Panel A: WTP(p) variable     
 Exclusionary screens Best practices screens    
WTP Obs. Percent  Obs. Percent  WTP(p)   
          
<1% 456 25.72%  509 28.71%  No   
1% 84 4.74%  113 6.37%  Yes   
2% 446 25.16%  460 25.94%  Yes   
≥ 5% 787 44.39%  691 38.97%  Yes   
          
Panel B: Assessed values and WTP(p)for Exclusionary screens    
WTP(p) Yes (1317 obs.)   No (456 obs.)   Difference Tests (t-stat) 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.     
          
Sum excl. screens 36.26 (9.60)  30.18 (13.25)  6.08 *** 10.49 
#screens >4 4.69 (2.18)  3.11 (2.80)  1.58 *** 10.80 
          
Panel C: Assessed values and WTP(p)for Best practices screens     
WTP(p) Yes (1264 obs.)   No (509 obs.)   Difference Tests (t-stat) 
          
Sum B.P. screens 33.08 (6.14)  29.42 (8.63)  3.66 *** 10.04 
#screens >4 4.84 (1.54)  3.70 (2.36)  1.14 *** 10.45 
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The effects are almost identical for the best practices screens (see the final columns in 
Table 4.6). Interestingly, drinker and male are both significant, which decreases the 
probability of WTP by 6% for men and for drinkers by 2%–3% per increment. The gender 
effect is in line with Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) who find that females are more willing 
to engage in altruism than do men when altruism is expensive.
63 Also with Laroche et al. 
(2001) who find that especially women have a higher willingness to pay for environmentally 
friendly products. Still, by far the most economically and statistically significant determinant 
is whether or not the beneficiary has a positive stated preference towards social screening. 
Therefore we test determinants of having this preference and report the results in Table 4.7.64 
The results from all columns in panel A of Table 4.7 show that female beneficiaries 
have stronger preferences towards social screening, they are around 4% more likely to score 
at least one of the screens higher than 4 out of 7. Another interesting result is that individuals 
with a higher level of education are more likely to have a positive preference- and to appoint 
the maximum score of 7 out of 7 towards at least one exclusionary screen while at the same 
time education has no effect on the sum of all screen ratings. All else equal older people rate 
all screens higher on average. Furthermore, individuals who smoke and are more tolerant to 
risk are less likely to prefer social screening. 
                                                 
63
 We argue that the amounts of willingness to pay we demand from the individuals are definitely expensive. 
64
 We take the approach of two separate probit regressions because the residuals of the two models are not 
significantly correlated (this correlation coefficient is usually referred to as rho). We used a seemingly unrelated 
regressions approach adjusted for probit models with standard errors clustered at the household level and 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity as well as a model with unadjusted standard errors. In the former we use a Wald 
test (p-value = 0.80) and for the latter a likelihood ratio test (p-value = 0.72). Both tests cannot reject the null of 





Looking at panel B of Table 4.7 we see that the results are very similar for the best 
practices screens. The difference is that education has lower predictive power while self 
declared financial literacy is now significant. Individuals with higher self reported financial 
literacy report a lower sum of preferences towards all social screens and have around 3% 
lower probability per increment to appoint a maximum score to a best practices screen. 
Across the board the pseudo-R2s and the marginal effects are low meaning that if pension 
funds want to apply socially responsible investment practices they should reveal the 
preferences of beneficiaries by direct engagement. 
4.6. Discussion 
 
A natural problem in the design of our survey lies in the fact that we do not observe the 
original pension investments of the pension funds and even if we would be able to get this 
information we are almost certain that the average individual does not possess this 
information. Therefore our results can also be interpreted as a lack of transparency of the 
pension funds’ investments. Since beneficiaries who are willing to accept a lower pension for 
the application of these screens consider their pension fund holdings to be less socially 
responsible than what they would ideally like them to be. This does not necessarily mean that 
the holdings do in fact not meet the demands of the pension participants to a large degree.  
 We also asked the respondents if they missed certain screens in the survey. 
The screens most often mentioned were companies with an excessive bonus culture, 
companies that engage in animal testing or other business practices that violate animal 
wellbeing, and using the environmental dimension as an exclusionary screen (worst polluting) 
rather than a selection screening method. Therefore the percentage of people willing to pay 




Table 4.6 Determinants of WTP for personalized pension investments 
This table reports the marginal effects estimated at mean values after estimating probit models. The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 for individuals who are willing to 
pay for socially screened pension investment portfolios. The individuals are offered a customized choice that selects only those screens rated >4 out of 7. Panel A presents the 
results for exclusionary screens on the full sample (columns 1 and 2) and a subset which excludes all respondents who make an inconsistent choice (columns 3 and 4). In 
panel B we do the same for the best practices screens. In addition columns 5 and 6 exclude respondents who only value the “profit” screen higher than 4 out of 7. In the first 
step of the two-step regression model the standard errors are clustered by household. We report the R-squared of the first stage. Z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
  Exclusionary screens   Best practices screens 
 Full sample  
Conditional 
Inconsistency4=0  Full sample  
Conditional 
Inconsistency4=0  Excl. only profit>4 
 (a) (b)  (c) (d)  (e) (f)  (g) (h)  (i) (j) 
Dimportant 0.401*** 0.395***  0.455*** 0.454***  0.437*** 0.422***  0.496*** 0.459***  0.444*** 0.443*** 
 (11.249) (9.402)  (9.382) (7.924)  (11.422) (9.279)  (10.138) (7.677)  (10.806) (9.075) 
l_hhnetincome 0.022* 0.017  0.039** 0.039**  0.044*** 0.035**  0.040** 0.042**  0.042*** 0.033** 
 (1.657) (1.091)  (2.453) (2.242)  (3.131) (2.195)  (2.461) (2.277)  (2.971) (2.031) 
Education 0.028*** 0.021**  0.035*** 0.026**  0.033*** 0.030***  0.045*** 0.043***  0.032*** 0.029*** 
 (3.528) (2.381)  (3.597) (2.360)  (4.037) (3.216)  (4.355) (3.762)  (3.968) (3.113) 
Age 0.001 0.001  0.001 -0.000  0.001 0.001  0.000 -0.001  0.001 0.001 
 (1.465) (0.855)  (1.121) (-0.235)  (0.773) (0.507)  (0.224) (-0.449)  (0.716) (0.530) 
Rural 0.000 0.003  -0.001 -0.002  0.003 0.004  -0.006 -0.007  0.005 0.006 
 (0.025) (0.264)  (-0.126) (-0.197)  (0.357) (0.372)  (-0.525) (-0.605)  (0.580) (0.613) 
Hhsize 0.006 -0.001  0.007 0.002  -0.000 -0.006  0.009 0.002  -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.567) (-0.094)  (0.505) (0.155)  (-0.039) (-0.466)  (0.604) (0.119)  (-0.045) (-0.406) 
Male -0.032 -0.050**  -0.036 -0.048  -0.062*** -0.077***  -0.060** -0.085***  -0.061*** -0.078*** 
 (-1.493) (-2.037)  (-1.336) (-1.562)  (-2.684) (-3.016)  (-2.080) (-2.625)  (-2.628) (-3.045) 
Dsmoker -0.065** -0.056  -0.022 -0.029  -0.050 -0.055  -0.021 -0.043  -0.050 -0.054 
 (-2.214) (-1.628)  (-0.606) (-0.703)  (-1.636) (-1.533)  (-0.559) (-0.986)  (-1.640) (-1.495) 
Drinker 0.019 0.019  0.026* 0.030*  0.023* 0.019  0.037*** 0.037**  0.023* 0.020 
 (1.590) (1.436)  (1.847) (1.955)  (1.881) (1.419)  (2.582) (2.329)  (1.950) (1.526) 
Finexpert_self 0.001 -0.008  0.003 -0.015  0.005 -0.005  0.006 -0.008  0.006 -0.004 
 (0.101) (-0.869)  (0.292) (-1.369)  (0.638) (-0.485)  (0.561) (-0.699)  (0.671) (-0.446) 
Risktol_Barsky 0.024*** 0.025***  0.025** 0.033***  0.024*** 0.020**  0.018 0.018  0.024*** 0.020** 
 (2.887) (2.618)  (2.343) (2.606)  (2.659) (2.060)  (1.547) (1.392)  (2.721) (2.071) 
Risktol_self 0.004 0.002  -0.001 -0.003  0.008 0.009  0.007 0.009  0.007 0.008 
 (0.439) (0.184)  (-0.106) (-0.194)  (0.738) (0.756)  (0.532) (0.606)  (0.705) (0.709) 
Finlitsum  0.065***   0.084***   0.059***   0.065***   0.059*** 
  (4.494)   (4.490)   (3.749)   (3.373)   (3.734) 
               
Observations 1,764 1,368  1,098 858  1,764 1,368  1,098 858  1,736 1,347 
1st stage pseudo-R2 0.107 0.124   0.135 0.175   0.105 0.109   0.137 0.145   0.101 0.109 
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Table 4.7 Determinants of preference variables for environmental and social screens 
This table reports the marginal effects after estimating probit models for columns (a)-(b) and first stage regression coefficients from ordered probit models are shown in 
columns (e)-(j). The dependent variables used are a dummy for individuals who are willing to pay for socially screened pension investment portfolios (a) and (b), a dummy 
for individuals that scored at least one screen 7 out of 7 (c) and (d), the sum of the scores for the social screens (e) and (f), quintiles of Total score (g) and (h), and the sum of 
all exclusionary screens valued higher than 4 out of 7. In panel A we report on the analyses using exclusionary screens, in panel B we report on all the best practices screens 
except the profit screen. In the first step of the two-step regression model the standard errors are clustered by household. We report the pseudo R-squared of the first stage. Z-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
Panel A: Exclusionary screens           
     Dimportant         1 screen max. score                 Total score     Quintiles of total score        Sum of preferred screens 
 (a) (b) (c)   (d)  (e) (f) (g)   (h) (i)   (j) 
l_hhnetincome 0.021** 0.013 0.022 0.018  0.032 0.020 0.014 0.003 0.035 0.017 
 (2.163) (1.200) (1.529) (1.168)  (0.964) (0.552) (0.432) (0.086) (1.046) (0.452) 
Education 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.031*** 0.033***  0.010 0.031 0.011 0.033 0.031* 0.050** 
 (3.097) (2.942) (3.753) (3.540)  (0.530) (1.511) (0.584) (1.555) (1.689) (2.443) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (-0.072) (-0.489) (0.251) (-0.206)  (3.579) (3.145) (4.368) (3.753) (3.515) (2.732) 
Rural -0.007 -0.001 -0.006 0.010  0.002 0.013 0.003 0.013 -0.001 0.009 
 (-1.036) (-0.131) (-0.613) (0.921)  (0.101) (0.601) (0.150) (0.556) (-0.063) (0.369) 
Hhsize -0.009 -0.010 -0.012 -0.015  0.020 0.015 0.026 0.018 0.008 -0.000 
 (-1.105) (-1.070) (-1.032) (-1.173)  (0.815) (0.545) (0.991) (0.604) (0.294) (-0.001) 
Male -0.047*** -0.038** -0.090*** -0.062**  -0.417*** -0.355*** -0.446*** -0.366*** -0.400*** -0.351*** 
 (-2.812) (-2.101) (-3.914) (-2.406)  (-7.732) (-6.041) (-8.097) (-6.014) (-7.230) (-5.742) 
Dsmoker -0.035 -0.060** -0.027 -0.062*  -0.196*** -0.277*** -0.219*** -0.302*** -0.241*** -0.342*** 
 (-1.495) (-2.146) (-0.882) (-1.750)  (-3.225) (-4.074) (-3.352) (-4.116) (-3.578) (-4.460) 
Drinker 0.023*** 0.023** 0.020* 0.021  -0.030 -0.019 -0.039 -0.030 -0.014 -0.017 
 (2.797) (2.477) (1.698) (1.559)  (-1.176) (-0.707) (-1.457) (-1.031) (-0.563) (-0.610) 
Finexpert_self 0.002 -0.005 -0.013 -0.025***  -0.039** -0.047** -0.040** -0.052** -0.018 -0.029 
 (0.382) (-0.779) (-1.587) (-2.809)  (-2.193) (-2.398) (-2.212) (-2.537) (-0.987) (-1.430) 
Risktol_Barsky 0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.002  -0.017 -0.029 -0.019 -0.028 -0.012 -0.032 
 (0.103) (-0.870) (0.506) (0.158)  (-0.880) (-1.320) (-0.956) (-1.234) (-0.561) (-1.343) 
Risktol_self -0.008 -0.007 -0.040*** -0.035***  -0.046** -0.042* -0.057** -0.047* -0.049** -0.043* 
 (-1.182) (-0.865) (-4.099) (-3.205)  (-2.100) (-1.685) (-2.547) (-1.808) (-2.228) (-1.723) 
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Table 4.7 Panel A continued           
Finlitsum  0.014  0.011   -0.082**  -0.095***  -0.032 
  (1.311)  (0.726)   (-2.293)  (-2.712)  (-0.841) 
            
Observations 1,764 1,368 1,764 1,368  1,764 1,368 1,764 1,368 1,764 1,368 
1st stage pseudo-R2 0.034 0.038 0.033 0.034   0.011 0.012 0.028 0.029 0.016 0.018 
Panel B: Best practices screens           
   Dimportant       1 screen max. score                 Total score    Quintiles of total score        Sum of preferred screens 
 (a) (b) (c)   (d)  (e) (f) (g)   (h) (i)   (j) 
l_hhnetincome 0.008 0.007 0.010 -0.003  0.011 -0.004 0.012 -0.008 0.012 -0.000 
 (0.859) (0.684) (0.649) (-0.170)  (0.337) (-0.118) (0.371) (-0.202) (0.324) (-0.008) 
Education 0.010* 0.007 0.002 0.004  -0.010 -0.013 -0.020 -0.027 -0.010 -0.017 
 (1.836) (1.285) (0.201) (0.370)  (-0.564) (-0.653) (-1.089) (-1.279) (-0.501) (-0.744) 
Age 0.002*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.007***  0.020*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 (2.578) (1.371) (6.804) (5.136)  (8.511) (6.663) (8.563) (6.738) (6.749) (5.279) 
Rural -0.012** -0.007 -0.020* -0.018  -0.031 -0.031 -0.027 -0.029 -0.027 -0.025 
 (-1.978) (-1.043) (-1.885) (-1.543)  (-1.489) (-1.376) (-1.235) (-1.172) (-1.145) (-0.970) 
Hhsize -0.007 -0.013* -0.012 -0.019  0.006 -0.013 -0.004 -0.020 -0.027 -0.053 
 (-1.009) (-1.778) (-0.960) (-1.356)  (0.227) (-0.424) (-0.149) (-0.610) (-0.971) (-1.596) 
Male -0.041*** -0.036** -0.080*** -0.068**  -0.266*** -0.207*** -0.263*** -0.193*** -0.259*** -0.208*** 
 (-2.777) (-2.260) (-3.121) (-2.310)  (-5.101) (-3.526) (-4.877) (-3.162) (-4.520) (-3.198) 
Dsmoker -0.049** -0.044* -0.016 -0.040  -0.131** -0.151* -0.140** -0.166** -0.141* -0.144* 
 (-2.205) (-1.805) (-0.499) (-1.057)  (-2.007) (-1.930) (-2.035) (-2.016) (-1.890) (-1.647) 
Drinker 0.009 0.007 -0.023* -0.028*  0.000 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 0.020 0.026 
 (1.076) (0.853) (-1.785) (-1.916)  (0.002) (-0.183) (-0.064) (-0.072) (0.682) (0.778) 
Finexpert_self -0.010* -0.017*** -0.024*** -0.034***  -0.055*** -0.066*** -0.053*** -0.065*** -0.036* -0.050** 
 (-1.918) (-3.095) (-2.673) (-3.404)  (-2.974) (-3.184) (-2.773) (-3.005) (-1.789) (-2.229) 
Risktol_Barsky 0.002 -0.003 0.021** 0.020**  0.011 -0.003 0.008 -0.003 0.003 -0.014 
 (0.378) (-0.425) (2.290) (1.962)  (0.544) (-0.119) (0.414) (-0.139) (0.142) (-0.579) 
Risktol_self -0.008 -0.006 -0.051*** -0.048***  -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.046* -0.039 
 (-1.261) (-0.921) (-4.549) (-3.771)  (-3.421) (-2.845) (-3.196) (-2.721) (-1.921) (-1.390) 
Finlitsum  0.015  -0.008   -0.046  -0.042  -0.010 
  (1.612)  (-0.501)   (-1.388)  (-1.212)  (-0.250) 
            
Observations 1,764 1,368 1,764 1,368  1,764 1,368 1,764 1,368 1,764 1,368 
1st stage pseudo-R2 0.043 0.052 0.065 0.066   0.021 0.020 0.038 0.038 0.027 0.028 
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Less of a concern is the fact that the questions reflect simplified versions of reality which is 
done to partially overcome the low financial literacy of the average house- hold member. A 
socially responsible investment strategy does not necessarily exclude all assets that do not 
pass a certain form of screening. Pension funds often interfere with managerial decisions by 
corporate engagement. In addition, we screened equities whereas debt can also be screened 
using similar corporate screens or social and political screens on a geographical level. One 
need only con- sider government bonds of countries where human rights are severely 
violated. These other types of SRI are ignored in this paper. 
Nevertheless, within the current setting of defined benefit pension plans we are able to 
assess the preferences for socially responsible investing. Our results show a clear opportunity 
for investment funds to take the heterogeneous nature of individuals into account when 
designing investment plans. In practice this is reflected by the growth in funds devoted to 
responsible investment; and is directly measured in our survey data. Pension funds could 
consider offering a menu of investment choices, which not only include variety in their 




This paper reports on frictions between pension fund participants’ social values and the 
allocation of their pension assets. To our knowledge it is the first empirical study into the 
effects of social values on pension investment decisions. We provide consistent evidence that 
beneficiaries do value social responsibility in their pension investments. Companies that 
operate in the weapons industry and companies that violate human rights amendments are 
deemed most important to be excluded from the investment portfolios of Dutch beneficiaries 
in 2011 relative to our proposed screens. While excluding the “sin” industries (alcohol, 
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tobacco, and gambling) is of a much lower importance to our respondents. It seems to be 
important for the respondents that companies treat other humans well as the highest rated 
exclusionary as well as best practices screens are related to human wellbeing.  
We further investigated if respondents are able to make financial decisions while 
simultaneously taking their non- financial attitudes into account and found that over one third 
reported at least one financial choice inconsistent with rational behavior. In particular, 
respondents who do not possess the required level of financial literacy to make investment 
choices and have a lower level of education make choices less in line with rational economic 
behavior. This is an important finding since the majority of beneficiaries report positive 
attitudes towards social and environmental screening in their pension investments. Which 
leads us to consider incorporating non-financial aspects into pension investments. 
Summarizing we find that a significant tranche of pension participants do derive 
positive utility from social screens in their pension investments. If pension funds already try 
to take into account the preferences of their clientele, they either fail to communicate their 
social responsibility practices effectively or their social responsibility practices do not meet 
the preferences of the participants. Because we observe variation in preferences it might not 
be optimal to provide the pension fund participants with just one pension investment scheme. 
Our findings have important implications on how socially responsible investment filters into 
the public domain through a market based system. It is important to reflect upon the influence 
of financial responsibility in society, whilst reconciling this with the observed level of limited 
financial literacy, which may stand in the way of providing tailor-made pension investment 




4.A. Appendix: The questionnaire 
 
The questions on the importance levels of different exclusionary screens 
-For each of the exclusionary screens we ask: 
What level of importance do you attribute to the following exclusions of your pension investments? 
 
1 = very unimportant 
7 = very important 
 
The questions on the importance levels of different best practices screens 
-For each of the best practices screens we ask: 
The previous was about not investing in certain companies, you also have the opportunity to choose in what 
companies/industries you certainly do want to invest in. Think about companies that have a good environmental 
program, companies that help people in third world countries and companies that take good care of their 
employees. 
What level of importance do you attribute to your pensionfund investing in the following companies? 
a. The company recycles a lot 
… 
       f. The company makes sure the profit margins are high (for continuity) 
 
1 = very unimportant 
7 = very important 
 
The questions % of stocks invested 
Step 1. 
What if your employer transfers your pension payments to an individual account after which this money is being 
invested in stocks and bonds by your pension fund. You have to decide yourself what amount is invested in 
stocks and what amount in bonds. Stocks have a higher expected return and a higher risk. Bonds have a lower 
expected return and a very low risk. All Dutch pension funds together held around 40% in stocks and 60% in 
bonds on average at the end of 2010.  
What percentage would you have invested in stocks? 
0..100 
Step 2. 
Intro: Almost all Dutch pension funds invest a part of the/your money in the weapons-*, alcohol-, tobacco-, 
gambling-,pornography industry,  nuclear energy, and companies that (in)direcly violate human rights (like 
child labor). 
*most big pension funds already exclude direct production of nuclear weapons and clusterbombs, however, this 




Question: What if your current pension fund decides no longer to invest in previously mentioned industries, 
keeping all other characteristics like risk and expected return (of the pension funds’ investments) equal to the 
current situation. 
Would you like to invest more or less in stocks in this situation? 
1 less 
2 the same 
3 more 
 
The question on the preferred basket of stocks 
What if your pension fund offers you the choice to invest your pension in different stock-portfolios: 
Package 1 = your current pension fund and stock portfolio 
Package 2 = does not invest in previously mentioned industries* but everything else is exactly the same. 
*These industries are the weapons-, alcohol-, tobacco-, gambling-,pornography industry,  nuclear energy, and 
companies that (in)direcly violate human rights (like child labor).   
Which package do you prefer? 
1 Package 1 
2 Package 2 
3 No preference 
 
The questions on willingness to pay 
Imagine that the return on the current pension investments is higher than in the case of the screened investments 
while the risk is the same. Are you prepared to give up a (very) small part of your pension income for such 
socially responsible pension composition? 
1 = No, certainly not 
7 = Yes, certainly 
 
The questions on willingness to pay for a personalized investment 
Intro: Imagine that the government decides to switch to a system in which you can choose yourself how much of 
your pension investments you want to invest in stocks and how much in bonds. Now consider this fund which 
does not invest in {all the screens the respondent rated higher than 4, if no screen was rated higher than 4 than 
all screens are applied} has a lower expected payoff but the same risk as your current holdings. We name this 
portfolio the responsible choice. 
Question: If you get the opportunity to invest in the responsible choice. Do you accept a monthly expected 
pension entitlement that is 2% lower than your current expected pension entitlement? This means that when 
your current expected pension (including state pension) would be 1100 euros a month that you will agree on a 
pension that is 1078 euros. 
1. Yes 
2. No  
If the answer is yes we replace the 2% by 5% and ask the question again. The numbers in the example are 
changed accordingly. 
If the answer is no we replace the 2% by 1% and ask the question again. The numbers in the example are 
changed accordingly. 






4.B. Appendix: Financial literacy questions 
1. Do you think that the following statement is true or false? A 15-year mortgage requires higher monthly 
payments on average than a 30-year mortgage (with equal amount borrowed), but the total rents payed 
over the whole period are lower for the 15-year mortgage. 
2. Imagine that the overall interest rate goes up tomorrow, what will happen to the value of outstanding 
bonds? (1) They will increase in value (2) They will decrease in value (3) They will have the same 
value (4) There is no relationship between interest rates and the values of bonds. 
 
4.C. Appendix: Generate financial literacy factors 
Table 4.C.1 reports the results of a principal component factor analysis on five variables that measure different 
aspects of financial literacy. The data is suited for this method since the Bartlett sphericity test returned a p-
value of 0.00, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure is 0.611. In panel A we report the eigenvalues and the 
(cumulative) proportions of the variance explained when using 1-5 factors. 
Table 4.C.1 
        
Panel A    
Component Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 1.49 0.30 0.30 
Factor2 1.00 0.20 0.50 
Factor3 0.96 0.19 0.69 
Factor4 0.79 0.16 0.85 
Factor5 0.76 0.15 1.00 
        
    
Panel B    
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Unexplained  
Finlitir 0.65 -0.22 0.53 
Finlitinfl 0.69 -0.01 0.53 
Finlitbonds 0.30 0.46 0.70 
Finlitrisk 0.66 -0.33 0.46 
Finlitmort 0.28 0.80 0.28 
        
 
4.D. Appendix: Creation of the Inconsistency variables 
Preferred basket is the answer to the question in which we ask the respondents the preference between the 
exclusionary screened and the conventional portfolio. WTP represent whether or not the respondent was willing 
to pay for screening in his or her portfolio (see Table 4.3). % in stocks is the answer to the question in which we 
asked the respondents if they would prefer to invest a different percentage in stocks given the basket of stocks is 
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screened using exclusionary screens compared to their ideal percentage invested in stocks. Inconsistency1 to 3 
are the variables we created using the answers those questions. Inconsistency4 takes on the value of one if the 
respondent makes one of the inconsistent financial choices. 
We distinguish three types of beneficiaries, one whose utility function is not influenced by social 
values, one who gets positive utility from the exclusionary screens proposed, and one who gets negative utility 
from the proposed screens. All types get positive utility from returns and negative utility from risk. In panel A 
we take risk aversion into account, panel B follows from panel A. See Table 4.D.1. 
Table 4.D.1 
Panel A: Answers consistent with three types of rational agents     
Utility from screening Preffered portfolio WTP   % invested in stocks 
        
No relation  No preference No  The same  
        
Positive  Screened  No/Neutral/Yes More/The same  
        
Negative  Conventional No  Less/The same  
        
Panel B: Definition of ERROR variables         
% stocks WTP Inconsistency1   % stocks Preference Inconsistency2 
 Yes 1    Conventional 0 
Less No 0   Less Screened 1 
 Neutral 1    No preference 1 
        
 Yes 0    Conventional 0 
Same No 0   Same Screened 0 
 Neutral 0    No preference 0 
        
 Yes 0    Conventional 1 
More No 0   More Screened 0 
 Neutral 0    No preference 1 
        
        
WTP Preference Inconsistency3     Inconsistency4 
 Conventional 1      
Yes Screened 0    1 if ∑ERRORi > 0 
 No preference 1      
        
 Conventional 0      
No Screened 0      
 No preference 0      
        
 Conventional 1      
Neutral Screened 0      
 No preference 1      









Over the last decades many large institutional investors committed to investing 
responsibly. A famous initiative is the United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible 
Investment (UNPRI) for which more than 850 institutions worldwide with assets under 
management of more than $25 trillion signed up. In the US, about 11% of the stock market 
investments are managed with an explicit mandate to be responsible according to the Socially 
Responsible Investment Forum (SIF).
65
 There are two common strategies socially conscious 
investors follow and often combine. First, they overweigh companies with high 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards and avoid companies with low ESG 
standards. Second, they exclude companies in controversial or “sinful” industries, such as 
alcohol, tobacco, or gambling. Institutional investors, who follow an ESG strategy claim that 
they believe that companies with high ESG standards will outperform in the long-term. A 
good example is CalPERS, which states in its Sustainability Report (2013, p. 5) “We are 
long-term investors, so its important that our portfolio companies look out on the horizon as 
well and implement the kind of ESG policies that will help sustain their future”. Similarly, 
investors who exclude sin or controversial stocks often refer to the long-term risk associated 
with these industries and products. Based on these statements, it seems that SR-investors are 
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particularly concerned about the long-term, fundamental performance of the companies they 
invest in.  
Another, potentially interrelated motive for holding a responsible portfolio are 
religious and political values. Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) show that strongly democratic-
oriented U.S. investment managers hold less stocks in their portfolio, which are deemed 
socially irresponsibly than Republicans or investors, who have no strong political views. 
Kumar and Page (2011) find that norm-constrained institutions only buy sin firms if they 
expect to earn a high positive abnormal return. The relevance of non-pecuniary motives is 
supported by the fact that socially responsible portfolios do generally not outperform 
conventional ones. ESG-strategies have not earned positive abnormal returns in recent years 
(Borgers, Derwall, Koedijk and ter Horst (2013)). Sin stocks have outperformed comparable 
stocks (Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)) leading to lower total returns for portfolios that 
exclude these industries. Just like the pecuniary motives, however, these non-pecuniary 
motives might be related to a more fundamentally-oriented, long-term investment style. As 
Nevins, Bearden and Money (2007) show in an experimental setting, people with stronger 
ethical values are more long-term oriented. 
By looking at institutional investors’ response to discount rate and cash-flow news, 
this paper investigates whether socially conscious investors focus more on long-term 
fundamental information than conventional investors. Cash-flow news, because of its link to 
production, is relatively more related to firm long-term fundamentals than discount rate news, 
which can reflect time-varying risk aversion or investor sentiment. To disentangle discount 
rate and cash-flow news, we apply the return decomposition originally introduced by 
Campbell (1991) and applied to stock returns by Vuolteenaho (2002). Similar to Cohen, 
Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2002) we use a vector autoregression (VAR) approach to 
investigate institutional investors’ response to the two different types of news. For the 
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purpose of our research question, we focus on comparing the response functions of socially 
conscious and conventional investors. We identify socially conscious investors based on their 
holdings using three different measures. 
First, we use the ESG concern indicators provided by MSCI and calculate a concern 
score for each portfolio. Portfolios with a low ESG concern score are classified as responsible 
portfolios, and the ones with a high concern score are classified as conventional portfolios. 
The second and third classifications are based on the avoidance of sin and controversial 
stocks. We classify portfolios, which have no sin (controversial) stocks as responsible, and 
portfolios with large holdings of sin (controversial) stocks as conventional portfolios. 
We find that socially conscious investors react significantly to cash-flow news, but not to 
discount rate news. A 1$ cash-flow shock leads to a trading response of socially conscious 
investors of 22.3 percent. The reaction to expected return news is statistically insignificant 
and economically small. Our findings are very different for conventional investors. 
Conventional investors react much less to cash-flow news than socially conscious investors: a 
1$ cash-flow shock is only associated with a trading response of 6.0 percent. They do 
respond however very strongly to discount rate news. An unexpected return shock of 1$ is 
associated with a trading response of 33.2 percent. These results are consistent across the 
three different classifications we use to identify socially conscious investors, and they seem 
to be a unique characteristic of socially conscious investors. Overall, we can therefore 
conclude that SR-investors are indeed more focused on fundamental, firm-specific news than 
conventional investors. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we explain the 
method we use to pull out news components from stock returns as well as the data we use for 
the application of this method. Section 3 provides the main results as well as robustness 




5.2. Methodology and data 
 
5.2.1. Return decomposition framework and estimation 
 
Our methodology closely corresponds with the return decomposition framework 
described in Campbell (1991), Vuolteenaho (2002), and Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho 
(2002), and others. We follow Vuolteenaho (2002) in that we start with a decomposition of 
unexpected changes in current individual stock returns into expected return news and cash-
flow news. Specifically, we describe unexpected individual stock returns as: 
             ∑  
        
 
       ∑  
     
 
      (5.1) 
Where     denotes the change in expectation from t-1 to t,    denotes the clean-surplus log 
accounting return (ROE),    the log stock return, κ is an approximation error, and ρ is a 
constant set to 0.97 (see Vuolteenaho 2002).
66
 Since the unexpected return is decomposed 
into an expected return and a cash-flow component we identify the first component as cash-
flow news (   ) and the second component as expected-return news (  ).
67
 Both components 
are given by: 
          ∑  
        
 
       (5.2) 
         ∑  
     
 
             (5.3) 
To take the above decomposition to the data we have to make some working assumptions on 
how investors form expectations about future returns and cash-flows. We follow Vuolteenaho 
                                                 
66
 Specifically, Vuolteenaho(2002) uses a value of 0.967 and shows that his results can be reproduced with 
values ranging from 0.95 to 1. 
67
 For details on the derivation see Cohen et al. (2002). 
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(2002) and Cohen et al. (2002) among others and use a Vector Autoregression (VAR) to 
model the forming of these expectations. 
 We modify the VAR used in Cohen et al. (2002) by separating the institutional 
ownership component into two parts in order to distinguish between socially conscious and 
conventional investor ownership. Our VAR model is given by: 
                               
                              (5.4) 
where   denotes a 5x1 vector containing the firm specific state variables. These are given by 
the market-adjusted log stock return, the market-adjusted log book-to-market ratio, the 
market-adjusted log accounting return on equity, the market-adjusted fraction of socially 
conscious investor ownership, and the market-adjusted fraction of conventional investor 
ownership.   denotes a 5x5 matrix of parameters to estimate, and   denotes a 5x1 vector of 
error terms with covariance matrix Σ. We relax the assumptions of constant parameters and 
covariance matrix in some of our specifications and allow for some forms of cross-sectional 
variation. 
 Using the VAR specification allows us to decompose the unexpected stock return into 
both news components. The VAR setup implies that:  
        
                 
                                               (5.5) 
where    is a 5x1 vector with one in the first entry and zeros everywhere else and   denotes 
the identity matrix. We can compute the cash-flow news by: 
          
                                                                (5.6) 
since the total unexpected stock return given by   
   equals the sum of both news components 
we are especially interested in the reactions of conventional and socially conscious investors 
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to both news components. The reactions are found by regressing the investor ownership 
fractions on the news components with a constant. Using the VAR structure it is 
straightforward to get implied regression coefficients. 
 For the estimation of the VAR we follow the procedure used in Vuolteenaho (2002) 
and Cohen et al. (2002) and estimate the VAR equation by equation using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) or weighted least squares (WLS), where we weight each cross section equally. 
Both procedures give very similar results, and we report the WLS results below. Standard 
errors are computed via the bootstrap method proposed in Kapetanios (2008). 
As in Cohen et al. (2002), the data needed for model estimation comes from the 
CRSP/Compustat intersection extended with firm-level ownership data taken from 
CDA/Thomson Reuters institutional ownership holdings. For a thorough description of the 
holdings- as well as the financial and accounting data, we refer to Appendix 5.A. 
The distinction between our VAR approach and that of Cohen et al. (2002) lies in the 
breakdown of institutional ownership in the VAR. For the execution of our VAR, we must be 
able determine how much of a firm is owned by, respectively, “sri” and “conventional” 
institutions, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
5.2.2. Profiling institutional shareholders based on social investment criteria 
 
To understand whether socially conscious institutions respond differently to news 
than do conventional institutions, we must first profile each institutional owner along relevant 
social dimensions in investing. To accomplish this goal we use ownership data from the 13F 
SEC filings of institutional investors with more than $100 million of discretionary assets 
under management and discloses for each institutional money manager (i) the amount of 
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shares held of each firm (j)
68
. In order to derive a social profile for each institutional manager, 
we match their holdings in the second quarter of each year with the annual firm- level ESG 
(“Environmental, Social, and Governance”) indicators from the Morgan Stanley Capital 
Indexes STATS (MSCI STATS) database. STATS provides these indicators on a yearly basis, 
starting in 1991 with an analyses of S&P500 stocks and constituents of the Domini 400 social 
index.  
Given that literature and anecdotal evidence suggest that socially conscious 
institutions have a history of avoiding social controversies, we collect for our main analysis 
the “concerns” indicators from all of the ESG categories covered in MSCI STATS 
(community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, corporate governance, 
and product)
69
. Because the STATS universe increases over time, we only use the indicators 
for S&P500 stocks, keeping our measurement procedure stable over time. With the holdings 
data and the ESG concerns data that are available, we value-weight the concerns for each 
institutional portfolio: 
 
               ∑
                                       
                                        
             (5.7a) 
where Concerns is the size-adjusted sum of all ESG concerns indicators.
70
 We use institutions 
that have invested in at least 100 firms in the S&P500
71
. This results in a sample of 1476 
institutions and 9681 institution-years. For each institution, we calculate the time series mean 
                                                 
68
 The holdings data have some recording errors, which lead to firms with institutional ownership greater than 
100 percent. We deal with this issue in two ways. At the institutional level we drop observations for which an 
institution claims to hold more than 110 percent of shares outstanding (due to rounding issues we cannot delete 
institutions that claim to hold more than 100 percent). And at the firm level we follow Lewellen (2001) and trim 
ownership observations at the 100 percent level so that each firm can only be owned for 100 percent by 
institutional owners and change the holdings for the sri and conventional owners accordingly. 
69
 See 6. General Appendix for a description of the MSCI STATS database. 
70
 We apply the size adjustment to account for the positive correlation between size and the number of social 
responsibility strength- and concern indicators. We size-adjust by subtracting the mean of each environmental 
and social score within each size decile (based on market cap) in each year.   
71
 Using only institutions that have at least invested in 0 or 25 MSCI STATS rated firms does not qualitatively 
alter the results. 
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of IOconcerns and define institutions in the bottom 1/3
rd
 of the distribution of the mean-
adjusted score, hence with relatively few investments in firms with ESG concerns, as socially 
conscious (sri) institutions.
72
 All other institutions are classified as conventional institutions.  
In additional analyses, we verify to what extent our results hold if we use different 
definitions of controversial assets to identify socially conscious institutions. Next to ESG 
indicators, MSCI STATS maintains controversial business indicators (tobacco, alcohol, 
gambling, weapons and military, and nuclear operations) that we can use to identify “sin 
stocks”, which according to studies are likely to be shunned by U.S. institutions that are 
sensitive to social norms (e.g. Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). Also SRI mutual funds have a 
history of avoiding these stocks (e.g. Hong & Kostovetsky 2012, and Borgers et al. 2014). 
Following Borgers et al. (2014), we adopt two definitions of “sin stocks”. Next to the 
classical working definition that includes stocks from tobacco, alcohol and gambling sectors 
(see, for example, Hong and Kacperczyk 2009), we broaden the sin stock universe to include 
all possible controversial business indicators from MSCI STATS (tobacco, alcohol, gambling, 
weapons/military, and nuclear operations). We define the broader set as “controversial 
stocks”.
73
 The definitions are formalized as follows:  
 
          ∑
                                 
                                        
          (5.7b) 
              ∑
                                           
                                        
         (5.7c) 
where Dsin is one for sin stocks (alcohol, gambling, tobacco) and Dcontroversial is an 
indicator for controversial stocks (sin, weapons, military and defense, and nuclear operations). 
                                                 
72
 Using the raw IOconcerns or [time series mean / time series standard deviation] of IOconcerns does not alter 
our findings significantly.  
73
 Among these additional stocks, especially stocks of weapons manufacturers are increasingly being blacklisted 
by institutional investors domiciled in the U.K. and continental Europe. 
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Using IOsin (IOcontrov) we define socially conscious institutions as those in the bottom (top) 
1/3
rd
 of the distribution.  
 By classifying each institution as either socially conscious (SRI) or conventional, we 
are able to determine annually, for each firm in the sample, the percentage of total equity that 
is held by each of these institutional shareholder categories. As these classifications play a 
crucial role in our analyses we provide a deeper look into their scores in Section 4. 
 
5.3. Empirical results 
 
5.3.1. Summary statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics on relevant firm-level variables. For each 
firm, we calculated annually the log of one plus the firm’s stock return (ret), the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s book-to-market ratio (b2m), and the natural logarithm of one plus the 
firm’s accounting return on equity (roe). In addition, we computed the fraction of a firm that 
is held by institutions labeled socially conscious (SRI) and those labeled conventional (conv), 
using  IOConcerns to distinguish institutions. 
On average SRI institutions hold 11.2 percent of the equity capital of each firm, while 
21.7 percent is held by conventional institutions this difference is by construction as we 
define SRI institutions as the all institutions in the bottom 1/3
rd
 of IOconcerns and 
conventional institutions are all others. On average, the firms in our sample produced a 
negative annual stock return of 2.4 percent. The distribution of returns is somewhat left 
skewed as the median firm returned positive 1.8 percent. The same holds for the return on 
equity with a mean and median of -1.8 percent and 8.2 percent respectively. For the sake of 
completeness, Panels B and C show correlations between the variables – on a market-
adjusted basis - as in Cohen et al. (2002). 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the data we use in the VAR model. The data come from the 
intersection of the CRSP and Compustat datasets matched to ownership data from CDA Thomson Reuters that 
was on its turn matched to the MSCI STATS database. In Panel A we present statistics on the natural logarithm 
of excess returns (ret), the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio (b2m), the natural logarithm of the 
GAAP accounting return on equity (roe) and the fractions of the firms owned by socially responsible (sri) and 
conventional (conv) investors.  Panel B presents contemporaneous correlations of market adjusted data (market 
adjustment is indicated by an underline). Panel C presents First order cross- and  autocorreltaions. 
Panel A: Basic descriptive statistics         
  Mean  Std. Dev. Min.  25%-pct  Median  75%-pct  Max. 
ret -0.024 0.452 -2.736 -0.231 0.018 0.221 3.084 
b2m -0.495 0.654 -2.215 -0.912 -0.501 -0.103 4.147 
roe -0.018 0.433 -2.302 -0.005 0.082 0.14 4.223 
sri 0.112 0.107 0.000 0.021 0.083 0.174 0.863 
conv 0.217 0.158 0.000 0.081 0.192 0.332 0.973 
        Panel B: Contemporaneous correlation, market adjusted data 
      
 
ret b2m roe sri conv 
ret 
  
1.000 -0.504 0.140 0.082 0.030 
b2m 
  
-0.504 1.000 -0.212 -0.155 -0.056 
roe 
  
0.140 -0.212 1.000 0.120 0.102 
sri 
  
0.082 -0.155 0.120 1.000 0.161 
conv 
  
0.030 -0.056 0.102 0.161 1.000 
        Panel C: First-order cross- and autocorrelations, market adjusted data 
       ret b2m roe sri conv 
ret 
  
-0.099 0.181 -0.073 -0.093 -0.072 
b2m 
  
-0.157 0.285 -0.063 -0.006 0.039 
roe 
  
0.206 -0.34 0.161 0.072 0.026 
sri 
  
0.097 -0.127 0.063 0.306 0.091 
conv 
  
0.048 -0.062 0.041 0.119 0.359 
                
 
 
5.3.2. VAR outcome and response coefficients 
 
Table 5.2 shows the VAR coefficients, which we obtained by estimating specification (5.4). 
Consistent with earlier studies, the VAR coefficients in the first row of Table 5.2 indicate a 
positive association between stock return and, respectively, past annual return, the book-to-
market ratio, accounting return on equity, the percentage of stocks held institutions (both SRI 
and conventional). As for the ownership variables, the last columns in Table 5.2 indicate that 
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both ownership by socially conscious institutions and ownership by conventional institutions 
is significantly greater in firms with higher past 12-month return, higher accounting return on 
equity, and higher level of past SRI and conventional institutional ownership. Unlike 
conventional institutional ownership, ownership by socially conscious institutions is lower 
when the book-to-market ratio is higher. This differential sensitivity is in line with the 
stylized fact that socially conscious investors tend to experience tilts to “growth” or “glamour” 
stocks, possibly because they avoid stocks with typical value characteristics (e.g. Hong and 
Kacperczyk 2009).  
 
Table 5.2 VAR coefficients 
The table reports the VAR parameters estimated form the annual panel. The model state variables include the 
market-adjusted log stock return, r (the first element of the state vector z); market-adjusted log book-to-market 
ratio, b2m (the second element); market-adjusted log profitability, roe (the third element); and market-adjusted 
fraction of shares outstanding owned by respectively socially conscious institutions, sri (the fourth element) and 
conventional institutions conv. The parameters correspond to the following system: 
                 ,           
   
We report two numbers for each parameter. The first number is a weighted least squares estimate of the 
parameter, where observations are weighted such that each cross-section receives an equal weight. The second 
number (in parentheses) is a robust standard error computed using Rogers’s (1983, 1993) method (details of the 
method are described by Vuolteenaho, 2002). 
VAR coefficients                   
   Γ         Σ         
ret 0.163 0.127 0.098 0.055 0.251 0.181 -0.118 0.028 0.005 0.004 
 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.067) (0.049) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
b2m 0.078 0.794 0.032 0.056 -0.093 -0.118 0.169 0.009 -0.004 -0.003 
 
(0.017) (0.011) (0.020) (0.057) (0.039) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
roe 0.183 0.079 0.558 0.326 0.226 0.028 0.009 0.110 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.076) (0.051) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
sri 0.012 -0.004 0.004 0.746 0.088 0.005 -0.004 0.001 0.003 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
conv 0.012 -0.001 0.005 0.100 0.884 0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 




In Table 5.3, Panel A, we show the covariance (correlations in bottom left) between 
the news variables and the two institutional ownership variables that are central to our 
analysis. Consistent with Cohen et al. (2002), firm-level market-adjusted return is more 
driven by cash-flow news than by expected-return news, and the news variables are positively 
correlated. The variances of expected-return news (0.176) and cash-flow news (0.393) are 
both larger than those that Cohen et al. (2002) report based on their sample, but the positive 
correlation between the news variables is similar (0.738).  
 
Table 5.3 Responses of prices and institutional ownership to news 
The table reports derived statistics calculated from the VAR specification of Table 5.2. The VAR specification 
has the structure:                  ,           
   
The model variables include the market-adjusted log stock return, market-adjusted log book-to-market ratio, 
market-adjusted log accounting return on equity, and market-adjusted institutional-ownership fractions from 
“socially conscious” and “conventional” investors respectively. Panel A reports the covariance and correlation 
matrices of expected-return news, cash-flow news, and institutional-ownership shock. The upper-left section 
(including diagonal) of the panel shows covariances and the lower-left section correlations. Panel B shows 
regression of return and institutional-ownership shock on cash-flow and expected-return news.  
Panel A: Covariances and correlations of   
news and institutional ownership 
    ern cfn sri conv 
ern 0.176 0.194 0.007 0.015 
 
(0.030) (0.035) (0.001) (0.002) 
cfn 0.738 0.393 0.012 0.019 
 
(0.033) (0.042) (0.001) (0.002) 
sri 0.537 0.360 0.003 
 
 
(0.040) (0.025) (0.000) 







Panel B: Regressions 
        cfn ern 




   
(0.037) 




   
(0.002) 




   
(0.003) 
     
  
0.025 0.011 
   
(0.002) (0.006) 
     
  
0.013 0.072 
   
(0.004) (0.011) 




We now turn our attention to responses of return and institutional ownership to cash-
flow news. In the first row of Table 5.3, Panel B, we first present the estimated response of 
returns to cash-flow news. The coefficient of 0.506 indicates that stock prices move less than 
one-to-one with a $1 cash-flow shock. Our estimate of a $0.494 (1-0.506) underreaction is 
somewhat stronger than the $0.41 underreaction that Cohen et al. (2002) report based on a 
different sample period.  
The subsequent coefficients indicate that ownership by socially conscious institutions 
and ownership by conventional institutions relate positively to cash-flow news. Given the 
underreaction of return to news, these results suggest that institutions buy on positive cash-
flow news in order to exploit the apparent underreaction. At first glance, they seem to do so 
to a different degree. The estimate response of sri to cash flow news equals 0.031, whereas 
the coefficient on conv is 0.048. However, we hasten to comment that the average percentage 
held by conventional institutions is by construction roughly twice as large as the percentage 
held by socially conscious institutions (as indicated in Table 5.1). Once the coefficients are 
scaled by mean ownership levels, sri (conv) increase their positions by 27.7 percent (22.1 
percent) on average after a cash-flow news shock of 1$. Given our model specifications and 
that we scale the coefficients simply by mean ownership over firms and time the responses to 
cash-flow news in this univariate setting are not extremely different. 
Although the abovementioned positive coefficients for the ownership variables could 
be taken to imply that both types of institutions buy stocks on positive cash-flow news in 
order to profit from underreaction, they could also point to a mere preference for holding 
stocks after positive cash-flow news (Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho 2002). To shed more 
light on the nature of the response coefficients, we report in the last lines of Table 5.3 the 
ownership regressions that include both cash-flow news and expected-return news.  
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In the case of ownership by conventional institutions, the magnitude of the coefficient 
on cash-flow news decreases to 0.013 when expected-return news is added as a regressor, and 
ownership loads significantly positively on expected-return news. That the coefficient on 
expected-return news is economically and statically significant suggests that conventional 
institutions buy on positive cash-flow news due to the positive expected return implied by the 
under reaction. Implicit in this interpretation is the assumption that positive expected return-
news captures mispricing (under reaction) because it is derived from market-adjusted data. 
In the case of ownership by socially conscious institutions, however, we find that 
expected-return news hardly subsumes the positive response to cash-flow news, and 
ownership does not significantly react to expected-return news. In other words, socially 
conscious institutions appear to be sensitive to cash-flow news, but not because of the higher 
expected return associated with under reaction to cash-flow news.  
To formally test whether the effects described above are different we need to scale the 
response coefficients in order to compare them. Therefore, we scale the response coefficients 
of sri and conv from the bivariate regression results presented in Table 5.3 by the respective 
mean ownership levels. For each bootstrap repetition we compute the difference between the 
mean-scaled responses to both news components. This gives us the mean scaled differences 
as well as their standard deviations. Socially conscious institutions react 15.2 percent (st.dev. 
1.0 percent) stronger to cash-flow news while they react 17.0 percent (st.dev. 6.9 percent) 
less to expected return news. With t-statistics of 15.2 and 2.5 respectively both the 
differences in response are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
The observed differential response to the news variables can be seen as an indication 
that socially conscious institutions are, compared to conventional institutions, mainly focused 
on the permanent components of returns because of a more long-term orientation. One would 
expect that long-term investors are mainly concerned about permanent shocks to their wealth, 
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as manifested in cash-flow news (see, e.g., Campbell, Polk and Voulteenaho 2010). They 
would arguably respond less to expected-return news because of mean reversion in returns 
that are unrelated to fundamentals. This interpretation concerning investors’ response to the 
news variables can be further understood by means of Figure 5.1, which shows what happens 
to cumulative (market-adjusted) returns if we shock the VAR with a 25 percent return 
without any cash-flow news, and what happens if we introduce a shock that is 25 percent 
cash-flow news. Over time the cash-flow news shock gets priced in as the cumulative market-
adjusted) return goes to 25 percent. However, in the absence of cash-flow news, the 




5.3.3. Alternative definitions of social controversies. 
 
We now verify whether the classification of institutions as either socially conscious 
(conventional) based on alternative definitions of social controversies affects our main results. 
To do so, we recompute sri and conv based on the alternative definitions described in Section 
2.2, and estimate their responses to cash-flow news and expected-return news.   The results in 
the first set of columns that are presented in Table 5.4 emerge from using IOsin to distinguish 
socially conscious institutions from conventional institutions. The second set of columns 
represents the outcome of using IOcontrov to make this distinction. Socially conscious 
institutions are those that comprise the bottom 1/3
rd
 of the distribution of these alternative 
institutional investor scores, and conventional institutions are those that below to the 
remaining 2/3
rd
. To facilitate a comparison with our baseline results, we summarize the 
relevant ownership response coefficients from Table 5.3 in the third set of columns that are 
presented in Table 5.4.  
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 These patterns are very similar to those of Voulteenaho (2002) and those of Cohen et al. (2002). The reported 
price response over time to a 25-percent shock in return is consistent with an initial momentum effect a la 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and subsequent reversal in the spirit of De Bondt and Thaler (1985). 
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Figure 5.1 Cumulative return responses to 25 percent return shocks 
The figure contains two impulse-response functions computed from the VAR system of Table 2. The figures 
plot the cumulative returns over years if we shock the VAR model with a 25 percent return in the absence of any 
cash-flow news (Top) or give an impulse of 25 percent cash-flow news (bottom).  
The 25 percent return shock is generated by setting the first element of the VAR-error vector to 0.25. 
The other elements of the VAR-error vector are set to their conditional expectations, conditional on the first 
element being equal to 0.25 and cash-flow news equal to zero. The typical 25 percent cash-flow news is induced 
by setting the VAR-error vector to a constrained maximum likelihood value, imposing the constraint that cash-




 Under these alternative definitions, the percentage of equity that is held by socially 
conscious institutions is smaller than in our baseline case. Using sin (controversial) stock 
investments to identify socially conscious investments yields average ownership of such 
investors of 5.7 percent (4.7 percent) in the average firm compared to 27.1 percent (28.2 
percent) for conventional investors.  
We now turn to the response coefficients to cash-flow news and expected-return news 
for both types of institutional ownership. Because ownership by socially conscious 
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institutions is smaller when derived from either IOsin or IOcontrov, compared to that derived 
from IOConcerns, the response coefficients are in magnitude smaller than those reported in 
our main analysis. Nevertheless, the main inferences remain unchanged: socially conscious 
institutions buy on positive cash-flow news and do not respond to expected-return news, 
whereas conventional institutions respond positively to both cash-flow news and expected-
return news.  
In another robustness check we allow institutions to switch groups (from socially 
conscious to conventional and the other way around) by classifying institutions based on their 
raw IOscore instead of the time series mean of the score. In Table 5.5 we report the results 




Table 5.4 Different identification of SR investors: Sin and Controverial investments 
In this table we use three different definitions of the IOscore to identify socially conscious investors. In the first 
two rows we present the average ownership by “sri” and “conv” investors identified according to one of three 
definitions (less investments in respectively Sin stocks, Controversial stocks, or stocks with more ESG 
concerns).  The rows below present results from bivariate regressions as presented in Table 5.3. Standard errors 
derived from 1000 bootstrap replications are given in parentheses below the implied VAR coefficients. 

















































Table 5.5 Different identification of SR investors: Raw IOscore 
In this table we use the raw IOscores instead of the timeseries mean IOscore for each institution. We again 
present three different definitions of the IOscore to identify socially conscious investors. In the first two rows 
we present the average ownership by “sri” and “conv” investors identified according to one of three definitions 
(less investments in respectively Sin stocks, Controversial stocks, or stocks with more ESG concerns).  The 
rows below present results from bivariate regressions as presented in Table 5.3. Standard errors derived from 
1000 bootstrap replications are given in parentheses below the implied VAR coefficients. 
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5.4. Validation of IOscores 
 
5.4.1. IOscores and political values 
 
Using controversial assets to identify socially conscious and conventional investors is 
central to our analysis, but a concern is that our measure might not capture the explicit 
preference of investors’ avoidance for non-controversial assets. Therefore we provide a 
simple exercise that relates our measure to a proxy for political preferences, which have been 
shown to be related to preferences for social investments.
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 Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) use 
political contributions of mutual fund managers as a measure of political preferences and 
show that (strong) Democrat contributors are less likely to invest in Controversial stocks 
(using a similar definition as ours) and stocks with Employee Relations- or Workforce 
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Diversity concerns. Furthermore, Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2013) argue that location of a 
firm influences the investment decisions since most outside stakeholders are located in 
proximity to the firm. They show that firms located in more Democrat oriented states score 
higher on measures of corporate social responsibility. Since we don’t have manager-level 
data, we follow Di Giuli and Kostovetsky and use the location as a proxy for political 
preferences. We search for the name and location of institutions in the top and bottom of the 
IOmeasures, when no specific division, and therefore location, is indicated in the data we use 
headquarters location. Subsequently we add election result data for all presidential elections 
that took place in during our sample period; 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008. For each state 
we add up the number of times Democrats won the elections (e.g. California = 5, Florida = 2, 
Utah = 0) and appoint this score to the institutions as shown for the 10 Top and Bottom 
institutions using the IOconcerns measure in Table 5.6.  
If our measure picks up the correlation between social and political preferences 
reported in the literature, we should see that institutions with higher exposures to stocks with 
ESG concerns are located in states with a more Republican preference.   
From Table 5.7, Panel A, it becomes clear that the top of our SRI group is located in 
more democrat-oriented states whereas the institutions with the highest exposure to assets 
with ESG concerns are headquartered more in states with a Republican voting majority. This 
effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent level for the controversial- and 
sin stock measures respectively. Moreover we confirm these findings in Table 5.7 Panel B 
where we compare all institutions that are in the lowest 1/3
rd
 of the distribution to the 
institutions in the highest 1/3
rd
 for each IOmeasure. This exercise shows that our measures to 
identify social values in institutional investment portfolios are correlated with political 
preferences albeit a crude measure.  
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Table 5.6: Top/Bottom IOconcerns institutions and state level election results 
This table reports a list of 10 institutions with the lowest and highest IOconcerns measure. For each institution 
we hand collect location data (if a specific division location is not indicated in the name we use the headquarters 
location). For each state we then provide the number of times the democrats won the presidential elections, 
ElectionWinDem.  
  Manager name STATE/Location ElectionWinDem 
Panel A: High exposure to STATS concerns 
  4.763 EVERCORE TRUST COMPANY, N.A. New York 5 
4.756 ALBION MANAGEMENT GROUP Connecticut 5 
3.112 PINNACLE MANAGEMENT & TRUST CO Texas 0 
3.067 WEBSTER TRUST COMPANY NA Arizona 1 
2.854 TD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC Tennessee 2 
2.479 MACQUARIE INVESTMENT MGMT LTD. Australia na 
2.428 MECHANICS BANK TRUST DEPT California 5 
2.414 FIDUCIARY GROUP 
Europe 
(Gibraltar) na 
2.266 MANUFACTURERS NATL CORP Texas 0 







        
Panel B: Low exposure to STATS concerns 
  -2.657 RBC TRUST CO (INT'L) LTD Canada na 
-1.966 FCM INVESTMENTS, LP Texas 0 
-1.832 ENGEMANN ASSET MANAGEMENT California 5 
-1.541 SANTA BARBARA ASSET MGMT, LLC California 5 
-1.455 CITIZENS ADVISERS INC New Hampshire 4 
-1.391 CENTURION ALLIANCE, INC California 5 
-1.375 VOYAGEUR ASSET MANAGEMENT INC. Minnesota 5 
-1.332 TRUST CO BANK OF GEORGIA Georgia 1 
-1.318 PADCO ADVR II, INC Maryland 5 
















Table 5.7: Top/Bottom IOmeasures and state level election results: difference tests 
Panel A of this table reports on difference tests of the measure MeanWinDem as explained in Table 5.1. In panel 
B we compare MeanWinDem for all institutions that are in the Highest 1/3
rd
 of the distribution for each 
IOmeasure (Concerns, Sin, and Controversial) to all institutions that are in the Lowest 1/3
rd
. The P-values 
between squared brackets are based on 1 tailed t-tests.  
Panel A: MeanWinDem per  IOmeasure 
Ioconcerns High exposure 2.750 
 





   Iosin High exposure 3.250 
 





   Iocontroversial High exposure 1.700 
 





   Panel B: MeanWinDem all IOmeasures 
All measures  Highest 1/3 3.450 





      
 
 
5.4.2. Institution types 
 
Another concern that we want to address is that we might overweight certain institution types. 
To address this concern we analyze the relation between our IOmeasures and institution type 
data from CDA/Thomson Reuters. They assign one of five types to an institution; (1) bank, (2) 
insurance company, (3) investment company (mutual fund), (4) investment advisor, and (5) 
other. Types (1)-(3) are self explanatory, the investment advisor category includes most of 
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the large brokerage firms, and the “other” category includes pension funds and university 
endowments. Because the data provider indicates that after 1998 institutions can be wrongly 
classified as type (5) we also use updated classification data provided by Brian Bushee on his 
personal website
76
. Besides being updated after 1998, this measure also separates the “other” 
type into private pensions, public pensions, and endowments. All institutions that do not fall 
into one of the above mentioned groups were classified as “miscellaneous”. 
We create dummy variables for each of the institution types and run pooled OLS 
regressions with the three IOscores on the institution type dummies, total equity, total number 
of stocks, total equity per stock, and year fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 5.8, 
the banking sector has a higher exposure to ESG concerns and stocks with more controversial 
stocks than do independent investment advisors (+3 percent higher exposure within the 
S&P500 investments). This effect is driven by banks investing more in firms with operations 
in the weapons, military and defense, and nuclear energy sectors. Overall, the institution 
types do not differ too much in their exposures to controversial stocks or stocks with ESG 
concerns as only 7 out of 33 institution dummies are significantly different from zero at 
conventional levels. Moreover, the results differ per measure. 
 
 
Table 5.8: Explaining IOscores by institution type 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of IOmeasures (Concerns, Sin, and Controversial) on style 
dummies taken directly from CDA/Thomson Reuters or style dummies from Brian Bushees personal website. 
As control variables we add the natural logarithm of Total Equity of the institution (manager), the natural 
logarithm of the Number of Stocks in the portfolio, Average Equity per stock in mln $US, and year fixed effects. 
Since we use mutually exclusive types we use the most common type, “independent investment advisors”, as the 
base case. T-stats, presented in parentheses, are derived from standard errors clustered at the institution and year 
level. 





Table 5.8 continued 
              
 
IOconcerns IOsin IOcontrov 












































































































































       Observations 9,681 9,410 9,681 9,410 9,681 9,410 
R-squared 0.038 0.054 0.024 0.025 0.282 0.292 
Controls and constant YES YES YES YES YES YES 





 Research on social values in financial markets concentrates on characteristics of assets 
which are over- or underweighted in investment portfolios given a set of norms or values (see, 
e.g. Hong and Kacperczyk 2009, Hong and Kostovetsky 2012, Kumar and Page 2011). In this 
paper we argue that besides having tastes against certain types of stocks, social values also 
influence the investment behavior for the assets that investors do hold. More specifically we 
argue that investors who are more socially conscious have a different investment orientation 
in that they are less sensible to non-persistent stock price effects not driven by fundamentals. 
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Since social values are known to manifest themselves in tastes for or against 
controversial assets we use the holdings of US institutional investors as means to indentify 
two investor types. We define socially conscious investors as institutions that have few assets 
under management invested in stocks with Environmental, Social, and Governance 
controversies and all other institutions as conventional. Subsequently we use a vector 
autoregression (VAR) framework to identify cash-flow (permanent) and expected return 
(temporary) news components of stock returns (following e.g. Vuolteenaho 2002 and Cohen 
et al. 2002) and analyse the relative responses of the investor types to both news components. 
Our main results indicate that socially conscious investors respond 17.0 percent less to 
expected return news while these investors respond 15.2 percent stronger to cash-flow news. 
This evidence is in line with the view that social values do not only influence tastes against 
stocks with social controversies but also the investment decisions for all assets in the 
portfolio on average.   
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5.A. Appendix: Data 
 
This appendix is taken from Cohen et al. (2002) and adjusted for the data used in this paper.  
5.A.1. CRSP–COMPUSTAT data 
 
The basic data come from the CRSP–COMPUSTAT intersection. The Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP) monthly stock file contains monthly prices, shares outstanding, 
dividends and returns for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. The COMPUSTAT annual 
research file contains the relevant accounting information for most publicly traded US stocks. 
In order to be included in our sample, a firm-year must satisfy the following COMPUSTAT 
data requirements. First, we require all firms to have a December fiscal-year end of t-1; in 
order to align accounting variables across firms. Second, a firm must have t-1; t-2; and t-3 
book equity available, where t denotes time in years. A number of CRSP data requirements 
must also be satisfied. A valid market equity figure must be available for t-1; t-2; and t-3: We 
require that there is a valid trade during the month immediately preceding the period t return. 
This requirement ensures that the return predictability is not spuriously induced by stale 
prices or other similar market micro-structure issues. We also require at least one monthly 
return observation during each of the preceding five years, from t-1 to t-5: In addition, we 
screen out clear data errors and mismatches by excluding firms with t-1 market equity less 
than $10 million and book-to-market more than 100 or less than 1/100. We carefully avoid 
imposing any COMPUSTAT or CRSP requirements on year t data, because these data are 
used in the dependent variables of our regressions. 
The stock returns are calculated as follows. The simple stock return is an annual value-
weighted return on a firm’s common stock issues (typically one). If no return data are 
available, we substitute zeros for both returns and dividends. Annual returns are compounded 
from monthly returns, recorded from the beginning of July to the end of June. 
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Delisting returns are included when available in CRSP. If a firm is delisted but the delisting 
return is missing, we investigate the reason for disappearance. If the delisting is performance-
related, we assume a -30% delisting return. Otherwise, we assume a zero delisting return. The 
delisting-return assumptions are based on Shumway’s (1997) results. Shumway tracks a 
sample of firms whose delisting returns are missing from the CRSP data and finds that 
performance-related delistings are associated with a significant negative return, on average 
approximately -30%. This assumption is unimportant to our final results, however. Market 
equity (combined value of all common stock classes outstanding) is taken from CRSP as of 
the end of June. If the year t market equity is missing, we compound the lagged market equity 
with return without dividends. 
For book equity, we prefer COMPUSTAT data item 60, but if it is unavailable we use item 
235. Also, if short- and/or long-term deferred taxes are available (data items 35 and 71), we 
add them to book equity. If both data items 60 and 235 are unavailable, we proxy book equity 
by the last period’s book equity plus earnings less dividends. If neither earnings nor book 
equity is available, we assume that the book to market ratio has not changed and compute the 
book equity proxy from the last period’s book-to-market and this period’s market equity. We 
treat negative or zero book equity values as missing. 
GAAP ROE is the earnings over the last period’s book equity, measured according to the US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. We use the COMPUSTAT data item 172, 
earnings available for common. When earnings are missing, earnings is computed as the 
change in book equity plus dividends. In every case, we do not allow the firm to lose more 
than its book equity. That is, we define the net income as maximum of reported net income 
(or clean-surplus net income, if earnings are not reported) and negative of the beginning of 
the period book equity. Hence, the minimum GAAP ROE is truncated to -100%. 
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We calculate leverage as book equity over the sum of book equity and book debt. The book 
debt is the sum of debt in current liabilities (34), total long-term debt (9), and preferred stock 
(130). The identities necessitate the use of log transforms of stock return, profitability and the 
book-to-market ratio. The log transformations can cause problems if some stock returns 
and/or ROEs are close to -100% or if some of the book-to-market ratios are close to zero or 
infinity. We follow Vuolteenaho (2002) and solve this complication by redefining the firm as 
a portfolio of 90% common stock and 10% Treasury-bills using market values. Every period, 
the portfolio is rebalanced to these weights. This affects not only stock return and accounting 
return on equity, but also the book-to-market equity, pulling this ratio slightly towards one. 
After adding this risk-free investment, the ratios and returns are sufficiently well behaved for 
log transformations. Simple market and accounting returns on this portfolio closely 
approximate simple returns on the firm’s common stock only. The accounting identities hold 
for the transformed quantities. Furthermore, this transformation method is superior to purely 
statistical transformations (such as the Box-Cox transformation), because the transformed 
quantities still correspond to an investment strategy.  
 
5.A.2. CDA/Thomson reuters data 
 
A 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 required all institutions with 
greater than $100 million of securities under discretionary management to report their 
holdings to the SEC. Holdings are reported quarterly on the SEC’s form 13F, where all 
common-stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 must be disclosed. These 
reports are available in electronic form back to 1980 from CDA/Spectrum, a firm hired by the 
SEC to process the 13F filings. Our data include the quarterly reports from the second quarter 
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of 1991 through the second quarter of 2009. Throughout this paper, we use ‘‘institution,’’ as 
a synonym for ‘‘an institution that files a 13F.’’ 
On the 13F, each manager must report all securities over which they exercise sole or shared 
investment discretion. In cases where investment discretion is shared by more than one 
institution, care is taken to prevent double counting. Spectrum officials have told us that they 
believe that duplication is rare. Once an institution enters the 13F sample, it is assigned a 
manager type by Spectrum. The five types are (1) bank, (2) insurance company, (3) 
investment company (mutual fund), (4) investment advisor, and (5) other. The first three 
categories are self-explanatory. The investment advisor category includes most of the large 
brokerage firms, and the “other” category includes pension funds and university endowments. 
These categorizations are not always precise, though. For example, brokerage firms with 
mutual fund subsidiaries will fall into category (3) if the mutual funds are deemed by 
Spectrum to make up more than 50% of the total 13F assets for that manager and into 
category (4) otherwise. Spectrum does not provide information to allow more precise 
partitioning of the data. It is also possible for a manager to be reclassified over time if 
Spectrum determines that the institution’s main business has changed. 
The Spectrum 13F holdings file contains three columns: date, CUSIP code, identifier for the 
institution, and number of shares held in that stock by that institution on that date. All dates 
are end-of-quarter (March 31, June 30, September 30, or December 31). For each CUSIP and 
date we simply sum up the shares held by all institutions in the sample to get total 
institutional holdings of the security at the end of that quarter. We do not drop firms without 
SPECTRUM data from our sample. Firms with no SPECTRUM data are recorded as having 
zero institutional ownership. We then match each CUSIP to a CRSP PERMNO, the 
permanent number CRSP assigns to that security. Holdings associated with CUSIPs for 
which we found no associated PERMNO are ignored. Fortunately, these account for a very 
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small fraction of institutional holdings. Some companies have multiple equity securities 
associated with them, and CRSP uniquely identifies each firm with a permanent company 
number, or PERMCO. We value-weighted returns and institutional holding percentages of 
the different share classes (PERMNOs) associated with each PERMCO. This gives us one 
return and one institutional ownership percentage associated with each set of accounting data. 
Our primary results are based on annual vector autoregressions. In these VARs we use end-
of-year t-1 accounting information to predict returns from July of year t through June of year 
t+1: We use institutional ownership data as of June 30 of year t as the variable corresponding 
to the returns over this period. In some of our tests we use monthly data. For this purpose we 
compute the percentage of institutional ownership at the end of each quarter and assume that 
the number stays constant over the subsequent three months. In this way, we can compute 
monthly returns on the aggregate institutional portfolio. We define all outstanding shares not 
held by 13F institutions to be ‘‘individual’’ or ‘‘household’’ holdings. (Our individual 
holdings thus contain assets controlled by very small financial institutions, but these make up 
only a tiny percentage of the category.) Therefore, for each stock the individual holding 




6. General Appendix: STATS data  
 
The STATS data produced by analysts of Mogan Stanley Capital Indexes (MSCI) and before 
2010 by Kinder Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) is used in three Chapters of this dissertation. 
STATS provides strengths and concern indicators for Environmental, Social, and Governance 
(ESG) issues and indicators for controversial business practices and industries with 
expanding coverage over time starting in 1991 (Table 6.1). In this appendix I list a brief 
summary of the STATS indicators. And for transparency I provide a thorough description for 
the environmental indicators. The full description of the data can be downloaded from the 
WRDS website in the manuals and overviews section.  
Table 6.1 Coverage of STATS data 
Index Universe 1991-2000 2001 2002 2003-Present 
S&P 500 Index X X X X 
Domini 400 Social Index X X X X 
Russell 1000 Index 
 
X X X 
Large Cap Social Index 
  
X X 
Russell 3000 Index 
   
X 
Broad Market Social Index 
   
X 
     Companies covered 650 1100 1100 3100 
          
 
 
-ESG strength and concern indicators 
Environmental Strengths 
Beneficial Products and Services-The company derives substantial revenues from innovative remediation 
products, environmental services, or products that promote the efficient use of energy, or it has developed 
innovative products with environmental benefits. (The term “environmental service” does not include services 
with questionable environmental effects, such as landfills, incinerators, waste-to-energy plants, and deep 
injection wells.) 
Pollution Prevention-The company has notably strong pollution prevention programs including both emissions 
reductions and toxic-use reduction programs. 
Recycling-The company either is a substantial user of recycled materials as raw materials in its manufacturing 
processes, or a major factor in the recycling industry. 
Clean Energy-The company has taken significant measures to reduce its impact on climate change and air 
pollution through use of renewable energy and clean fuels or through energy efficiency. The company has 
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demonstrated a commitment to promoting climate-friendly policies and practices outside its own operations. 
KLD renamed the Alternative Fuels strength as Clean Energy Strength. 
Communications-The company is a signatory to the CERES Principles, publishes a notably substantive 
environmental report, or has notably effective internal communications systems in place for environmental best 
practices. KLD began assigning strengths for this issue in 1996, and then incorporated the issue with the 
Corporate Governance: Transparency rating which was added in 2005. In all spreadsheets it is incorporated into 
the Transparency rating. 
Property, Plant, and Equipment-The company maintains its property, plant, and equipment with above average 
environmental performance for its industry. KLD has not assigned strengths for this issue since 1995. 
Other Strength-The company has demonstrated a superior commitment to management systems, voluntary 
programs, or other environmentally proactive activities. 
 
Environmental Concerns 
Regulatory Compliance-This indicator measures a firm’s record of compliance with environmental regulations. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, fines/sanctions for causing environmental 
damage, and/or violations of operating permits.  
Substantial Emissions-This indicator measures a firm’s emission of toxic chemicals according to data from the 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) database of information on 
toxic chemical releases and waste management activities. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not 
limited to, how the firm compares to its industry peers.  
Climate Change-This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s climate change related 
policies and initiatives. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a history of involvement 
in greenhouse gas (GHG)-related legal cases, widespread or egregious impacts due to corporate GHG emissions, 
resistance to improved practices, and criticism by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and/or other third-
party observers. In addition, factors cover whether a company derives substantial revenues from the sale of coal 
or oil and its derivative fuel products, or whether the company derives substantial revenues indirectly from the 
combustion of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products.  
Negative Impact of Products & Services-This indicator measures the negative environmental impact of a firm’s 
products and/or services. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, products/services that 
involve regulated substances, the production/consumption of hazardous chemicals, and controversial products 
such as those that use genetically modified organisms or nanotechnology.  
Land Use & Biodiversity-This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s use or 
management of natural resources. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a history of 
involvement in natural resource-related legal cases, widespread or egregious impacts due to the firm’s use of 
natural resources, resistance to improved practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party observers.  
Non-Carbon Emissions-This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s non-GHG 
emissions. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a history of involvement in land, air, 
or water emissions-related legal cases, widespread or egregious impacts due to corporate non-GHG emissions, 
resistance to improved practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party observers.  
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Other Concern-This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s environmental impact. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to widespread or egregious environmental impacts, 
resistance to improved practices, criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party observers, and any other 
environmental controversies not covered by other environmental ratings. 
 
Community Strengths    Community Concerns 
Charitable Giving    Community Impact  
Innovative Giving    Operations in Burma  
Non-US Charitable Giving   Operations in Sudan  
Support for Housing    Other Concern  
Support for Education 




Corporate Governance Strengths  Corporate Governance Concerns 
Limited Compensation    High Compensation 
Ownership Strength    Ownership Concern 
Transparency Strength    Transparency Concern 
Political Accountability Strength   Polical Accountability Concern   
Other Strength     Accounting Concern 
      Other Concern  
 
Diversity Strengths    Diversity Concerns 
Female CEO     Workforce Diversity Controversies 
Board of Directors    Board of Directors   
Work/Life Benefits     Representation  
Women & Minority Contracting   Other Concern 
Employment of the Disabled 
Gay & Lesbian Policies 
Other Strength 
 
Employee Relations Strengths   Employee Relations Concerns 
Union Relations     Union Relations   
No-Layoff Policy    Workforce Reductions 
Retirement Benefits Strength    Retirement/Pension Benefits Concern 
Health and Safety Strength    Health and Safety Concern 
Cash Profit Sharing     Other Concern 
Employee Involvement     




Human Rights Strengths   Human Rights Concerns 
Positive Record in South Africa   South Africa Controversies 
Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength  Indigenous Peoples Relations Concern 
Labor Rights Strength    Labor Rights Concern 
Other Strength     Northern Ireland Operations 
      Burma Concern 
      Mexico Concern (labor or environmental) 
Other Concern 
N.B. Most of the indicators in the Human Rights area are measured during a small sub period in the data.  
  
Product quality Strengths   Product quality Concerns 
Quality Program     Product Safety  
R&D/Innovation     Marketing/Contracting Concern  
Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged  Antitrust 
Other Strength     Customer Relations Concern 
      Other 
   







Ownership of an Alcohol Company  




• Products manufactured  
• Gambling technology and support  
• Gambling-related services 
Licensor  
Ownership of a Gambling Company 










Ownership of a Tobacco Company  





Ownership of a Firearms Company  
Ownership by a Firearms Company  
Military 
Conventional Weapons Systems & Components 
Nuclear Weapons Systems & Components  
Chemical and Biological Weapons Systems & Components 
Support Systems and Services  
Ownership of a Weapons company 
Ownership by a Weapons company  
  
Nuclear power 
Nuclear Power Generation 
Essential Suppliers:  
• Builders or designers 
• Suppliers of nuclear-specific key components or essential services 
• Nuclear industry consulting and license renewal services  
• Companies involved in uranium mining, spent fuel processing, and fuel storage 
• Distributors and handlers of nuclear fuel  
• Repair and maintenance  
Ownership of a Nuclear energy company 






Ali, A., X. Chen, T. Yao and T. Yu.  “Do mutual funds profit from the accruals anomaly?”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, 46 (2008), 1-26. 
Amihud, Y. and R. Goyenko. “Mutual fund’s R
2
 as predictor of performance.” Review of Financial Studies, 26 
(2013), 667-694. 
Andreoni, J., and J. Miller. “Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the consistency of preferences 
for altruism.” Econometrica, 70 (2002), 737-753 
Andreoni, J., and L. Vesterlund. “Which is the fair sex? Gender differences in altruism.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 116 (2001), 293-312. 
Angel, J.J. and P. Rivoli. “Does ethical investing impose a cost upon the firm? A theoretical perspective.” 
Journal of Investing, 6 (1997), 57–61. 
Auger, P., P. Burke, T.M. Devinney, and J.J. Louviere. “What will consumers pay for social product features?” 
Journal of Business Ethics 42 (2003), 281-304. 
Bae, K., J. Kang and J. Wang. “Employee treatment and firm leverage: A test of the stakeholder theory of 
capital structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, 100 (2011), 130-253. 
Barber, B. “Monitoring the monitor: Evaluating CalPERS’ activism.” Journal of Investing Winter (2007), 66-80. 
Barney, J.B. “Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage.” Journal of Management, 17 (1991), 99–120. 
Barsky, R., F.T. Juster, M.S. Kimball, and M.D. Shapiro. “Preference parameters and behavioral heterogeneity: 
An experimental study in the Health and Retirement Study.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997), 537-
579.  
Bauer, R., and P. Smeets. “Social identification and investment decisions.” Working Paper (2010), University of 
Maastricht, NL. 
Bebchuk, L., A. Cohen and C. Wang. “What matters in corporate governance?” Review of Financial Studies, 22 
( 2009), 783-827. 
Bebchuk, L., A. Cohen and C. Wang. “Learning and the disappearing association between governance and stock 
returns.” Journal of Financial Economics,108 (2013), 323-348. 
Becchetti, L., and F.C. Rosati. ”Global social preferences and the demand for socially responsible products: 
Empirical evidence from a pilot study on fair trade consumers.” The World Economy 30 (2007), 807-836. 
Benartzi, S., and R.H. Thaler. “Naïve diversification strategies in defined contribution savings plans.” American 
Economic Review 91 (2005), 79-98.  
Benson, K.L., and J.E. Humphrey. “Socially responsible investment funds: Investment reaction to current and 
past returns.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 32 (2008), 1850-1859. 
Bernheim, D.B., D.M. Garrett, and D.M. Maki. “Education and saving: The long-term effects of high school 
financial curriculum mandates.” Journal of Public Economics 80 (2001), 435-465. 
Bernheim, D.B., D.M. Garrett. “The effects of financial education in the workplace: evidence from a survey of 
households.” Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003), 1487-1519. 
181 
 
Bessire, D. and S. Onnée. “Assessing corporate social performance: Strategies of legitimation and conflicting 
ideologies.” Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 21 (2010), 445–467. 
Bollen, N. “Mutual fund attributes and investor behavior.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42 
(2007), 683-708. 
Borgers, A., J. Derwall, K. Koedijk, and J. Ter Horst. “Stakeholder relations and stock returns: On errors in 
investors’ expectations and learning.” Journal of Empirical Finance 22 (2013), 159-175. 
Borgers, A., J. Derwall, K. Koedijk, and J. Ter Horst. “Can investors profit from social tastes? Evidence from 
mutual fund holdings.” Working paper (2014). 
Borgers, A. and R. Pownall. “Attitudes towards environmentally and socially responsible investment.” Journal 
of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 1 (2014), 22-44. 
Calvet, L.E., J.Y. Campbell, and P. Sodini. “Measuring the financial sophistication of households.” American 
Economic Review, 99 (2009a), 393-398.  
Calvet, Laurent E., John Y. Campbell, and Paulo Sodini. “Fight or flight? Portfolio rebalancing of individual 
investors.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (2009b), 301-348. 
Campbell, J.Y. “A variance decompositions for stock returns.” Economic Journal 101, 57-179. 
Campbell, J.Y., C. Polk, and T. Vuolteenaho (2010), “Growth or Glamour? Fundamentals  and Systematic Risk 
in Stock Returns”, Review of Financial Studies 23 (2010), 305-344. 
Carhart, M. “On the persistence in mutual fund performance.” Journal of Finance, 52 (1997), 57–82. 
Chan, L., N. Jegadeesh and J. Lakonishok. “Momentum strategies.” Journal of Finance, 51 (1996), 1681-1713. 
Chava, S. “Environmental externalities and the cost of capital.” (2013) Management Science, forthcoming.  
Chen, I.H., H. Hong, and K. Shue. “Do managers do good with other people’s money?” Working Paper (2013), 
Princeton University. 
Chordia, T., Subrahmanyam, A. and Q. Tong. “Trends in the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns”, 
Working Paper (2012), University of California at Los Angeles. 
Cohen, R. B., P.A. Gompers and T. Vuolteenaho (2002), ”Who underreacts to cash-flow news? Evidence from 
trading between individuals and institutions”, Journal of Financial Economics , 66, 409-462. 
Core, J. R. W. Guay, and T. Rusticus. “Does weak governance cause weak stock returns? An examination of 
firm operating performance and investors’ expectations.” Journal of Finance, 61 (2006), 655–687.  
Cornell, B. and A. Shapiro. “Corporate stakeholders and corporate finance.” Financial Management, 16 (1987), 
5-14. 
Cremers, M., Petajisto, A. and E. Zitzewitz. “Should benchmark indices have alpha? Revisiting performance 
evaluation. (2010), Critical Finance Review, forthcoming. 
Dahliwal, D., O. Li, A. Tsang and Y. Yang. “Voluntary nonfinancial disclosure and the cost of equity capital: 
The initiation of corporate social responsibility reporting.” The Accounting Review, 86 (2011), 59-100. 
DeBondt, W., and R. Thaler. “Does the stock market overreact? Journal of Finance 40 (1985), 557-581. 
Derwall, J., N. Guenster, R. Bauer and K. Koedijk. “The eco-efficiency premium puzzle.” Financial Analysts 
Journal, 61 (2005), 51–63. 
Deng, X., J. Kang, and B.S. Low. Corporate social responsibility and sakeholder value maximization: Evidence 
from mergers.” Journal of Financial Economics (2013) 110, 87-109. 
182 
 
Derwall, J., K. Koedijk and J. Ter Horst. “A tale of values-driven and profit-seeking social investors.” Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 35 (2011), 2137-2147. 
Di Giuli, A. and L. Kostovetsky. “Are red or blue companies more likely to go green? Politics and coporate 
social responsibility.” Journal of Financial Economics (2013), Forthcoming. 
Dimson, E., O. Karakas, and X. Li. “Active ownership” Working Paper (2012), LBS. 
Doukas, J., C. Kim, and C. Pantzalis. “A Test of the errors–in–expectations explanation of the value/glamour 
stock returns performance: evidence from analysts’ forecasts.” Journal of Finance, 57 (2002), 2143-2165. 
Dowell, G., S. Hart and B. Yeung. “Do corporate global environmental standards create or destroy market 
value?” Management Science, 46 (2000), 1059-1074. 
Durand, R.B., S. Koh, and P.L. Tan. “The price of sin in the Pacific-Basin.” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 21 
(2013) 899-913. 
Edmans, A. “Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices.” Journal 
of Financial Economics, 101 (2011), 621-640. 
El Ghoul, S. O. Guedhami, C.C.Y. Kwok and D.R. Mishra. “Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost 
of capital?" Journal of Banking and Finance, 35 (2011), 2388-2406. 
Els, P.J.A. Van, J.W. Van Den End, M.C.J. Van Rooij. “Pensions and public opinion: a survey among Dutch 
households.” De Economist 152 (2004), 101-116.  
Fabozzi, F. J., K.C. Ma, B.J. Oliphant. “Sin stock returns”, Journal of Portfolio Management, 35 (2008), 82–94. 
Fama, E.F. and K.R. French. “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds.”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 33 (1993) 3-56. 
Fama, E.F. and K.R. French. “Disagreement, tastes, and asset pricing.” Journal of Financial Economics, 83 
(2007), 667–689. 
Fauver, L. and M.B. McDonald. “Interntional variation in sin stocks and its effects on equity valuation.” Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 25 (2014), 173-187. 
Galema, R., A. Plantinga and B. Scholtens. “The stocks at stake: Return and risk in socially responsible 
investing.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 32 (2008), 2646–2654. 
Gebhardt, W.R., C.M.C. Lee, and B. Swaminathan. “Toward an implied cost of capital.” Journal of accounting 
research, 39 (2001), 135-176. 
Gollier, C. and S. Pouget. “Asset prices and corporate behavior with socially responsible investors.” Working 
Paper, Toulouse School of Economics (2012). 
Gompers, P., J. Ishii and A. Metrick. “Corporate governance and equity prices.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 118 (2003), 107–155.  
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales. “Trusting the stock market.” Journal of Finance 63 (2008), 2557-2600.  
Hart, S. “A natural-resource-based view of the firm.” The Academy of Management Review, 20 (1995), 986-
1014. 
Heinkel, R., A. Kraus and J. Zechner. “The effect of green investment on corporate behavior.” Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35 (2001), 431–449. 
Hong, H. and M. Kacperczyk. “The price of sin: The effects of social norms on markets”. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 93 (2009), 15-36. 
183 
 
Hong, H. and L. Kostovetsky. “Red and blue investing: Values and finance”. Journal of Financial Economics, 
103 (2012), 1-19. 
Huij, J. and M. Verbeek. “On the use of multifactor models to evaluate mutual fund performance.” Financial 
Management, 38 (2009), 75-102. 
Jiao, Y. “Stakeholder welfare and firm value.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 34 (2010), 2549-2561. 
Kapetanios, G. (2008). “A bootstrap procedure for panel data sets with many cross-sectional units.” The 
Econometrics Journal, 11, 377-395. 
Kempf, A. and P. Osthoff. “The effect of socially responsible investing on portfolio performance.” European 
Financial Management, 13 (2007), 908-922. 
Kempf, A. and P. Osthoff. “SRI funds: Nome nest omen.” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 35 
(2008), 1276-1294. 
Kim, I. and M. Venkatachalam. “Are sin stocks paying the price for accounting sins?” Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Finance, 26 (2011), 415-422. 
King, A. and M. Lenox. “Exploring the locus of profitable pollution reduction.” Management Science, 48 (2002), 
289–99. 
Kumar, A. and J. Page. “Deviations From Norms and Informed Trading,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, Forthcoming, 2011.  
Kumar, A., J. Page, and O. Spalt. “Religious beliefs, gambling attitudes, and financial market outcomes.” 
Journal of Financial Economics 102 (2011), 671-708. 
La Porta, R., J. Lakonishok, A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, “Good news for value stocks: further evidence on 
market efficiency.” Journal of Finance, 50 (1997), 1715–1742. 
Laroche, M., J. Bergeron, and G. Barbaro-Forleo. “Targeting consumers who are willing to pay more for 
environmentally friendly products.” Journal of Consumer Marketing, 18 (2001), 503-520. 
Lim, T. “Rationality and analysts’ forecast bias.” Journal of Finance, 56 (2001), 369-385. 
Liston, D.P. and G. Soydemir. “Faith-based and sin portfolios: An empirical inquiry into norm-neglect vs. 
norm-conforming investor behavior.” Managerial Finance, 36 (2010), 876-885. 
Ljungqvist, A., C. Malloy, and F. Marston. “Rewriting history.” Journal of Finance, 64 (2009), 1935-1960.  
Lo, A.W. and A.C. MacKinlay. "Data-snooping biases in tests of financial asset pricing models." Review of 
Financial Studies, 3 (1990), 431-67.  
Lobe, S. and C. Walkhausl. “Vice vs. virtue investing around the world.” Working Paper University of 
Regensburg (2011). 
Lusardi, A., and O.S. Mitchell. “Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The Role of Planning, Financial Literacy, 
and Housing Wealth.” Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (2007a), 205-224. 
Lusardi, A., and O.S. Mitchell. “Financial literacy and retirement preparedness: Evidence and implications for 
financial education.” Business Economics 42 (2007b), 35-44. 
Lusardi, A., and O.S. Mitchell. “Planning and Financial Literacy: How do women Fare?” American Economic 
Review 98 (2008), 413-417. 
McWilliams, A., and D. Siegel. “Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: Correlation or 
misspecification?” Strategic Management Journal 21 (2000), 603-609.  
Morse, A., and S. Shive. “Patriotism in your portfolio.” Journal of Financial Markets, 14 (2011), 411-440. 
184 
 
Nevins, J.L., W.O. Bearden, and B. Money, “Ethical values and long-term orientation,” Journal of Business 
Ethics, 2007, 71 (3), 261–274. 
Newey, W.K. and K.D. West. “A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent covariance matrix.” Econometrica, 55 (1987), 703-708. 
Nilsson, J. “Segmenting socially responsible mutual fund investors: the influence of financial return and social 
responsibility.” International Journal of Bank Marketing 27 (2009), 5-31. 
O’Loughlin, J. and R. Thamotheram, “Enhanced Analytics for a New Generation of Investor”, Report by 
Universities Superannuation Scheme Ltd, (2006). 
Pastor, L. and R.F. Stambaugh, "Liquidity risk and expected stock returns," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 
111 (2003), 642-685. 
Quandt, R.E. “Tests of the hypothesis that a linear regression system obeys two separate regimes.” Journal of 
the American Statistical Association, 55 (1960), 324-330. 
Renneboog, L., and C. Spaenjers. “Religion, economic attitudes, and household finance.” Oxford Economic 
Papers 64 (2011), 103-127. 
Renneboog, L., J. Ter Horst, and C. Zhang. “Is ethical money financially smart? Nonfinancial attributes and 
money flows of socially responsible investment funds.” Journal of Financial Intermediation 20 (2011), 562-588. 
Richardson, B. “Do the fiduciary duties of pension funds hinder socially responsible investment?” Banking and 
Finance Law Review 22 (2007), 146-201. 
Richardson, B. “Keeping ethical investment ethical: regulatory issues for investing for sustainability.” Journal 
of Business Ethics 87 (2009), 555-572. 
Richardson, B. “From fiduciary duties to fiduciary relationships for socially responsible investing: responding to 
the will of beneficiaries.” Journal of Sustainable Finance and Investment 1 (2011), 5-19. 
Rooij, M.C.J. Van, C.J.M. Kool, and H.M. Prast. “Risk-return preferences in the pension domain: Are people 
able to choose?” Journal of Public Economics 91 (2007), 701-722. 
Rooij, M.C.J. Van, A. Lusardi, and R.J.M. Alessie. “Financial literacy and retirement planning in the 
Netherlands.” Journal of Economic Psychology 32 (2011a), 593-608.   
Rooij, M.C.J. Van, A. Lusardi, and R.J.M. Alessie. “Financial literacy and stock market participation.” Journal 
of Financial Economics 101 (2011b), 449-472. 
Russo, M. and P. Fouts. “A resource-based perspective on corporate environmental performance and 
profitability.” Academy of Management Journal, 40 (1997), 534–59. 
Salaber, J. “The determinants of sin-stock returns: Evidence on the European market.” Working Paper 
University of Bath (2007). 
Schuyt T.N.M., B.M. Gouwenberg, R.H.F.P. Bekkers. “Geven in Nederland 2009; Giften, Nalatenschappen, 
Sponsoring en Vrijwilligerswerk.” Reed Business, (2009), 57-64.  
Schwert, G. "Anomalies and market efficiency." In G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), 
Handbook of the Economics of Finance, ed. 1, Elsevier, (2003), 939-974.  
Shumway, T., (1997). “The delisting bias in CRSP data.” Journal of Finance 41, 579-590. 
Sirri, E.R. and P. Tufano, “Costly search and mutual fund flows.” Journal of Finance, 53 (1998), 1589-1622. 
Sloan, R. “Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings?” The 
Accounting Review, 71 (1996), 280-315. 
185 
 
Statman, M. and D. Glushkov. “The wages of social responsibility.” Financial Analysts Journal, 65 (2009), 33–
46. 
Verwijmeren, P. and J. Derwall. “Employee well-being, firm leverage, and bankruptcy risk.” Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 34 (2010), 956-964. 
Vuolteenaho, T. (2002). “What drives firm-level stock returns?” The Journal of Finance, 57, 233-264. 
Wernerfelt, B. “The resource-based view of the firm.” Strategic Management Journal, 5 (1984), 171–180. 
Zingales, L. “In search of new foundations.” Journal of Finance, 55 (2000), 1623-1653. 
 
